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THE EXPECTATIONS OF CONSUMERS
Douglas A. Kysar*
In the few yearsfollowing promulgation of the Restatement (Third)
of Torts: Products Liability, several courts have reaffirmed their allegiance to the consumer expectations test for product design defect liability,
while rejecting the Restatement's contrary recommendation to adopt a design defect test thatfocuses primarily on technicalfeatures regardingthe risk
and utility of alternativeproduct designs. In this Article, Professor Kysar
reviews the post-Third Restatement decisions, identifying within them a
common failure to articulate a coherent, independent doctrinal role for the
consumerexpectations test, despite the courts' clearly expressed desire to do so.
In Kysar's view, courts adheringto the consumer expectations test are correct
to sense that the reasonable alternative design standard of the Third Restatement offers an inappropriatelyconstrained basis for evaluating product designs. The consumer expectations test that they offer in its place, however, provides only an amorphous and ill-explained doctrinalformulation
that repeatedly seems to collapse into the very Restatement framework that
it purports to reject. Kysar seeks to overcome these failings of the consumer
expectations doctrine by identifying a conceptually distinct, normatively desirable role for the doctrine to play within products liability law: The consumer expectations test should be redirected toward important cognitive and
behavioralphenomena regardingthe manner in which individuals evaluate
risk, phenomena that are not as readily subsumed within the more analytically-rigid risk-utility test.
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INTRODUCTION

The consumer expectations test for design defectiveness has become
products liability's version of the rule against perpetuities: a doctrine
nearly universally reviled but stubbornly and inexplicably persistent.'
Purporting to arise from the venerable section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts,2 the test actually appears to represent a gross misreading
of that section. 3 From this questionable origin, the consumer expectations test rose to prominence during the products liability revolution of
the 1960s and 1970s. Even during the doctrine's heyday, however, academic commentators were expressing reservations about its attempt to
rest product design liability on the simple but essentially formless question of whether a product disappointed the safety expectations of an "or1. The consumer expectations doctrine states that manufacturers are liable for
product-induced harm whenever the product is considered "dangerous to an extent
beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it,
with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics." Giglio v.
Conn. Light & Power Co., 429 A.2d 486, 488 (Conn. 1980) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). Typically, "[w]hether a product is unreasonably dangerous is a
question of fact [about which jury members] . . . . can draw[ I their own reasonable
conclusions as to the expectations of the ordinary consumer and the knowledge common
in the community at large." Id. at 489 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
2. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965) [hereinafter Restatement
(Second) ].
3. See infra text accompanying notes 53-57.
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dinary consumer."4 Indeed, by the 1980s, a consensus view among products liability scholars emerged that the consumer expectations test was
both indefensible in theory and unworkable in practice. 5 In its stead,
scholars advocated the explicit cost-benefit balancing approach of the primary alternative doctrine that courts had developed for determining design defectiveness, the risk-utility test.6 Finally, as products liability entered its fourth decade of confusion concerning the scope and
significance of the consumer expectations test, the American Law Institute appointed Professors Henderson and Twerski, two academic critics
ofjudicial expansion of product manufacturer liability, as co-Reporters of
the ALI's ambitious and important project, the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability.7 When the ALI eventually adopted the results of the
Reporters' prodigious efforts on May 20, 1997, it endorsed a set of blackletter statements that finally and definitively rejected the consumer expectations test as an independent test for product design defect in favor
8
of the more analytically sound risk-utility test.

At least, that was the plan. In the few years following promulgation
of the Third Restatement, however, several courts have issued opinions ex4. See, e.g., W. Page Keeton, Products Liability-Design Hazards and the Meaning of
Defect, 10 Cumb. L. Rev. 293, 310, 312-13 (1979); Gary T. Schwartz, Foreword:
Understanding Products Liability, 67 Cal. L. Rev. 435, 475 n.237, 476 n.241 (1979)
[hereinafter Schwartz, Foreword]; see also Todd v. Societe Bic, S.A., 21 F.3d 1402, 1406,
1409 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Under the Restatement, the consumer [expectations] test was the
only standard authorized to determine whether a product was unreasonably dangerous.
But tort commentators soon began to express dissatisfaction with the test's restrictions on
manufacturer liability.").
5. See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 99, at 699 (5th
ed. 1984) (criticizing consumer expectations test); Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the
Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence,
33 Vand. L. Rev. 593, 611-18 (1980) (warning that consumer expectations test might lead
to "confused, divergent, and unjust decisions"); see also James A. Henderson, Jr.,
Symposium, A Discussion and a Defense of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: ProductsLiability,
8 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 19, 20 (1998) ("If you look at the scholarship prior to 1992 ....
major players in this products liability field almost without exception . . .said consumer
expectations will not work as a mainstream test. It's got to be some form of risk-utility.").
6. As described infra text accompanying notes 47-49, courts have employed two
primary versions of the risk-utility test: one in which the aggregate costs and benefits of the
marketed product design are assessed, and one in which only the marginal costs and
benefits of a proposed alternative design are assessed. The former "macro-balancing"
approach examines the safety and utility tradeoffs of the product as a whole, while the
latter "micro-balancing" approach examines only the tradeoffs posed by a suggested safety
improvement or design alteration to the product. See David G. Owen, Toward a Proper
Test for Design Defectiveness: "Micro-Balancing" Costs and Benefits, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 1661,
1664, 1670-86 (1997) [hereinafter Owen, "Micro-Balancing"].
7. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. (1998) [hereinafter Restatement
(Third)].
8. Specifically, the new Restatement rests design defect liability on a risk-utility
balancing approach in which costs and benefits of a proposed safety improvement to the
product design are weighed in order to determine whether the absence of the
improvement renders the marketed design "not reasonably safe." Id. § 2(b).
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pressing varying degrees of judicial allegiance to the consumer expectations test.9 Indeed, at times they have appeared deeply suspicious of the
ALI Restatement project and its recommendation to abandon consumer
expectations as an independent means for determining product design
liability. These judicial objections are puzzling in light of the aforementioned consensus view among commentators that the consumer expectations test is in one way or another harmful to plaintiffs, defendants, and
the judicial process itself. They are even more puzzling given that, as the
Reporters carefully have explained, judicial opinions that purport to apply the consumer expectations doctrine generally fail in practice to articulate and apply anything other than a veiled risk-utility standard or a
simple res ipsa loquitur-like exception thereunder.' 0 Significantly, even
post-Third Restatement consumer expectations decisions, which profess a
strong desire to retain an independent role for the consumer expectations test, tend to fit this pattern.1' In the view of the Reporters, therefore, continued insistence by courts on portraying the consumer expectations test as something
more than it is gives rise to unnecessary
"rhetorical confusion. ' 12 It perpetuates a "myth that the general standard for defective product design is unsettled and unclear" when in fact
judicial "consensus has been achieved.""'
This Article examines the disjunction between rhetoric and reality in
post-Third Restatement products liability decisions. It aims to demonstrate,
first, that the doctrinal framework established by the Third Restatement is
in fact an accurate representation of design defect litigation despite the
apparent persistence of the consumer expectations test. Courts that retain the consumer expectations doctrine typically express concern that
9. These cases are discussed infra notes 111-124 and accompanying text. They
include: Gen. Motors Corp. v. Farnsworth, 965 P.2d 1209 (Alaska 1998); Potter v. Chi.
Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319 (Conn. 1997); Acoba v. Gen. Tire, Inc., 986 P.2d 288
(Haw. 1999); Hansen v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 764 N.E.2d 35 (IIl. 2002); Delaney v.
Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930 (Kan. 2000); Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 792 A.2d 1145
(Md. 2002); Vautour v. Body Masters Sports Indus., Inc., 784 A.2d 1178 (N.H. 2001);
Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730 (N.Y. 1995); Clark v. Mazda Motor Corp., 68
P.3d 207 (Okla. 2003);Jackson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 60 S.W.3d 800 (Tenn. 2001); Green
v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727 (Wis. 2001).
10. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, The Products Liability
Restatement in the Courts: An Initial Assessment, 27 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 7, 21 (2000)
("[M]ost of the cases cited by courts supporting a consumer expectations test are of [the
res ipsal genre."); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1512, 1528 (1992)
[hereinafter Henderson & Twerski, Proposed Revision] ("[I]n those instances in which
courts differ with respect to doctrine, careful analysis reveals that despite the somewhat
different verbalizations, the core approaches to the underlying problems are remarkably
similar.").
11. See infra Part II.B.
12. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Consensus on Defective
Product Design, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 867, 910 (1998) [hereinafter Henderson & Twerski,
Achieving Consensus].
13. Id. at 872, 919.
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risk-utility analysis imposes an undue burden on injured plaintiffs, particularly when such analysis is read to require demonstration of an alternative product design that would have avoided the plaintiff's harm at a reasonable cost.14 They also worry that the risk-utility test fails to capture the
full spectrum of concerns relevant to products liability law and its goal of
"insur[ing] that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are
borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather
5
than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves.'
As this Article will underscore, despite the force of these critiques, courts
applying the consumer expectations test have offered in the alternative
only an ill-defined doctrinal construction that seems repeatedly to collapse into the very risk-utility framework that the courts claim to reject.
Second, this Article seeks to explain and build upon the puzzling
rhetorical allegiance of courts to the consumer expectations doctrine, ultimately offering a reinvigorated understanding of the doctrine that fulfills its purpose of providing a normatively desirable alternative to the
risk-utility test. As will be seen, the choice between the consumer expectations and risk-utility tests for design defect litigation mirrors current
debates in risk regulation regarding the respective roles of public safety
demands, which often hinge on qualitative aspects of a given health or
safety hazard, and cost-benefit analysis, which tends to abstract away from
such nuances in order to provide a more uniform, ordered assessment of
risks.' 6 Evidence from cognitive psychology and other studies of human
perception and behavior suggest two broad findings. First, the public's
reaction to health and safety hazards often differs markedly from that of
scientists and other expert observers. Second, although much of the divergence between expert and lay modes of risk evaluation may be attributed to factual or cognitive errors on the part of lay observers, a substantial remaining core of divergence seems to flow from the failure of expert
risk-assessment models to accommodate areas of significant, legitimate
public concern. 17 In light of these two findings, this Article concludes
14. See, e.g., Potter, 694 A.2d at 1332; Vautour, 784 A.2d at 1183.
15. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963) (Traynor, J.).
16. Professor Shapo's recent description of the divide among advocates of risk-utility
and consumer expectations analysis helps to illuminate these parallels:
On one side . . . there stand advocates for whom law is basically an exercise in
balance sheets, quantifying hunan production and human injury and making
decisions based primarily, even exclusively, on how the balance comes out. On
the other side is a cadre with a more psychologically oriented view of law, who
emphasize tying legal rules closely to the wellsprings of human behavior.
Marshall S. Shapo, Tort Law and Culture 215 (2003) [hereinafter Shapo, Tort Law and
Culture]; see also id. at 10, 293, 297 (referring to a distinction between 'justice culture"
and "market culture" influences on tort law). The central doctrinal recommendation of
this Article-that the consumer expectations doctrine should be reoriented toward
capturing the ways in which lay risk perceptions systematically differ from expert
assessments-can be seen as an effort to tie "legal rules closely to the wellsprings of human
behavior" in just the manner described by Shapo.
17. See infra Part IV.A.
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that products liability courts should adopt a twin-test approach to design
defect litigation, resting manufacturer liability either on a product's failure to pass risk-utility analysis or on its failure to comport with the firmly
established safety expectations of consumers.1 8 Such a construction
would serve to effectuate important lay risk values that seem unlikely to
register in the more narrowly delineated risk-utility test. At the same
time, the twin-test approach would acknowledge the fallibility of ordinary
consumer perceptions by including risk-utility analysis as an additional,
more technically-oriented standard for determining product manufacturer liability.
In order to prevent the consumer expectations prong of the test
from operating as an amorphous or unprincipled doctrine, as it appears
to have operated in the past, attention should be directed specifically toward the ways in which consumer beliefs about product safety are likely to
depart from the results of risk-utility analysis. More particularly, a products liability plaintiff who fails to present traditional risk-utility evidence
nevertheless should survive summary judgment if she raises a triable question of fact regarding a significant identified aspect of consumer risk perception that is not captured by conventional risk-utility analysis but that is
implicated by the injurious product.' 9 Tying consumer expectations
analysis to the findings of risk perception research in this manner would
eliminate much of the perceived arbitrariness that concerns critics of the
consumer expectations doctrine, while still infusing the test with an independent substantive role.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief overview of
products liability law's half-century struggle to develop an acceptable test
for design defectiveness, beginning with the revolutionary but problematic language of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and
culminating in the Third Restatement's unequivocal rejection of the consumer expectations test.2z 1 Part II then reviews a series of state court rulings issued after the ALI's adoption of the Third Restatement, each of
which expresses some degree of reluctance to abandon the consumer ex18. This is similar to the approach adopted first in California and subsequently
followed in several other states. See infra text accompanying notes 68-72.
19. See infra Part IV.B.
20. For more thorough historical treatment, see generally Richard A. Epstein,
Modern Products Liability Law 9-67 (1980); FrankJ. Vandall, Strict Liability: Legal and
Economic Analysis 1-15 (1989); Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the
Revolution: The Revived Case for Enterprise Liability, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 683, 695-712
(1993) [hereinafter Croley & Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution]; Oscar S. Gray,
Reflections on the Historical Context of Section 402A, 10 Touro L. Rev. 75 (1993);James
A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability Frontier:
The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1263, 1269-72 (1991)
[hereinafter Henderson & Twerski, Closing the Frontier]; Robert L. Rabin, Restating the
Law: The Dilemmas of Products Liability, 30 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 197 (1997); Gary T.
Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort Law,
26 Ga. L. Rev. 601 (1992) [hereinafter Schwartz, Modern American Tort Law]; Schwartz,
Foreword, supra note 4, at 435-41.
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pectations test as an independent means for establishing design defectiveness. Nevertheless, as predicted by the Reporters, the decisions tend to
fit quite comfortably within the doctrinal framework established by the
Third Restatement, despite the courts' proclamations to the contrary.
In light of this expressed desire but general failure of several courts
to articulate a conceptually distinct role for the consumer expectations
test, Part III argues that products liability scholars should reexamine the
much derided doctrine to ascertain what exactly courts are struggling to
accomplish through its retention.2 ' Part III begins that task by reviewing
the positive and normative depictions of consumer behavior that have,
from time to time, appeared in products liability opinions and scholarship. Consistent with earlier criticisms of the consumer expectations test,
these depictions for the most part fail to describe the content and significance of consumer expectations in a manner that is both separable from
risk-utility analysis and suitable for products liability adjudication. Thus,
at least initially, Dean Keeton seems to be correct in his assessment that
"there is no way to avoid a risk-benefit analysis in passing upon designs." 22
Part IV, however, discusses more promising findings that emerge
from cognitive and social psychology, behavioral economics, and other
social science investigations of human behavior and decisionmaking. In
particular, researchers from these fields have uncovered a wealth of
knowledge in recent years concerning the manner in which individuals
perceive and process information regarding health and safety dangers.
As it turns out, lay individuals frequently comprehend such risks in ways
that depart systematically from the approaches that characterize expert
decisionmaking. Although such departures sometimes result from undesirable factual or cognitive errors on the part of individuals, a substantial
remaining core of lay risk perception cannot easily be dismissed as irrational or otherwise lacking foundation. Instead, the research suggests a
form of "rival rationality" on the part of lay observers, coexisting with
expert conceptions of risk and arguably deserving of equal recognition
21. For earlier efforts to explore the positive and normative implications of a
consumer-focused products liability law, see generally Michael D. Bernacchi, A Behavioral
Model for Imposing Strict Liability in Tort: The Importance of Analyzing Product
Performance in Relation to Consumer Expectation and Frustration, 47 U. Cin. L. Rev. 43
(1978); Reed Dickerson, How Good Does a Product Have To Be?, 42 Ind. L.J. 301 (1967);
F. Patrick Hubbard, Reasonable Humnan Expectations: A Normative Model for Imposing
Strict Liability for Defective Products, 29 Mercer L. Rev. 465 (1978); joseph W. Little, The
Place of Consumer Expectations in Product Strict Liability Actions for Defectively
Designed Products, 61 Tenn. L. Rev. 1189 (1994); Paul D. Rheingold, What Are the
Consumer's "Reasonable Expectations"?, 22 Bus. Law. 589 (1967); Marshall S. Shapo, A
Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability
for Product Disappointment, 60 Va. L. Rev. 1109 (1974) [hereinafter Shapo,
Representational Theory]; Aaron D. Twerski, From Risk-Utility to Consumer Expectations:
Enhancing the Role of Judicial Screening in Product Liability Litigation, 11 Hofstra L. Rev.
861 (1983) [hereinafter Twerski, From Risk-Utility to Consumer Expectations].
22. Page Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 St. Mary's L.J. 30, 39
(1973).

HeinOnline -- 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1706 2003

2003]

THE EXPECTATIONS OF CONSUMERS

1707

within legal analysis of health and safety decisions. 23 Part IV therefore
concludes that the consumer expectations test should be redirected toward these important cognitive and behavioral phenomena that are not
as readily subsumed within the rubric of the risk-utility test. Such doctrinal recognition of the ways in which lay risk evaluations differ from those
of experts would help to complement the increasingly technical orientation of products liability law by identifying specific areas in which riskutility analysis is likely to ignore or overlook important product-related
variables. Moreover, because these lay risk values have been well demonstrated in social science experiments, the approach advocated in this Article would help to satisfy the desire of courts to vindicate the interests of
ordinary consumers without entailing the degree of uncertainty and
vagueness in application that previous incarnations of the consumer ex24
pectations doctrine appear to have suffered.
As Professors Henderson and Twerski note, the consumer expectations test is "[t]he only serious alternative" to the risk-utility test. 25 To
date, however, the doctrine has proven a decidedly inferior alternative as
courts and commentators have failed to articulate adequately the doctrine's conceptual foundation, particularly as it relates to the competitor
standard of risk-utility analysis. Properly conceived, a doctrine that seeks
to vindicate the expectations of consumers would be premised on wellsupported, distinctive notions of what it is that consumers actually expect
from the modern marketplace and why it is that those expectations
should ground a standard of liability for design defectiveness. Recent
findings from cognitive psychology and other social science fields have
begun to provide a more nuanced portrayal of individual risk perception,
one that provides a strong substantive foundation for the consumer expectations doctrine. Indeed, if consumer expectations come to be understood from this perspective, then the consumer expectations test will help
to accommodate fundamental value distinctions that exist in the way expert and lay observers think about and react to product risks. In that
manner, the doctrine that refuses to die may yet find a purpose, nearly
fifty years after its accidental birth.
23. See infra notes 272-274 and accompanying text. The phrase "rival rationality"
originates in Howard Margolis, Dealing with Risk: Why the Public and the Experts
Disagree on Environmental Issues 21 (1996) [hereinafter Dealing with Risk]. Some
scholars, including Professor Margolis and more recently Professor Sunstein, have
challenged the claim that risk perception research collectively makes the case for a rival
rationality. This objection is discussed infra Part IV.C-C.1.
24. A recent examination of toxic tort doctrines by Professor Heinzerling and
Cameron Hoffman reflects a similar call to increase tort law's sensitivity to social science
understandings of risk perception. See Lisa Heinzerling & Cameron Powers Hoffman,
Tortious Toxics, 26 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 67 (2001). In their article,
Heinzerling and Hoffman contend that tort law should "decouple the notion of 'risk' and
risk-based harms from numerical probabilities of physical injuries" and instead consult the
"treasure trove of insights relevant to toxic tort law" that emerge from sociological and
psychological understandings of risk. Id. at 68, 76.
25. Henderson & Twerski, Proposed Revision, supra note 10, at 1533.
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THE DESIGN DEFECT TEST DEBATE IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY

The expansion of product manufacturer liability throughout the latter half of the twentieth century stands "among the most dramatic
[changes] ever witnessed in the Anglo-American legal system."'26 At no
point, however, did the expansion in liability reach its logical extreme of
absolute manufacturer liability for all physical harms caused by consumer
products. 2 7 Despite frequent academic support for the establishment of
such a system of "enterprise liability,"2 8 American courts invariably have
stopped short of making the manufacturer bear the personal injury costs
of all product-caused accidents irrespective of fault. As a consequence,
courts have been put to the task of fashioning various doctrinal tests for
ascertaining when a product will be considered "defective" such that its
manufacturer bears responsibility for the costs of ensuing harm.
26. George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the
Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14J. Legal Stud. 461, 461 (1985); see also
William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 Minn. L.
Rev. 791, 793-94 (1966) (describing products liability in the 1960s as "the most rapid and
altogether spectacular overturn of an established rule in the entire history of the law of
torts").
27. See James A. Henderson,Jr., Echoes of Enterprise Liability in Product Design and
Marketing Litigation, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 958, 959 (2002) [hereinafter Henderson, Echoes];
Henderson & Twerski, Closing the Frontier, supra note 20, at 1277; Fleming James, The
Untoward Effects of Cigarettes and Drugs: Some Reflections on Enterprise Liability, 54
Cal. L. Rev. 1550, 1550 (1966); Roger J. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective
Products and Strict Liability, 32 Tenn. L. Rev. 363, 366-67 (1965).
28. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents (1970); Albert A. Ehrenzweig,
Negligence Without Fault (1951); Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, Understanding
Enterprise Liability: Rethinking Tort Reform for the Twenty-First Century (1995); Guido
Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 Yale L.J. 499
(1961); Guido Calabresi &Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81
Yale L.J. 1055 (1972); Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of
Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1787 (1995)
[hereinafter Croley & Hanson, Pain-and-Suffering Damages]; Croley & Hanson, Rescuing
the Revolution, supra note 20; Steven P. Croley &Jon D. Hanson, What Liability Crisis? An
Alternative Explanation for Recent Events in Products Liability, 8 YaleJ. on Reg. 1 (1991);
Mark Geistfeld, Implementing Enterprise Liability: A Comment on Henderson and
Twerski, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1157 (1992); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, The Joint
Failure of Economic Theory and Legal Regulation, in Smoking: Risk, Perception, and
Policy 229, 268-70 (Paul Slovic ed., 2000) [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar, Joint Failure];Jon
D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: A Response to Market
Manipulation, 6 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 259 (2000) [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar,
TBSIII]; Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some
Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1420 (1999) [hereinafter Hanson &
Kysar, TBSII]; Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The
Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 630 (1999) [hereinafter Hanson &
Kysar, TBSI]; Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party Insurance Externality: An
Economic Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 129 (1990); Fleming
James, Jr., General Products-Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without Negligence?, 24
Tenn. L. Rev. 923 (1957). For an illuminating history of the theory of enterprise liability,
see generally Gregory C. Keating, The Theory of Enterprise Liability and Common Law
Strict Liability, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1285 (2001).
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Generally speaking, in those cases when a product fails to comport
with its own intended design-that is, when a "manufacturing defect"
causes the product to depart from the defendant's own standards for the
product line-courts have had little trouble finding liability. 29 When the
product's intended design itself is challenged, however, courts have been
required to engage in a more wide-ranging inquiry to determine whether
the product suffers from a deficiency severe enough to justify imposing
accident costs on its manufacturer. As numerous courts and commentators have noted, this latter task-of determining the proper test for design defectiveness-has been the central issue in products liability law for
the last four decades. 3 0 This Part traces the development of the design
defect test concept from its early twentieth-century origins to its most recent incarnation in the Third Restatement.
A. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A
Products liability law was much simpler prior to Judge Cardozo's
landmark opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.3 : It did not exist.
Before MacPherson, courts generally followed the "privity rule," which
held that a product manufacturer could not be liable in tort to a consumer with whom the manufacturer had no direct contractual relationship.3 2 Because the expansion and modernization of retail markets
meant that few products were being purchased directly from their makers, manufacturers enjoyed wide immunity from injury claims based on
the design and production of consumer products. Judge Cardozo's opin29. See Epstein, supra note 20, at 70.
30. See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 880 (Alaska 1979)
("Design defects present the most perplexing problems in the field of strict products
liability .... "); Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 182 (Mich. 1984) (noting that
design defect presents "the most agitated and controversial" problems in products liability
law); Richard A. Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56 N.C. L.
Rev. 643, 647-49 (1978) (describing judicial confusion in assessing design defects);
Keeton, supra note 4, at 298 n.23 ("The search for the universally acceptable definition of
defect has been the most elusive one in the products liability field."); Little, supra note 21,
at 1190 ("The difficult and politically contentious cases are those that involve allegations of
defective design."); Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products Liability: The ALl
Restatement Project, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 631, 638 (1995) [hereinafter Shapo, The ALl
Restatement Project] ("[A] crucial aspect of products liability law-perhaps the core
concept, if any one idea may be described that way-lies in the definition of defect.");
Marshall S. Shapo, Products at the Millennium: Traversing a Transverse Section, 53 S.C. L.
Rev. 1031, 1033 (2002) ("However divided analysts of products law may be about
definitions, most would agree that the heart of the matter in products liability is the
concept of defect.").
31. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). For an engaging reevaluation of MacPherson, seeJames
A. Henderson, Jr., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company: Simplifying the Facts While
Reshaping the Law, in Torts Stories 41 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds.,
2003).
32. The privity rule is generally traced to the English case of Winterbottom v. Wright,
152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. Ch. 1842). James A. Henderson,Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Products
Liability: Problems and Process 8-9 (4th ed. 2000).
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ion in MacPherson,however, eviscerated this immunity by "put[ting] aside
the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of contract and nothing else."'33 Rather, the duty to prevent foreseeable harms caused by neg'34
ligent conduct, according to Cardozo, emanated directly from "the law"
without regard to the extent or quality of contractual relations between
manufacturer and consumer.
In addition to MacPherson, the New Jersey case of Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc. also provides a key moment in the historical development of products liability law.3 5 By recognizing an implied warranty of
merchantability irrespective of consumer-manufacturer privity, and by refusing to enforce a manufacturer's attempted contractual disclaimer of
such a warranty, Henningsen followed through on the early movement of
MacPherson away from freedom of contract as the exclusive jurisprudential paradigm for product-caused injuries.3 6 Noting the consumer's relative lack of knowledge and control of product safety factors, the pressure
of modern advertising and marketing techniques, and the "gross inequality of bargaining position occupied by the consumer in the automobile
industry," the Henningsen court concluded that safety was simply too important an element of "social justice" to leave entirely to the operations of
the marketplace.3 7 Thus,just as MacPherson earlier had recognized a negligence-based cause of action for injuries caused by defective products,
Henningsen firmly established a warranty-based cause of action for such
injuries.
Finally, Justice Traynor's opinion for the California Supreme Court
in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. took the strict liability concept
underlying warranty law and incorporated it directly into the law of
torts. 38 On the heels of this famous opinion, the ALI released the Restatement (Second) of Torts in 1965. Section 402A of the Second Restatement,
which was to become the most frequently cited section in all of the ALI
33. 111 N.E. at 1053.
34. Id.
35. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
36. Cf. Richard A. Epstein, Torts § 15.2, at 384 (1999) (noting that the "great
expansion in the post-1965 period" of products liability law was "fueled" by early judicial
limitation of the role of contract in injury law).
37. 161 A.2d at 83-87.
38. 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963). Justice Traynor wrote:
Although ... strict liability has usually been based on the theory of an express or
implied warranty running from the manufacturer to the plaintiff, the
abandonment of the requirement of a contract between them, the recognition
that the liability is not assumed by agreement but imposed by law, and the refusal
to permit the manufacturer to define the scope of its own responsibility for
defective products make clear that the liability is not one governed by the law of
contract warranties but by the law of strict liability in tort.
Id. (citations omitted).

HeinOnline -- 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1710 2003

20031

THE EXPECTATIONS OF CONSUMERS

1711

Restatement projects, 39 stated plainly that " [o] ne who sells any product in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer...
is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user
or consumer." 40 Moreover, subsection 2 emphasized that such liability
was strict in nature and did not depend on contractual privity. 4 1 Although Dean Prosser, the chief architect of the Second Restatement and
section 402A, could point only to Justice Traynor's opinion as judicial
authority for these dramatic propositions at the time the Second Restatement was promulgated, 42 within a generation the section43 received nearly
unanimous endorsement throughout the United States.
Several aspects of section 402A merit particular attention. Most notably, although it purports to establish a regime of "strict liability" for
product manufacturers, in fact the section requires demonstration of a
44
"defective condition" in the product to trigger manufacturer liability.
The critical question then becomes, of course, how to define the notion
of product defectiveness. Section 402A does not provide a direct answer
to this question. 45 Courts are advised by the section to apply liability
whenever a product is in a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer, ' 46 but the notions of defectiveness and unreasonable danger do not provide self-executing tests for manufacturer liability. Instead, to give flesh to these concepts, courts over the years have
devised various doctrinal means of assessing the adequacy of product designs. For instance, many courts have utilized some version of costbenefit balancing, often by weighing the seven risk-utility factors identi39. Henderson & Twerski, Proposed Revision, supra note 10, at 1512 n.1; David G.
Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the "Strict" Products Liability Myth, 1996 U. Ill.
L. Rev. 743, 743 [hereinafter Owen, Defectiveness Restated]; see also Little, supra note 21,
at 1189 ("No 'restatement' of the law of torts has been more frequently endorsed by state
courts than Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.").
40. Restatement (Second), supra note 2, § 402A(1).
41. Id. § 402A(2).
42. See Little, supra note 21, at 1189.
43. See Owen, Defectiveness Restated, supra note 39, at 744 ("With a gusto
unmatched in the annals of the Restatements of the Law, courts and legislatures across the
land embraced section 402A and the bold new doctrine that it proclaimed .... " (footnotes
omitted)).
44. Restatement (Second), supra note 2, § 402A cmt. a, cmt. g. Justice Traynor's
opinion in Greenman similarly hinged its revolutionary theory of liability on a finding of
product defect: "A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the
market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect
that causes injury to a human being." Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897,
900 (Cal. 1963). Thus, the strict liability of product injury law never has been truly strict, if
by "strict" one means a system of liability in which the defendant's level of care is
irrelevant. Rather, in addition to duty, causation, and damages, products liability plaintiffs
always have been required to make some showing of inadequacy with regard to the
manufacturer's product, if not its conduct. See Henderson, Echoes, supra note 27, at 959
(noting widespread use of reasonableness standard in determining manufacturer liability).
45. Little, supra note 21, at 1193.
46. Restatement (Second), supra note 2, § 402A(1).
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fled by Dean Wade in his highly influential 1973 article. 47 More recently,
the trend among risk-utility jurisdictions has been to replace the aggregate cost-benefit balancing approach of the Wade test with a more narrow
analysis focusing only on the marginal costs and benefits entailed by particularized safety aspects of the product design, 48 a distinction that Pro49
fessor Owen terms "macro-balancing" versus "micro-balancing.
In contrast to these risk-utility approaches, a significant number of
courts have attempted to fashion their design defect standard for products liability from a notion of consumer expectations that lies within the
comments to section 402A itself.0 Specifically, comment i provides:
"The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which
47. See John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss.
L.J. 825 (1973). Dean Wade's seven factors were:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the user and to
the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will cause injury, and
the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and
not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product
without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its
utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the
product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and
their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious
condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or
instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by
setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.
Id. at 837-38.
48. See Restatement (Third), supra note 7, § 2 cmt. d reporters' note, iI.A.
49. See Owen, "Micro-Balancing," supra note 6, at 1664; see also William C. Powers,
Jr., The Persistence of Fault in Products Liability, 61 Tex. L. Rev. 777, 786 (1983) (noting
that "[ilt is tempting to compare the overall risks and benefits of a product, but the riskutility test is appropriately applied only to the specific feature that allegedly makes the
product defective").
50. It bears noting that commentators differ sharply in their assessments of how
widely the consumer expectations test for design defect has been adopted. Compare John
F. Vargo, The Emperor's New Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns a "New Cloth"
for Section 402A Products Liability Design Defects-A Survey of the States Reveals a
Different Weave, 26 U. Mem. L. Rev. 493, 553, 556-57 (1996) (suggesting a greater
number ofjurisdictions had adopted some form of consumer expectations test than had
adopted the risk-utility test), with Henderson & Twerski, Achieving Consensus, supra note
12, at 911-19 (responding to critics who have asserted that a majority ofjurisdictions use
the consumer expectations test). The debate centers on the question of whether cases
nominally applying the consumer expectations test nevertheless can more properly be
understood as applying risk-utility analysis or a recognized exception thereunder. As
noted infra text accompanying notes 125-142, the Reporters, who argue that consumer
expectations jurisdictions often apply a doctrine that turns out to be conceptually
indistinguishable from more common doctrinal formulations, appear to have the better of
the debate.
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would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with
the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics."'5I Relying on this somewhat ambiguous statement, numerous courts
over the years have hinged the outcome of design defect litigation on the
question of whether a product's failure frustrated the safety expectations
52
of the ordinary consumer.
The most basic problem with resting the consumer expectations doctrine on the comments to section 402A is that the quoted language appears not to have been directed at all toward the task of fashioning a test
for design defectiveness.5 3 Rather, the most likely interpretation is that
the drafters had in mind a type of catastrophic product failure that subsequently has come to be known as a manufacturing defect. 54 At the time
of the drafting of the Second Restatement, manufacturing defect cases dom-

51. Restatement (Second), supra note 2, § 402A cmt. i; see also id. at cmt. g ("The
rule stated in this Section applies only where the product is, at the time it leaves the seller's
hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be
unreasonably dangerous to him.").
52. See, e.g., Lester v. Magic Chef, 641 P.2d 353, 357, 361 (Kan. 1982) (upholding
jury instruction providing that a product is unreasonably dangerous if it is dangerous
beyond the expectations of a consumer with knowledge "common to the community");
Rahmig v. Mosley Mach. Co., 412 N.W.2d 56, 82 (Neb. 1987) (affirming Nebraska's use of
the "user-contemplation" test to determine design defectiveness); Heaton v. Ford Motor
Co., 435 P.2d 806, 809 (Or. 1967) (en banc) ("The jury is supposed to determine the
basically factual question of what reasonable consumers do expect from the product.");
Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 230 N.W.2d 794, 798 (Wis.
1975) ("[T]he test in Wisconsin of whether a product contains an unreasonably dangerous
defect depends upon the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer concerning
the characteristics of this type of product.").
53. See Mary J. Davis, Design Defect Liability: In Search of a Standard of
Responsibility, 39 Wayne L. Rev. 1217, 1232 (1993) ("Neither section 402A nor Greenman
purported to identify a method of imposing strict liability for design defects .... "); James
A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Arriving at Reasonable Alternative Design: The
Reporters' Travelogue, 30 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 563, 572 (1997) ("The simple explanation
for the drafters' reliance on a consumer expectations test in section 402A comments g and
i is that the drafters were not addressing design defect litigation."); John E. Montgomery &
David G. Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort Liability for
Defective Products, 27 S.C. L. Rev. 803, 812-13 (1976) (providing history of the ALl
proceedings leading up to adoption of section 402A and concluding that "failure of a
consumer's expectancy interest" was not intended to be the entire inquiry for determining
product defectiveness); George L. Priest, Strict Products Liability: The Original Intent, 10
Cardozo L. Rev. 2301, 2303 (1989) (concluding that the "founders" of strict products
liability did not countenance liability for design defects in their proposals); Schwartz,
Modern American Tort Law, supra note 20, at 623-24 (noting that "[t]he Second
Restatement adopts, in section 402A, a rule of strict liability that readily applies to cases
involving manufacturing defects," and that Dean Prosser justified the strict liability rule of
section 402A with "the high correlation between manufacturer negligence and
manufacturing defects").
54. See supra text accompanying note 29. The section also was intended to eliminate
the possibility that manufacturers of unavoidably dangerous products such as knives or
alcohol would be subjected to liability. See infra text accompanying note 66.
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inated thinking about the nascent field of products liability. 5 The facts
of Henningsen, in which the steering mechanism of a new automobile
spun wildly out of control just ten days after the vehicle was purchased,
provide a typical example. 56 By hinging liability on the expectations of
the ordinary consumer, the drafters of section 402A recognized that inherent limitations in the manufacturing process sometimes result in severe product failures that neither the consumer nor the manufacturer
expects or desires. To that extent, consumer expectations provide a serviceable means of establishing a defendant's responsibility for injuries
caused by manufacturing flaws. As numerous commentators subsequently have indicated, however, subjecting a manufacturer's intended
product design to the same measure of consumer expectations requires
justification beyond the largely unhelpful Restatement comments. 57 Moreover, as the next section notes, torts scholars for the most part have been
unable to locate any such justification.

55. Richard L. Cupp, Jr. & Danielle Polage, The Rhetoric of Strict Products Liability
Versus Negligence: An Empirical Analysis, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 874, 890 (2002); Davis, supra
note 53, at 1233; James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, What Europe, Japan, and
Other Countries Can Learn from the New American Restatement of Products Liability, 34
Tex. Int'l L.J. 1, 4 (1999) [hereinafter Henderson & Twerski, Europe, Japan]; Aaron
Twerski, From a Reporter's Perspective: A Proposed Agenda, 10 Touro L. Rev. 5, 9-11
(1993).
56. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 75 (N.J. 1960).
57. See Charles E. Cantu, Reflections on Section 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts: A Mirror Crack'd, 25 Gonz. L. Rev. 205, 218 (1990) ("The courts did not
recognize that the test used to determine whether a product was mismanufactured was not
necessarily the appropriate test to determine whether the product was defective due to
error in the designing or marketing process."); David A. Fischer, Products Liability-The
Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. Rev. 339, 345 (1974) (noting that the consumer expectations
test "is sometimes wrongly singled out as the only Restatement test of defect"); Gray, supra
note 20, at 86-88 (observing that section 402A reflected established concepts with regard
to manufacturing defects, but also produced "subsidiary doctrines," such as the consumer
expectations test, that "were confusing because of the verbiage"); James A. Henderson, Jr.,
Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication,
73 Colum. L. Rev. 1531, 1542-44, 1547 (1973) [hereinafter Henderson, Conscious Design
Choices] (distinguishing "manufacturing flaws" from "generically dangerous products" as
more readily justiciable); David G. Owen, The Graying of Products Liability Law: Paths
Taken and Untaken in the New Restatement, 61 Tenn. L. Rev. 1241, 1243 (1994) (stating
that at the time of Second Restatement drafting "the defect concept was only roughly
understood and was conceived of quite naively as a unitary concept; products were either
too dangerous, i.e., 'defective,' or safe enough, i.e., 'nondefective"'). To be sure, the
primary authority for section 402A, Greenman, involved a challenge to the manufacturer's
intended design, rather than a mere manufacturing defect. However, the plaintiff in
Greenman established such a defect by introducing evidence of "other more positive ways of
fastening the parts of the [product] together, the use of which would have prevented the
accident." Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 899 (Cal. 1963). In other
words, the sole strict products liability precedent existing at the time of the drafting of
section 402A relied on the type of evidence typically presented under the risk-utility test,
not the consumer expectations test.
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B. Dissatisfactionwith the Consumer Expectations Test

Not long after courts began to devise a design defect test based on
section 402A's consumer expectations language, academic commentators
began to note the problems inherent in such a project. Most fundamentally, scholars repeatedly have complained that the expectations of consumers provide too amorphous a basis on which to assess manufacturer
liability. As Deans Prosser and Keeton note in their treatise, "The meaning is ambiguous and the test is very difficult of application to discrete
problems .... [As a result, t] he test can be utilized to explain most any

result that a court or jury chooses to reach. ' 58 In a particularly memorable critique of the doctrine's arbitrariness, Professor Gary Schwartz recites a series of ever-shifting automobile marketing messages, querying
whether the extent of a manufacturer's liability really should hinge on
59
the particular message that happens to entice an injured consumer.
These commentators encapsulate the widely held view that consumer expectations provide only the most meager and insufficient guidance to
factfinders charged with the difficult task of assessing the adequacy of a
product design. Indeed, to many observers, the test simply "is so vague as
60

to be lawless."1

58. Keeton et al., supra note 5, § 99, at 699.
59. Schwartz writes:
For several years, [Datsun's] advertising stressed economy through the slogan,
"Datsun Saves." After a well-publicized change of advertising agencies, in
1977-78 Datsun's message became "We Are Driven," suggesting quality and
performance. With inventories swelling in dealers' lots in fall 1978, its advertising
shifted to "We Are Dealing," pointing to temporary low prices. To my mind,
these changes in advertising themes, conspicuous though they are, do notjustif@ a
legal rule that measures Datsun's personal injury liability to its 1976 purchasers by
standards less demanding than those applicable to its 1977-78 purchasers.
Schwartz, Foreword, supra note 4, at 476 n.241; see also Henderson, Echoes, supra note
27, at 988 n.156 (arguing that products liability "cannot rest on the case-by-case reactions
of juries to the hypothesized psychological effects of product advertising").
60. Henderson & Twerski, Achieving Consensus, supra note 12, at 882. For further
criticism of the doctrine, see Bernacchi, supra note 21, at 46 ("The apparent widespread
adoption of [the consumer expectations] standard is form almost void of substance ....");
Henderson & Twerski, Achieving Consensus, supra note 12, at 883 (describing the
consumer expectations test as "almost wholly based on intuition"); Henderson & Twerski,
Closing the Frontier, supra note 20, at 1295 ("[A]s a practical matter, [the consumer
expectations] standard for liability seems almost entirely rhetorical."); James A.
Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Drug Designs Are Different, 111 Yale L.J. 151, 178
(2001) (calling the consumer expectations doctrine "a vacuous, ersatz test that allows triers
of fact to decide drug design claims on nothing more than a fact-finder's whim");
Henderson & Twerski, Proposed Revision, supra note 10, at 1534 ("As numerous courts
and commentators have noted, [the consumer expectations] approach to liability is so
open-ended and unstructured that it provides almost no guidance to the jury in
determining whether a defect existed."); Henderson & Twerski, Europe, Japan, supra note
55, at 19 ("[T]he risk-utility standard for defective design relies less on intuition in its
application than the consumer expectations standard does."); Jane Stapleton, Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability, an Anglo-Australian Perspective, 39 Washburn L.J.
363, 378 (2000) ("In a sense, the consumer expectations test simply gives the fact-finder its

HeinOnline -- 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1715 2003

1716

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 103:1700

Scholars also have made more narrow attacks on the consumer expectations test. For instance, several commentators have pointed out that
the test provides little or no guidance in cases where product-caused
harm befalls bystanders who have neither purchased nor consumed the
product. 61 In such a case, the factfinder is directed to evaluate the product in light of expectations that are likely to be nonexistent. Similarly, for
a great variety of technologically complex products, consumers may not
have formed specific expectations at all with regard to the relevant product features. As Professors Montgomery and Owen observe, in such cases
"the consumer may have at most only a generalized expectancy-perhaps
more accurately only an unconscious hope-that the product will not
harm him if he treats it with a reasonable amount of care. ' 62 To the
extent that consumer attitudes do take this simplistic form ("I expect not
to be harmed by a product"), then the consumer expectations test threatens to become in practice the very standard of absolute manufacturer
liability that no American jurisdiction has appeared ready to accept. 63
An altogether different objection to the consumer expectations test
is that the doctrine too easily can work against plaintiffs under circumstances in which defendant liability might further the instrumental goals
of products liability law. For instance, because consumer expectations
generally derive from impressions of the existing state of the product
marketplace, safety demands of consumers may lag behind technological
improvements in product design whose absence under risk-utility balancing would subject a manufacturer to liability. 64 Similarly, manufacturers
head .... It nakedly invites the fact-finder to use his or her gut instincts to determine the
dispute.").
61. See, e.g., William A. Dreier, Consumer Expectations: A Defective Test for Design
Defects, 10 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 118, 120 (2000); Fischer, supra note 57, at 351; Geraint
G. Howells & Mark Mildred, Is European Products Liability More Protective Than the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?, 65 Tenn. L. Rev. 985, 995 (1998); Abed
Awad, Comment, The Concept of Defect in American and English Products Liability
Discourse: Despite Strict Liability Linguistics, Negligence Is Back with a Vengeance!, 10
Pace Int'l L. Rev. 275, 351 (1998).
62. Montgomery & Owen, supra note 53, at 823; see also Turner v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 851 (Tex. 1979) (rejecting consumer expectations test due to "the
inconclusiveness of the idea that jurors would know what ordinary consumers would
expect in the consumption or use of a product"); Keeton, supra note 4, at 303 (criticizing
"the fallacious assumption that the ordinary purchaser has definite expectations regarding
the dangerousness of the products purchased"); Powers, supra note 49, at 796-97 ("The
vague expectations of consumers probably oscillate between never expecting a product to
injure them ... and actually expecting some products to be 'lemons."'); Wade, supra note
47, at 829 ("In many situations ... the consumer would not know what to expect, because
he would have no idea how safe the product could be made.").
63. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28. Note, though, that a sizable group of
products liability commentators over the years would have viewed such a development
favorably. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
64. See Dickerson, supra note 21, at 314 ("[C]onsumer expectations will lag behind
actual practices, and [therefore] the further extension of safety practices designed to
minimize the consequences of accidents will depend either on direct regulation or on the
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under a consumer expectations test may escape liability for productcaused harm whenever consumers can be said to "expect" the possibility
that such harm will occur. Thus, whenever a product-imposed danger
may be characterized as "open and obvious" to the typical consumer,
plaintiffs may be unable to recover irrespective of whether the manufac65
turer could have eliminated the risk cost-effectively.
Much of the language in section 402A and its comments was in fact
designed to prevent consumers from recovering against manufacturers of
products, such as kitchen knives, alcohol, or cigarettes, that pose unavoidable health and safety risks. 66 Nevertheless, even an unavoidably unsafe
product sometimes can be made marginally less unsafe. By allowing
courts to balance the risks and rewards posed by alternative product designs, the risk-utility test provides manufacturers with incentives to constantly evaluate and adopt such reasonable alternative designs. The consumer expectations test, on the other hand, operates to shield
manufacturers generally from liability to customers who, through experience, education, or otherwise, have come to expect a particular type of
product to pose significant danger. Thus, although plaintiffs' advocates
have been the most vocal opponents of attempts to restrict the use of the
consumer expectations test,6 7 even such consumer-oriented observers
have reason to be concerned about the effects of the doctrine.
Considerations of this sort led the Supreme Court of California in
Barker v. Lull EngineeringCo. to provide a prominent early departure from
consumer expectations as the exclusive means for judging design defectiveness in products liability litigation. 68 The Barker court noted that relying on consumer expectations alone can lead to an underprovision of
safety incentives for product manufacturers, particularly in cases where
consumers lack concrete safety expectations or where product dangers
development of a broader rationale of seller responsibility."); Fischer, supra note 57, at
349-50 (noting that consumer expectations "will not always be in line with what the
reasonable manufacturer can achieve" and therefore manufacturers sometimes "will have
no incentive to improve the safety of products").
65. See Restatement (Third), supra note 7, § 2 cmt. d (noting that some courts have
utilized the consumer expectations test in order to deny recovery to victims of "obvious"
product dangers).
66. See Oscar S. Gray, The Draft ALI Product Liability Proposals: Progress or
Anachronism?, 61 Tenn. L. Rev. 1105, 1107 (1994); Montgomery & Owen, supra note 53,
at 812-13.
67. See, e.g., Philip H. Corboy, The Not-So-Quiet Revolution: Rebuilding Barriers to
Jury Trial in the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 61 Tenn. L. Rev.
1043, 1089 (1994) (noting practical difficulties for plaintiffs in absence of consumer
expectations test); Vargo, supra note 50, at 518-19 (arguing that Restatement's absolute
requirement of a reasonable alternative design "overshadowed" any role it gave to
consumer expectations); cf. John F. Vargo, Caveat Emptor: Will the A.L.I. Erode Strict
Liability in the Restatement (Third) for Products Liability?, 10 Touro L. Rev. 21, 33 (1993)
(suggesting courts should be more sympathetic to the "consumer's viewpoint").
68. 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
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are considered to be open and obvious.6 9 "The flaw in the [consumer
expectations] analysis," in the court's view, was "that it treats such consumer expectations as a 'ceiling' on a manufacturer's responsibility under
strict liability principles, rather than as a 'floor.'"70 To overcome this limitation, the court held that a finding of design defect may result from a
demonstration either that the product failed to perform as safely as an
ordinary consumer would expect under normal operating circumstances,
or that the risks inherent in the product's design outweigh the benefits of
that design. 71 Several jurisdictions over the years have followed Califor72
nia in this twin-test approach.
C. The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2(b)
In light of problems such as those described in the previous section,
the majority of both courts and commentators have favored one form or
another of risk-utility balancing as the controlling test for design defectiveness. 75 At the same time, however, the vaunted language of section
402A has continued to exert a strong but confusing rhetorical influence
on judicial opinions in many jurisdictions.74 Against this background of
increasingly apparent discord and uncertainty in the law of products liability, the ALI in 1992 appointed Professors Henderson and Twerski as
Reporters of a volume of the Restatement (Third) of Torts that was to be
devoted entirely to the field of products liability. 75 Over the next several
years, the Reporters navigated a seemingly endless array of interested observers, commentators, and critics, 76 eventually producing a voluminous,
69. Id. at 451.
70. Id. at 451 n.7.
71. Id. at 455-56. Notably, the Barker court held that the defendant bears the burden
of proof under the second prong of the design defect test; that is, "if the plaintiff
demonstrates that the product's design proximately caused his injury [then] the defendant
[must] establish, in light of the relevant factors, that, on balance, the benefits of the
challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design." Id. at 456.
72. See infra note 123 and text accompanying notes 122-124.
73. See Jane Stapleton, Product Liability 236 (1994) ("By the early 1980s the
inappropriate and unsupportable 'consumer expectations' test had been supplanted in
most US jurisdictions by an approach openly based on balancing a product's costs and
benefits ....").
74. Cf. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Foreword to Restatement (Third), supra note 7, at xvi
('No one can seriously argue that the law of products liability in any jurisdiction has
evolved in a straight line from § 402A of the Restatement Second.").
75. See Henderson & Twerski, Proposed Revision, supra note 10, at 1513. The two
previous incarnations of the Restatement of Torts were issued as self-contained volumes.
76. As an indication of the level of interest generated by the project, consider the
number of academic symposia that have been devoted to the Third Restatement, focusing on
such areas as its substantive content, its drafting process, its implications for the tort reform
debate, and its early reception in the courts. See generally Symposium, The Restatement
(Third) of Torts and the Future of Tort Law, 10 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 2 (2000);
Symposium, Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, Is the Best Defense
Redefining the Offense?, 26 N. Ky. L. Rev. 531 (1999); Symposium, Proving Product Defect
After the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 30 Seton Hall L. Rev. 202
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exhaustively documented study that received the endorsement of the
American Law Institute Council in May of 1997. This section provides a
brief overview of the treatment of design defect litigation in the new
77
Restatement.
Although section 1 of the Third Restatement announces the general
liability of product manufacturers for the costs of defect-induced harm, 78
section 2 begins in earnest the substantive work of the new Restatement.
Reflecting the Reporters' decision to focus on functional criteria necessary to establish liability rather than overly formalistic doctrinal requisites, 7 9 section 2 provides that a product defect can be shown through a
failure in the product's manufacture, design, or accompanying warnings.80 Thus, for the first time, the Restatement recognizes an explicit conceptual distinction between manufacturing flaws and alleged deficiencies
in product design. Significantly, this categorical distinction allows the Reporters to specify a standard for design defectiveness that is unclouded by
language more appropriately restricted to manufacturing defects. As
noted above, the drafters of the Second Restatement, whose emerging understanding of products liability law centered nearly exclusively on manufacturing defects, were not afforded such a luxury.8 1
To establish a defective design under the Third Restatement, plaintiffs
must pass a fairly rigid version of the risk-utility test by showing that "the
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced
or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design."8 2 In
other words, the plaintiff must show that some modified version of the
(1999); Symposium, Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, Is It a Reasonably
Safe Product?, 8 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 1 (1998); Symposium on the American Law
Institute: Process, Partisanship, and the Restatements of Law, 26 Hofstra L. Rev. 567
(1998); Colloquy on Products Liability: Comprehensive Discussion on the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 30 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 197 (1997); Symposium,
Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 21 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 361
(1995); A Symposium on the ALI's Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability, 61 Tenn. L. Rev. 1043 (1994); Symposium, The Revision of Section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts: Occasion for Reform of Products Liability Law?, 10 Touro
L. Rev. 1 (1993).
77. For more thorough introductions to the new Restatement, see generally Hon.
William A. Dreier, Design Defects Under the Proposed Section 2(b) of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability-A Judge's View, 30 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 221 (1997);
James A. Henderson, Jr., Restatement Third, Torts: Products Liability: What Hath the ALI
Wrought?, 64 Def. Couns. J. 501 (1997); Aaron D. Twerski, Inside the Restatement, 24
Pepp. L. Rev. 839 (1997) [hereinafter Twerski, Inside the Restatement].
78. Restatement (Third), supra note 7, § 1.
79. See Restatement (Third), supra note 7, § 1 cmt. a; see also Keith N. Hylton, The
Theory of Tort Doctrine and the Restatement (Third) of Torts, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1413, 1437
(2001) (supporting shift from formal to functional organization in the Restatement, as "a
better sense of the functional similarities among rules should enhance efforts to clarify by
reducing the fragmentation or diffusion of legal concepts").
80. Restatement (Third), supra note 7, § 2.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 54-56.
82. Restatement (Third), supra note 7, § 2(b).
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product would have avoided her injury at a cost that is reasonable in light
of the degree of harm thereby reduced. This definition of design defect,
which was supported by the Reporters in their academic writings prior to
the ALI project, 13 proved controversial during the Restatement drafting
process for at least two reasons. First, many commentators criticized the
explicit rejection of consumer expectations as an independent test for
defectiveness. Second, several scholars and practitioners argued that the
requirement of a reasonable alternative design constitutes an unwarranted evidentiary burden for consumer plaintiffs. 8 4 After all, these critics argued, the law of products liability emerged precisely in response to
the fact that plaintiffs in product injury cases typically have little access to
the information necessary to demonstrate fault on the part of the manufacturer.8 5 Thus, these commentators argued that plaintiffs should be
permitted to proceed under the more flexible "macro-balancing" approach of the Wade test, rather than be required to offer the more demanding level of "micro-balancing" proof required under the reasonable
86
alternative design test.
Although it is too early to fully assess the Third Restatement's impact
on product design litigation, one can observe that the document on its
face appears more sensitive to such concerns than its critics generally admit. For instance, the new Restatement has not rejected entirely the relevance of consumer expectations; rather, it expressly considers the expectations of product users as part of the overall assessment of existing and
83. See, e.g., Henderson & Twerski, Proposed Revision, supra note 10, at 1514
(proposing section 402A revision in which a design defect can be shown only if a product
risk "could have been reduced at reasonable cost by the seller's adoption of a safer
design").
84. Critical appraisals of the products liability Restatement along these lines can be
found in Roland F. Banks & Margaret O'Connor, Restating the Restatement (Second),
Section 402A-Design Defect, 72 Or. L. Rev. 411 (1993); Corboy, supra note 67, at
1092-96; Howard C. Klemme, Comments to the Reporters and Selected Members of the
Consultative Group, Restatement of Torts (Third): Products Liability, 61 Tenn. L. Rev. 1173
(1994); Rebecca Korzec, Dashing Consumer Hopes: Strict Products Liability and the
Demise of the Consumer Expectations Test, 20 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 227 (1997);
Patrick Lavelle, Crashing into Proof of a Reasonable Alternative Design: The Fallacy of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 38 Duq. L. Rev. 1059 (2000); Little, supra note
21, at 1190; JerryJ. Phillips, Achilles' Heel, 61 Tenn. L. Rev. 1265 (1994);Jerry Phillips,
The Proposed Products Liability Restatement: A Misguided Revision, 10 Touro L. Rev.
151, 168-73 (1993); Shapo, The ALl Restatement Project, supra note 30, at 665-75; Vargo,
supra note 50, at 515-19; Marshall S. Shapo, A New Legislation: Remarks on the Draft
Restatement of Products Liability, 30 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 215 (1997) (cataloging
controversies and suggesting Restatement draft failed to take into account considerations
such as the significance of marketing techniques and liability for product categories);
Note, just What You'd Expect: Professor Henderson's Redesign of Products Liability, 111
Harv. L. Rev. 2366, 2381 (1998) [hereinafter Just What You'd Expect].
85. See, e.g., Cronin v.J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1162 (Cal. 1972) ("[Tjhe
very purpose of... [the development of strict products liability] was to relieve the plaintiff
from problems of proof inherent in pursuing negligence .
.
86. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
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alternative product designs. 87 Moreover, as comment b to section 2
makes clear, the reasonable alternative design rule of section 2(b) is by
no means the exclusive test governing design defects. 88 Most notably,
section 3 provides for a res ipsa loquitur-like inference of defect for any
plaintiff able to demonstrate that her injury "was of a kind that ordinarily
occurs as a result of product defect."8 9 Significantly, the res ipsa inference of section 3 can be applied either to design defect scenarios or to
the type of unexpected product malfunctions typically associated with
manufacturing flaws. 90
In addition to section 3's evidentiary relief, plaintiffs relying on
section 2's comment e also may attempt to demonstrate that, irrespective of whether a product could have been replaced by a reasonable
alternative design, the product as actually manufactured and sold has
such "low social utility and high degree of danger" that it constitutes
a "manifestly unreasonable design." 9 1 Although only three courts
appear ever to have held a manufacturer responsible under a theory
similar to that of comment e, 9 2 several have endorsed the concept in
87. See Restatement (Third), supra note 7, § 2 cmt. g; see also id. § 2 cmt. f (noting
that relevant factors under section 2(b) include "the nature and strength of consumer
expectations regarding the product, including expectations arising from product portrayal
and marketing"). In addition, the Third Restatement identifies consumer expectations as
the primary standard for determining whether food products are defective, see id. § 7, and
as the benchmark for deciding whether sellers of used products should be held to the
standards governing new products, see id. § 8.
88. Id. § 2 cmt. b.
89. Id. § 3(a). The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is explained in the proposed Restatement
(Third) of Torts: General Principles as follows: "It may be inferred that the defendant has
been negligent when the accident causing the plaintiffs physical harm is a type of accident
that ordinarily happens because of the negligence of the class of actors of which the
defendant is the relevant member." Restatement (Third) of Torts: Gen. Principles § 15
(Discussion Draft 1999).
90. See Restatement (Third), supra note 7, § 3 cmts. b & c. For instance, comment b
notes that "an aircraft may inadvertently be designed in such a way that, in new condition
and while flying within its intended performance parameters, the wings suddenly and
unexpectedly fall off, causing harm." Id. § 3 cmt. b. In such a case, the trier of fact may
draw the inference that a defect existed, without the plaintiff specifically identifying the
type or nature of the product's defect.
91. Id. § 2 cmt. e. One can think of this provision as offering a sort of "thumb on the
scales" version of the "macro-balancing" approach to design defect.
92. See Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110, 115-16 (La. 1986)
(asbestos); Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143, 1159 (Md. 1985) ("Saturday Night
Special" handguns); O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 306 (N.J. 1983) (aboveground swimming pool). Each of these cases met with fairly swift legislative reversal or
modification. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.56(1) (West 1997) (enacted 1988); Md.
Code Ann., Crim. Law art. 27, § 36-1(h) (Supp. 2002), repealed by 2003 Md. Laws ch. 5
(S.B. 1), WL 2003 MD LEGIS 5 (enacted 1988); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:58C-3.b(3) (West
2000) (enacted 1987) (limiting liability in absence of a reasonable alternative design to
situations in which product is "egregiously unsafe or ultra-hazardous," product offers "little
or no usefulness," and consumers are unaware of the product's risks). The Supreme Court
of Washington has required something very similar to "macro-balancing" in assessing
whether a manufacturer is entitled to invoke the "unavoidably unsafe product" defense of
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dicta 93 and, thus, section 2's comment e exists as an area for possible
94
further development by the courts.
As one can see, the new products liability Restatement attempts to synthesize a significant amount of case law into a single workable framework
for litigation. Although several critics bemoaned its demotion of the consumer expectations test, the Reporters argued persuasively throughout
the drafting process that the actual manner in which courts apply the test,
as a general matter, is functionally indistinguishable from the Third Restatement's doctrinal structure. 9. In the view of the Reporters, courts that
purport to apply a consumer expectations test largely can be grouped
into one of two categories: those that simply cloak a risk-utility test with
consumer expectations language, 96 and those that emphasize consumer
expectations only in the context of product malfunctions that would
equally merit an inference of defect under the Restatement's section 3.97
More specifically, as shown diagrammatically in Figure 1, the Reporters envision a set of defective products in which a small subgroup consists
comment k to section 402A, but plaintiffs still generally must demonstrate a reasonable
alternative design to establish their prima facie case. See Ruiz-Guzman v. Amvac Chem.
Corp., 7 P.3d 795, 800, 804 (Wash. 2000).
93. See, e.g., Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 97 n.8 (Minn. 1987)
("Conceivably, rare cases may exist where the product may be judged unreasonably
dangerous because it should be removed from the market rather than be redesigned.");
Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1328 n.5 (Or. 1978) ("There might be cases
in which the jury would be permitted to hold the defendant liable on account of
dangerous design feature even though no safer design was feasible .... "); Sumnicht v.
Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 360 N.W.2d 2, 17 (Wis. 1984) ("A product may be
defective and unreasonably dangerous even though there are no alternative, safer designs
available.").
94. For reasons advanced prior to their role in the Restatement project, the Reporters
believe that this type of "product category liability" will remain an infrequently used
doctrine. See Henderson & Twerski, Closing the Frontier, supra note 20, at 1297-1328
(arguing that courts are ill-equipped to make the type of comprehensive, multi-factored
judgments required in condemning a consumer product category). Nevertheless, it has
received express recognition in the Third Restatement.
95. Again, Henderson and Twerski expressed a similar view prior to their
appointment as Reporters for the Third Restatement. See, e.g., Henderson & Twerski,
Proposed Revision, supra note 10, at 1528, 1533-34 (concluding that courts "temper[ed]
[consumer expectations] with significant risk-utility balancing").
96. See Restatement (Third), supra note 7, § 2 cmt. d reporters' note, II.C; Twerski,
Inside the Restatement, supra note 77, at 843 n.21 (observing that courts applying
consumer expectations "rarely did so without engaging in some risk-utility balancing").
97. See Restatement (Third), supra note 7, § 2 cmt. d reporters' note, II.C; see also
James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, The Politics of the Products Liability
Restatement, 26 Hofstra L. Rev. 667, 675 (1998) [hereinafter Henderson & Twerski,
Politics] ("When a product fails to perform its manifestly intended function, a court may
impose liability saying that the product failed the consumer expectations test. This version
of the consumer expectations test is nothing more than the traditional rule of res ipsa
loquitur in a products liability setting." (footnotes and citations omitted)); Henderson &
Twerski, Europe, Japan, supra note 55, at 10 ("In almost every instance, the so-called
'other, independent' tests for design defect turn out to be one or another of the
exceptions to [reasonable alternative design] built into the Restatement itself .... ").
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of products whose very manner of malfunctioning reveals obvious, fundamental mistakes in the product. 98 Such cases may consist either of manufacturing defects (e.g., an automobile sold inadvertently without brake
pads) or design defects so obvious in nature as to make precise specification unnecessary (e.g., an automobile sold with brake pads that fail without warning after a single day's use). For these types of res ipsa situations,
the Reporters acknowledge that courts should and do allow the plaintiff
to establish product defect without undertaking a costly inspection of pertinent costs and benefits. 99 Similarly, in those jurisdictions that adhere to
it, the consumer expectations test accommodates this category of products liability litigation by judging the product against a standard-the
safety expectations of consumers-that generally does not tolerate catastrophic and otherwise inexplicable product failure. 100
FIGURE 1:
THE REPORTERS' VIEW OF DESIGN DEFECT CASES

~Reasonable Alternative
Design (§ 2(b))

Res ipsa (§ 3)
(Consumer
Expectations)

98. Although not depicted in Figure 1, allowance also has been made in the Third
Restatement for the possibility of a cause of action premised on a "manifestly unreasonable
design." Restatement (Third), supra note 7, § 2 cmt. e. In addition, the Third Restatement
allows plaintiffs to avoid the reasonable alternative design requirement of the risk-utility
test when a product fails to comply with a relevant product safety statute or regulation. Id.

§ 4.
99. Section 3 of the Third Restatement therefore allows a factfinder to infer the
presence of a design defect whenever "the incident that harmed the plaintiff.., was of a
kind that ordinarily occurs as a result of product defect." Id. § 3. Section 3 also requires
that the incident "was not, in the particular case, solely the result of causes other than
product defect existing at the time of sale or distribution." Id.
100. Similar reasoning explains the Reporters' decision to retain the consumer
expectations standard of liability for adulterated, impure, or otherwise harmful food
products. See id. § 7. In this instance, the Reporters believed that consumer expectations
are sufficiently stable and predictable to provide a coherent standard of defectiveness. Id.
§ 7 cmt. b.
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The Reporters' argument is perhaps best exemplified by California's
twin-test approach to design defect liability. Although it was already evident in Barker,")' the Supreme Court of California subsequently made
clear in Soule v. GeneralMotors Corp. that use of the consumer expectations
prong of the test should be limited to simple, res ipsa-like product failures, and that remaining design defect claims should be determined by
juries with the guidance of expert testimony regarding the risks and benefits of a product's design.1 2 In broad outline, therefore, the Barker test
appears to be functionally compatible with the construction of Figure 1
and the Third Restatement's formulation of design defect.
Conceivably, some remaining courts might apply a consumer expectations doctrine that does not fit within the Reporters' categories of doctrinal equivalency. However, in light of the paucity of their numbers and
the strong academic view that they provide an essentially indecipherable
basis for assessing liability, 103 the Reporters decided against relying on
these courts to recognize the consumer expectations test as "an independent standard for judging the defectiveness of product designs." 10 4 Given
the Reporters' charge to bring much-needed coherence to the law of
products liability, and given the cases and commentaries before them, the
decision to reject consumer expectations as a stand-alone test for design
defectiveness would seem to have been an easy one, which courts would
quickly embrace. As will be seen in Part II, however, despite the careful
reasoning and exhaustive research that went into the Third Restatement, its
promise to harmonize the law of design defect litigation has encountered
some unexpected difficulties.
I.

THE PUZZLING PERSISTENCE OF THE CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS TEST

In most respects, the Third Restatement has been an unqualified success in the courts. For instance, among other issues, the new Restatement
has brought considerable clarity to the questions of how product warnings interact with claims of defective design,' 0 5 whether consumers can
101. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 454 (Cal. 1978) ("Under [the
consumer expectations] standard, an injured plaintiff will frequently be able to
demonstrate the defectiveness of a product by resort to circumstantial evidence, even when
the accident itself precludes identification of the specific defect at fault." (citations
omitted)).
102. 882 P.2d 298, 308 & n.4 (Cal. 1994).
103. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
104. Restatement (Third), supra note 7, § 2 cmt. g.
105. Several courts previously had relied on commentj to section 402A of the Second
Restatement for the proposition that a product bearing an adequate warning cannot be
deemed defective in other respects. See Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products
and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 1193 (1994). Commentj provides: "Where
[adequate] warning is given, the seller may reasonably assume that it will be read and
heeded; and a product bearing such a warning, which is safe for use if it is followed, is not
in defective condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous." Restatement (Second), supra
note 2, § 402A cmt. j. In contrast, comment I to section 2 of the Third Restatement
recognizes that product warnings often are ineffective; therefore, the new Restatement
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recover for damages caused by "open and obvious" dangers, 106 how damages are to be assessed in "crashworthiness" cases,u ° 7 whether manufacturer warning responsibilities continue post-sale,1 8 and whether strict
products liability applies to component part manufacturers that do not
participate in the design or manufacture of a finished product.' 9 Courts
have been less uniformly receptive, however, of the Third Restatement's
reasonable alternative design requirement and its concomitant demotion
of the consumer expectations test to a subsidiary role for purposes of
design defect litigation. Although the Iowa Supreme Court recently embraced the Third Restatement's defective design framework, 1 0 several
other state courts have proclaimed their continued commitment to use of
the consumer expectations doctrine despite the contrary recommendation of the Third Restatement.
Such cases pose a puzzle for products liability scholars: How is one
to explain the dedication ofjudicial authorities to a doctrine that learned
continues to hold manufacturers to the reasonable alternative design standard irrespective
of the presence or adequacy of warnings. Restatement (Third), supra note 7, § 2 crnt. 1.
Several courts already have cited this comment favorably, thereby avoiding a potentially
significant gap in the safety incentives provided to manufacturers by products liability law.
See Hanson & Kysar, TBSI, supra note 28, at 699-704 (discussing Latin's review of
behavioral research and its conclusions about resulting consumer and manufacturer
behavior).
106. See, e.g., Ogletree v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 500 S.E.2d 570, 571-72 (Ga.
1998).
107. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Farnsworth, 965 P.2d 1209, 1212 n.], 1219-20
(Alaska 1998); Lally v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 698 N.E.2d 28, 33, 37-39 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1998); Trull v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 761 A.2d 477, 481, 482 (N.H. 2000);
Poliseno v. Gen. Motors Corp., 744 A.2d 679, 685-89 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000);
Green v. Gen. Motors Corp., 709 A.2d 205, 215-16, 223-24 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1998); Stecher v. Ford Motor Co., 779 A.2d 491, 495-96 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001).
108. See, e.g., Lovick v. Wil-Rich, 588 N.W.2d 688, 694-96 (Iowa 1999); Lewis v.
Ariens Co., 751 N.E.2d 862, 864, 866-67 (Mass. 2001); see also Watkins v. Ford Motor Co.,
190 F.3d 1213, 1219 (11th Cir. 1999).
109. For opinions limiting liability of component part manufacturers, see, e.g.,
Cipollone v. Yale Indus. Prods., Inc., 202 F.3d 376, 379 (1st Cir. 2000); Port Auth. of N.Y. &
N.J. v. Arcadian Corp., 189 F.3d 305, 313-14 (3d Cir. 1999); Cimino v. Raymark Indus.,
Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 334 (5th Cir. 1998); In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab.
Litig., 996 F. Supp. 1110, 1114 (N.D. Ala. 1997); Artiglio v. Gen. Elec. Co., 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d
817, 821-22 (Ct. App. 1998); Ogletree v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 511 S.E.2d 204, 209
n.22 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999); Zaza v. Marquess & Nell, Inc., 675 A.2d 620, 629 (N.J. 1996);
Buonanno v. Colmar Belting Co., 733 A.2d 712, 715-16 (R.I. 1999); Davis v. Komatsu Am.
Indus. Corp., 42 S.W.3d 34, 35, 38, 40-43 (Tenn. 2001).
110. See Wright v. Brooke Group Ltd., 652 N.W.2d 159, 167, 169 (Iowa 2002). In
addition, several jurisdictions have reaffirmed their allegiance to risk-utility analysis
following promulgation of the Third Restatement. See, e.g., Ogletree, 500 S.E.2d at 571;
Banks v. ICI Ams., Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671, 673-74 (Ga. 1994); Lovick, 588 N.W.2d at 699;
Nissan Motor Co. v. Nave, 740 A.2d 102, 117 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998); Estate of Hunter v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 729 So. 2d 1264, 1277 (Miss. 1999); Cavanaugh v. Skil Corp., 751 A.2d
518 (N.J. 2000); Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 902 P.2d 54, 62 (N.M. 1995); Hernandez v.
Tokai Corp., 2 S.W.3d 251, 257 (Tex. 1999); Ford Motor Co. v. Miles, 967 S.W.2d 377, 388
(Tex. 1998); Campbell ex rel. Campbell v. Studer, Inc., 970 P.2d 389, 392 n.1 (Wyo. 1998).
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observers, after considerable deliberation, have concluded is conceptually indistinguishable from the risk-utility test and its recognized exceptions? This Part explores that question, considering whether the courts
issuing these opinions have failed tojustify the existence of the consumer
expectations doctrine, whether the Reporters of the Third Restatement
have overlooked something significant in their reading of the case law, or
whether some other factor altogether explains the puzzling persistence of
the consumer expectations test.
A. Recent Developments
Just one week after the ALI adopted the Third Restatement, the project
suffered its first judicial rebuke.'
Issued on May 27, 1997, the decision
of the Supreme Court of Connecticut in Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool
Co. expressly declined the new Restatement's invitation to abandon the
consumer expectations test.1 2 Writing pointedly about the "substantial
controversy" engendered by the Third Restatement drafting process, the
Potter court set out to demonstrate that the new ALI publication both
misinterpreted the state of existing products liability law and offered normatively unattractive rules in place of that law."1 3 Rather than follow
such a seemingly flawed project, the Connecticut Supreme Court chose
to "continue to adhere to [its] long-standing rule that a product's defectiveness is to be determined by the expectations of an ordinary

consumer."'

14

Other state

high

courts,

including

those of Kansas, 11 5

Wis-

111. See Marshall S. Shapo, Products Liability: The Next Act, 26 Hofstra L. Rev. 761,
761 (1998) [hereinafter Shapo, The Next Act]. Although the case predates formal
adoption of the Third Restatement, mention also should be made of Denny v. Ford Motor Co.,
in which the Court of Appeals of New York declined a suggestion that the doctrines of
negligence, strict liability, and implied warranty of merchantability should be merged into
a single products liability cause of action. 662 N.E.2d 730, 736-39 (N.Y. 1995); see also
Restatement (Third), supra note 7, § 2 cmt. n. The Denny court reasoned that strict
liability and warranty claims in New York do not perfectly overlap because the former relies
on a risk-utility test for determining defectiveness while the latter utilizes a consumer
expectations test. 662 N.E.2d at 736. Thus, the opinion reflects a belief that the consumer
expectations and risk-utility tests are not coextensive in the manner argued by the
Reporters.
112. 694 A.2d 1319 (Conn. 1997).
113. See id. at 1331-32 & n.1l.
114. Id. at 1333.
115. Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930 (Kan. 2000). The Supreme Court of
Kansas went to great lengths to express its disappointment with the Third Restatement when
answering certified questions from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. Although asked
only to clarify the relationship between product safety warnings and claims of defective
product design, the Kansas court determined that "[a] complete answer to this . . .
question involves consideration of Kansas law in relation to the Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 402A and the Restatement (Third) of Torts § 2." Id. at 940. Describing the Third
Restatement as a "harshly criticized" document that went beyond "simply taking a
photograph of the law of the field," the Delaney court strongly rejected the notion that
design defect cases should be resolved according to risk-utility analysis and the reasonable
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consin, 116 New Hampshire," 7 and Maryland,' 1 8 have echoed both the
Potter court's distrust of the products liability Restatement and its strong
desire to retain the consumer expectations standard for design defectiveness. For instance, in Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., the Court of Appeals
of Maryland began its discussion of the Third Restatement by noting that
the project "has attracted considerable criticism and has been viewed by
many as a retrogression, as returning to negligence concepts and placing
a very difficult burden on plaintiffs."' 19 The court briefly acknowledged
the Reporters' view that "the formulation in Restatement (Third), § 2,
represents the majority thinking in the United States," but sharply countered with the claim that this view "represent[s] an unwanted ascendancy
of corporate interests under the guise of tort reform."' 120 Rather than
enter such potentially troubled waters, the Maryland court chose to retain its "existing jurisprudence," which focuses on a range of factors that
12 1
may influence the safety expectations of consumers.
Other courts have chosen to signal their disagreement with the Third
Restatement framework using considerably less charged language. For instance, the Oklahoma Supreme Court recendy indicated continued adherence to the consumer expectations standard for design defect claims
without addressing at all the contrary recommendation of the ALI.122 In
addition, four state supreme courts since 1997 have chosen to retain a
Barker-style twin test for design defect, in which either risk-utility or consumer expectations measures of defect may be employed to demonstrate
alternative design requirement. Id. at 945-46. Rather, the court held that in Kansas,
"whether a design defect in a product exists [must continue to be] determined using the
consumer expectations test." Id.
116. Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727 (Wis. 2001). As with the
Connecticut and Kansas decisions, the opinion in Green took pains to "note that there has
been considerable controversy over the Restatement (Third) of Torts § 2(b)," even going
so far as to quote one commentator's characterization of section 2(b) as "'a wish list from
manufacturing America."' Id. at 751 n.16 (quoting FrankJ. Vandall, Constructing a Roof
Before the Foundation Is Prepared: The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability
Section 2(b) Design Defect, 30 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 261, 261 (1997)). The court stated
that it was "troubled" by these and other aspects of the Third Restatement and concluded
that section 2(b) "is fundamentally at odds with current Wisconsin products liability law."
Id. at 751.
117. Vautour v. Body Masters Sports Indus., Inc., 784 A.2d 1178 (N.H. 2001).
Predictably, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire characterized the Third Restatement
approach as a "rigid" one that had garnered "considerable controversy" during the
drafting process. Id. at 1182-84. Rather than endorse the ALI project, the New
Hampshire court chose to retain its existing test for design defectiveness, which focuses on
the degree of product safety "contemplated by the ordinary consumer." Id. at 1182. As
noted infra text accompanying notes 136-138, however, the New Hampshire court further
defines its consumer expectations test in a manner that expressly commits the factfinder to
risk-utility balancing.
118. Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 792 A.2d 1145 (Md. 2002).
119. Id. at 1154.
120. Id. at 1154-55.
121. Id. at 1159.
122. See Clark v. Mazda Motor Corp., 68 P.3d 207, 209 n.4 (Okla. 2003).
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product defect. 12 - Significantly, despite the Reporters' powerful argument that the Barker approach to design defect is functionally equivalent
to that of the Third Restatement, these courts have preferred the California
formulation to the Third Restatement's res ipsa construction. Thus, even in
the context of the Barker test, which the Reporters cite as perhaps the
clearest demonstration of their point regarding doctrinal equivalency, 24
courts seem unwilling to take the Reporters' bait.
B. The Reporters' Explanation
All told, at least twelve state jurisdictions have announced some measure of disagreement with the Third Restatement's design defect framework. As noted earlier, however, the Reporters' response to such decisions is quite convincing: Most courts that cling to the consumer
expectations test apply it in such a manner that it becomes effectively
indistinguishable from the doctrinal framework applied in many other
125
jurisdictions and in the new Restatement itself.
Ironically, the Potter case provides ample support for the Reporters'
argument. After commenting sharply on the drafting process of the
Third Restatement, the Pottercourt proceeded to outline the state of the law
in Connecticut with respect to design defect litigation. First, the court
noted that a reasonable alternative design requirement such as that imposed by the Third Restatement is inconsistent with the notion that "a jury
may, under appropriate circumstances, infer a defect from the evidence
without the necessity of expert testimony."' 2" Such an inference, of
course, is precisely the type of evidentiary mechanism provided by section
3 of the Third Restatement.'12 7 Second, the Potter court argued that "in
some instances, a product may be in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user even though no feasible alternative design is available."' 2 Again, such a situation seems adequately covered by comment e
to section 2, which expressly contemplates the possibility that "designs of
some products [may be] so manifestly unreasonable, in that they have low
123. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Farnsworth, 965 P.2d 1209, 1220-21 (Alaska 1998)
(refusing manufacturer's invitation to abandon the consumer expectations test); Acoba v.
Gen. Tire, Inc., 986 P.2d 288, 304 (Haw. 1999) (noting that both "consumer expectation"
and "risk-utility" tests are valid ways to establish product defectiveness (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)); Hansen v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 764 N.E.2d 35, 43-46
(11. 2002) (upholdingjury verdict under both consumer expectations test and risk-benefit
analysis); Jackson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 60 S.W.3d 800, 803-06 (Tenn. 2001) (construing
state products liability statute such that "the consumer expectation test is applicable to any
products liability case in which a party seeks to establish that a product is unreasonably
dangerous under Tennessee law").
124. See Restatement (Third), supra note 7, § 2 cmt. d reporters' note, II.D.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 95-102.
126. Potter v. Chi. Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1332 (Conn. 1997).
127. See Restatement (Third), supra note 7, § 3.
128. 694 A.2d at 1332.
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should attach even
social utility and high degree of danger, that liability
29
absent proof of a reasonable alternative design."1
The Potter court then examined the consumer expectations test itself,
conceding quickly that "there may be instances involving complex product designs in which an ordinary consumer may not be able to form expectations of safety."' 3 ° In such cases, the court held that Connecticut
law requires application of a "modified consumer expectation test" that
focuses on "various factors that balance the utility of the product's design
with the magnitude of its risks."' '3 1 Apart from the fact that it treated
evidence of a reasonable alternative design as a factor rather than a requirement in its risk-utility test, it is difficult, if not impossible, to discern
a consequential difference between the Potter court's formulation of the
"modified consumer expectation test" and the doctrinal framework established by the Third Restatement. Just as the Third Restatement requires riskutility balancing in the absence of a res ipsa-like situation, the Connecticut Supreme Court unequivocally mandates that "the jury should engage
in the risk-utility balancing required by our modified consumer expectation test when the particular facts do not reasonably permit the inference
that the product did not meet the safety expectations of the ordinary
32
consumer." 1
As one can see, there is considerable force to the Reporters' argument that "the Connecticut Supreme Court's analysis in Potter is, in actuality, perfectly consistent with this Restatement."'1 3 3 Other post-Third Restatement cases also support the Reporters' argument regarding doctrinal
equivalency, despite their purported adherence to the consumer expectations test. For instance, the Kansas Supreme Court in Delaney accepted
"the validity of risk/utility analysis as a guide in determining the expectations of consumers in complex cases." 13 4 Thus, although the court professed to have reaffirmed Kansas's general adherence to the consumer
expectations test,'3 5 the court actually seemed to embrace the test only in
those simple product defect situations that equally would be treated as res
ipsa-like failures under section 3 of the Third Restatement.
Vautour v. Body Masters Sports Industries, Inc. demonstrates an even
more obvious collapsing of risk-utility and consumer expectations
frameworks. In Vautour, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire expressly
noted that "whether a product is unreasonably dangerous to an extent
beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer is
129. Restatement (Third), supra note 7, § 2 cmt. e.
130. 694 A.2d at 1333.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1334.
133. Restatement (Third), supra note 7, § 2 cmt. d reporters' note, LI.C; see also
1 David G. Owen et al., Madden & Owen on Products Liability § 8:6, at 493 (3d ed. 2002)
("Potter's basic result is sound, but tying the risk-utility prong to consumer expectations
unfortunately sows seeds of confusion for future design defect litigation.").
134. Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 944 (Kian. 2000).
135. Id.
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determined by the jury using a risk-utility balancing test."1 6 Quite literally, then, the expectations of consumers are invoked in name only when
assessing design defectiveness in New Hampshire. Such a rhetorical construction follows the approach taken by numerous pre-Third Restatement
cases. 13 7 Unfortunately, like those earlier decisions, the confusing language of Vautour may lead products liability observers to classify it as a
case that adheres to the consumer expectations test, despite the express
equation of consumer expectations with risk-utility analysis.',,
Finally, even the Halliday court, which resisted the trend to undermine the nominally independent consumer expectations test by incorporating risk-utility analysis, nevertheless failed to identify the affirmative
doctrinal role for which it felt the need to preserve the consumer expectations test. In that case, the Court of Appeals of Maryland declined to
adopt a risk-utility balancing test at the request of a plaintiff whose threeyear-old child had accidentally shot himself with a handgun. ' 3 9 Knowing
that her claim against the manufacturer of the gun would fail under a
consumer expectations test-because "regrettably, [the gun] worked
exactly . . . as any ordinary consumer would have expected it to
work"' 4 0-the mother of the deceased child instead argued that the
handgun was defective because any of several alternative safety designs
would have avoided the death of her child at an acceptable increase in
the cost of the product.14 1 Without a glimmer of self-awareness concerning the tension in its reasoning, the Halliday court refused to accept the
plaintiff's theory of liability because, it argued, adopting the alternative
reasonable design approach of the Third Restatement would "plac[e] a very
difficult burden on plaintiffs."' 42 The court apparently failed to appreciate that its own version of the consumer expectations test resembled an
affirmative defense for product manufacturers, rather than a mechanism
for easing the evidentiary burdens of injured consumers. The Third Restatement, of course, would have permitted the plaintiff to plead her case
based on the proffered design modification.
136. Vautour v. Body Masters Sports Indus., Inc., 784 A.2d 1178, 1182 (N.H. 2001).
137. See, e.g., Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830, 834-35 (Iowa 1978)
("'The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer' . . . . Proof of unreasonableness involves a
balancing process. On one side of the scale is the utility of the product and on the other is
the risk of its use." (citation omitted)); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 542 P.2d 774, 779
(Wash. 1975) ("In determining the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer, a
number of factors must be considered. The relative cost of the product, the gravity of the
potential harm from the claimed defect and the cost and feasibility of eliminating or
minimizing the risk may be relevant .... ").
138. See, e.g., Jerry J. Phillips, Consumer Expectations, 53 S.C. L. Rev. 1047, 1051
(2002).
139. Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 792 A.2d 1145, 1148, 1153-54 (Md. 2002).
140. Id. at 1158.
141. Id. at 1149.
142. Id. at 1154.
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C. Alternative Explanations
As described in the previous section, there is much truth to the Reporters' claim that courts have failed in practice to stake out a conceptually distinct role for the consumer expectations test. Nevertheless, a
number of courts have reacted with palpable hostility to the Reporters'
effort to point out that, in the kingdom of consumer expectations, the
emperor appears to have no clothes. Surprisingly, the opinions of these
courts frequently acknowledge the limitations of the consumer expectations test even as they proclaim allegiance to it. 1 4 Such judicial awareness of the limitations of the consumer expectations test tends to cast
doubt on the Reporters' belief in the "'inexorable inevitability' of the
definitions of defect included in the new Restatement."'1 44 Rather than a
doctrine that eventually will be abandoned as a matter of "pragmatic inevitability,"1 45 the consumer expectations test may have longevity in spite of
its (fully acknowledged) shortcomings. As Professor Hathaway has noted,
such persistence would not be unprecedented or even especially unusual
1 46
in a common law system.
This possibility prompts one to search beyond the view that consumer expectations represent only a temporary way station in the logical
unfolding of risk-utility analysis as the governing standard for design defect. Toward that end, this section considers three alternative explanations for post-Third Restatement persistence of the consumer expectations
doctrine: First, courts may perceive both practical and symbolic advantages to retaining their traditional formulation of the design defect test,
even if the Reporters are correct that the formulation substantially mirrors the Third Restatement framework; second, courts may acknowledge
but accept the ambiguity inherent in the consumer expectations test because they recognize similar failings in the risk-utility test; and third,
given their view that the alternative risk-utility test fails to assure an adequate degree of protection to product users, courts may simply and sincerely be struggling toward an independent role for the consumer expectations test. The latter explanation, which takes courts at face value in
143. For instance, although well cognizant of scholarship criticizing the consumer
expectations test for its ambiguity and shortcomings in application, the Potter court
nevertheless refused to "adopt the requirement that a plaintiff must prove a feasible
alternative design as a sine qua non to establishing a prima facie case of design defect."
Potter v. Chi. Pneumatic Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1333 (Conn. 1997); see also Delaney v. Deere
& Co., 999 P.2d 930, 944 (Kan. 2000) ("Certainly, the consumer expectations test has its
failings.").
144. Henderson & Twerski, Europe, Japan, supra note 55, at 15; see also id. at 14
(arguing that "[plragmatic concerns will inevitably drive a modern industrialized state's
system of products liability in tort to accept the organization of the defect concept
reflected [in the new Restatement]").
145. Id. at 14.
146. See Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern
of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 601, 631-32 (2001) (discussing
tendency of stare decisis in common law system to lock in legal rules).
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their expressed desire to articulate a normatively significant role for consumer expectations analysis, provides the point of departure for Parts III
and IV of this Article, which seek to elucidate just such a role.
1. Rules, Exceptions, and Expressions. Unlike the Reporters' view
depicted in Figure 1, courts in consumer expectations jurisdictions may
believe that the universe of compensable product-caused accidents better
resembles the portrayal in Figure 2, in which the res ipsa/consumer expectations category of accidents forms a much more significant component than it does in Figure 1. On this view, retaining the consumer expectations test as an independent doctrine simply may be a practical
response to the perceived distribution of compensable product-caused accidents.1 47 Risk-utility balancing remains necessary to supplement the
primary test when consumer expectations provide an ill-formed or otherwise inadequate basis for assessing liability (i.e., bystanders, small children, highly complex product failures, open and obvious dangers). However, the consumer expectations test is not construed as a mere exception
to some more general rule of risk-utility. Instead, given the perceived
frequency of its significance in design defect cases, the consumer expectations test is treated as a primary and independent doctrine that some148
times must be supplemented by risk-utility considerations.

147. Cf. Robert C. Casad & Kevin M. Clermont, Res Judicata: A Handbook on Its
Theory, Doctrine, and Practice 39-40 (2001) (suggesting that rules and exceptions, albeit
"logically interchangeable," differ in that rules "constitut[e] a generalfonnulation of inclusion
[establishing] the prima facie reach of the doctrine," while exceptions are "exceptional in
excluding only certain special situations from the doctrine's application"). The Reporters
seem implicitly to discount the significance of the res ipsa-like cases for which they accept
that a consumer expectations test may be appropriate. See Henderson & Twerski, Europe,
Japan, supra note 55, at 17 (describing "the majority of design cases [as those] that do not
involve [res ipsa-like] product malfunctions, violations of safety regulations, or egregiously
dangerous products" (emphasis added)). Other commentators, however, view the
consumer expectations test as "probably the central test for determining a product defect,"
even arguing that the risk-utility test "can be comfortably subsumed under consumer
expectations." Phillips, supra note 138, at 1048. For a similar argument that the proposed
Restatement (Third) of 'orts: Ceneral Principles carries undesirable connotations by treating
various areas of strict liability in tort law as exceptional or anomalous, rather than
competitive with the negligence standard, see Keating, supra note 28.
148. See Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 944, 945 (Kan. 2000) (expressing
conviction that "consumer expectations play a dominant role in the determination of
defectiveness," but also noting "the validity of risk/utility analysis as a guide in determining
the expectations of consumers in complex cases"). By contrast, the Halliday court, which
refused to permit plaintiff's offer of risk-utility evidence to supplement the consumer
expectations doctrine in this manner, seemed to express the view that only the inner circle
of product-caused accidents is worthy of compensation through tort law. See Halliday v.
Sturm, Ruger & Co., 792 A.2d 1145, 1153-54, 1158-59 (Md. 2002).
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AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW OF DESIGN DEFECT CASES
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The choice of doctrinal construction also may be seen to hinge on
the type of judicial error that courts wish to minimize. By treating consumer expectations as an independent means of establishing design defectiveness, the consumer expectations test seems engineered to minimize cases in which designs are erroneously deemed nondefective due to
background assumptions about the limited frequency of res ipsa-like
cases. On the other hand, the Third Restatement, by implicitly deeming res
ipsa-like product failures anomalous or exceptional, seems designed to
minimize cases in which designs are erroneously found to be defective
through overly generous application of the consumer expectations test.
The choice of doctrinal construction therefore rests at least partially on
the policy question of whether one prefers judicial errors to occur in the
149
favor of accident victims or product manufacturers.
With that choice in mind, one can perhaps better understand the
reluctance of some courts to embrace the Reporters' doctrinal framework. After all, the history of products liability jurisprudence is littered
with eloquent paeans to the consumer, whose acquisitive habits are seen
as representing the driving force behind the success of modern capitalism, but whose haplessness and gullibility are seen to require constant
149. Cf. Casad & Clermont, supra note 147, at 41 (noting that the choice between
alternative rule-exception constructions may depend on whether lawmakers prefer
"overinclusion" or "underinclusion" as a policy matter). Courts that refuse to treat
demonstration of a reasonable alternative design as a requirement, rather than just an
element, of the risk-utility test often do so on similar pragmatic grounds. The Vautour
court, for instance, believed that "a requirement of proving a reasonable alternative design
coupled with [the Third Restatement's] broad exceptions will introduce even more complex
issues for judges and juries to unravel." Vautour v. Body Masters Sports Indus., Inc., 784
A.2d 1178, 1183 (N.H. 2001).
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safeguarding by the courts. 1511 While contemporary decisions address
consumers with considerably less condescension, courts nevertheless remain proud of their pioneering role in the products liability revolution
and their commitment to the norm of consumer protection. Recent consumer expectations opinions, for instance, are quick to point out that
section 402A of the Second Restatement "was regarded as an important proconsumer advance"; 15 1 that the court in question was among the firstjurisdictions to adopt section 402A; 15 2 and that section 2(b) of the Third
Restatement appears to depart from this storied tradition by placing an
unacceptable "burden on injured persons."' 1 3
Thus, in addition to the practical considerations described above,
courts also seem concerned about the expressive implications 15 4 of the
Third Restatement, notwithstanding the Reporters' otherwise accurate observation regarding the functional equivalence of doctrinal
frameworks.' 5 5 In other words, demoting consumer expectations to an
explicitly subsidiary role might give rise to the impression that courts
have abandoned their resolve to ensure the fulfillment and protection of
150. See infra text accompanying notes 222-224 (providing quotes to that effect from
seminal products liability decisions).
151. Halliday, 792 A.2d at 1154.
152. See Potter v.Chi. Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1330 (Conn. 1997); Green
v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 736 (Wis. 2001) ("Since 1967, Wisconsin
has adhered to the rule of strict products liability set forth in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts 402A.").
153. Green, 629 N.W.2d at 752; see also Halliday, 792 A.2d at 1154 (noting perception
of the Third Restatement as "a retrogression, as returning to negligence concepts and
placing a very difficult burden on plaintiffs"). In addition, many of the recent opinions
that refuse to endorse the Third Restatement's test for design defect do so only after
engaging in a lengthy, almost self-congratulatory review of the history of products liability
law in the courts. See, e.g., Potter, 694 A.2d at 1327-30 (reviewing history of products
liability from the privity rule to the Third Restatement).
154. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev.
2021, 2024 (1996) (defining the expressive function of law as "the function of law in
'making statements' as opposed to controlling behavior directly").
155. See Stapleton, supra note 60, at 386 (describing the doctrinal ordering of design
defect categories in the Third Restatement as an "example of the Reporters sacrificing
analytical clarity in favor of attempting to 'send messages' through the choice of format for
the Restatement"). The Reporters also appear to appreciate the expressive significance of
how doctrinal categories are framed or presented. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron
D. Twerski, Product Design Liability in Oregon and the New Restatement, 78 Or. L. Rev. 1,
3 (1999) [hereinafter Henderson & Twerski, Oregon] (emphasizing the importance of
introducing exceptions to the reasonable alternative design rule before examining the rule
itself). Indeed, Professor Henderson has reported to the author that a great deal of
thought and debate during the drafting process centered on the question of whether to
label the baseline design defect standard "consumer expectations," but then define the
standard by using the same substantive provisions that ultimately were adopted in the new
Restatement. The Reporters opposed such a move, however, on the ground that it would
perpetuate the same longstanding rhetorical confusion that they were attempting to
transcend.
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consumer expectations in the modern marketplace. A significant number of jurisdictions appear unwilling to risk sending such a message.
2. Risk, Utility, and Ambiguity. In addition to the practical and
symbolic benefits described in the previous subsection, another explanation for the reluctance of some courts to abandon the notion of an independent consumer expectations test may be that these courts perceive as
much ambiguity in the risk-utility doctrine as products liability scholars
do in the consumer expectations test. After all, Judge Learned Hand,
whose opinion in United States v. Carroll Towing Co. provided tort law's
most famous formal expression of cost-benefit balancing for negligence
law,' 56 also held the view that "all such attempts [to quantify the determinants of liability] are illusory, and, if serviceable at all, are so only to
center attention upon which one of the factors may be determinative in
any given situation."1 5 7 If even the foremost originator of risk-utility analysis in tort law found its precision "illusory," perhaps some jurisdictions
continue to adhere to the consumer expectations doctrine simply because they do not see an obviously superior alternative in the risk-utility
test.
Judge Hand's admonition notwithstanding, courts and scholars for
many years appeared to take the analytical clarity of the risk-utility test as
an article of faith, particularly when judged in comparison to a consumer
expectations inquiry. 158 In a prominent 1988 article, however, Professor
Alan Schwartz argued that any doctrine requiring factfinders to balance
product risks against benefits was theoretically flawed.' 59 Because the degree of consumer utility provided by a product design could be ascertained only through highly sophisticated econometric analyses, Schwartz
concluded that the practice of "requiring juries to [derive such figures] is
asking statues to dance.'' 6° Soon thereafter, Professor Viscusi offered an
equally critical examination of the manner in which courts actually apply
risk-utility balancing, concluding that "the increased use of the risk-utility
approach has not been accompanied by a sound articulation of the pro156. 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). The opinion indicated that negligence may be
determined by reference to the following formula: "[I]f the probability [of an accident
occurring] be called P; the injury, L; and the burden [of avoiding the accident], B; liability
depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL." Id.
157. Moisan v. Loftus, 178 F.2d 148, 149 (2d Cir. 1949). In another opinion, Judge
Hand wrote that the negligence determination "always involves some preference, or choice
between incommensurables, and it is consigned to ajury because their decision is thought
most likely to accord with commonly accepted standards, real or fancied." Conway v.
O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940), rev'd, 312 U.S. 492 (1941).
158. See David G. Owen, Risk-Utility Balancing in Design Defect Cases, 30 U. Mich.
J.L. Reform 239, 240 (1997) ("[Flew courts or commentators have attempted to unravel
the mysteries that lie within the various formulations of the balancing equation.").
159. Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis,
97 Yale L.J. 353 (1988).
160. Id. at 388.
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cedures that courts should follow when undertaking the analysis."' 16 ' Instead, courts have developed only a "muddle" of factors that "do[ ] not
2
provide a systematic or coherent framework for assessing liability."'6
Professors Schwartz and Viscusi express concern over the ability of
lay juries to estimate the utility that consumers derive from product designs.'"!- In addition to assessing product design benefits in this manner,
the risk-utility test also requires juries to engage in an instrumentalist assessment of the value of human life and health. That is, in order to engage in a meaningful comparison of the costs and benefits posed by an
alternative product design, factfinders must conceive of the risk of personal injury in a manner that is commensurable with the fiscal costs of
the alternative design. The "micro-balancing" approach of the Third Restatement's reasonable alternative design requirement does help to streamline the design defect equation by narrowing the scope of relevant factors.'" 4 Nevertheless, members of the jury still ultimately must complete
161. W. Kip Viscusi, Wading Through the Muddle of Risk-Utility Analysis, 39 Am. U.
L. Rev. 573, 575 (1990) [hereinafter Viscusi, Wading].
162. Id. at 578.
163. See Schwartz, supra note 159, at 388; Viscusi, Wading, supra note 161, at 593,
612 (implying that expert economic analysis is required to assess consumer benefit, and
noting that "[t] he nature of the information required to undertake a risk-utility assessment
is routinely calculated as part of a regulatory analysis, though it is certainly not the norm in
court cases"). The Reporters demonstrate similar concerns about the ability to quantify
'social benefits" when arguing against risk-utility analysis of a particular product in its
entirety, rather than merely in relationship to some proposed alternative design. See
Henderson & Twerski, Achieving Consensus, supra note 12, at 885. As early as 1965, Judge
Calabresi presaged this concern by noting that
[d]espite Learned Hand's formulation that negligence is a balancing of the
"danger of an activity" against what must usefully be given up to avoid that
danger, it is altogether too clear that a system of fault liability is designed to deal
only with "useless" conduct and not with the more subtle interests involved in
measuring the value and danger of an activity.
Guido Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of
Costs, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 713, 719 (1965). More generally, Professor Shapo observes that
obtaining precise quantitative data on either side of the cost-benefit ledger often will prove
difficult. See Marshall S. Shapo, Principles of Tort Law 82 (2d ed. 2003).
164. Indeed, evidence from psychology appears to bolster the case for requiring
evidence of a reasonable alternative design when undertaking risk-utility analysis. In one
experiment designed to test the role of affective and cognitive factors in decisionmaking,
subjects were asked to state their willingness to pay for one of two music dictionaries. See
Christopher K. Hsee, The Evaluability Hypothesis: An Explanation for Preference
Reversals Between joint and Separate Evaluations of Alternatives, 67 Organizational
Behav. & Hum. Decision Processes 247, 248 (1996). Dictionary A was described as
containing 10,000 entries and being in "like new" condition. Dictionary B was described as
containing 20,000 entries and having a "torn cover." When presented with both options,
subjects favored Dictionary B, presumably because it contained twice the number of entries
as Dictionary A. When presented with only one dictionary, however, those subjects
presented with Dictionary A expressed a higher willingness to pay than subjects presented
with Dictionary B. Id. The number of entries therefore played a much larger role in the
subjects' expressed preferences when they were presented with a context for evaluating it.
See id. at 249-50. Similarly, the Reporters might argue that juries will be much more
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the analysis by weighing relevant monetary costs against the value that
they place on human life and physical well-being, a requirement that in165
troduces considerable variability into the design defect equation.
Indeed, a growing body of empirical evidence suggests thatjuries are
simply unable or unwilling to approach the final step of the risk-utility
1 66
analysis in the tidy, algebraic manner required by economic theory.
capable of evaluating the defectiveness of product designs when they are presented with
alternative designs for comparison. Cf. Paul Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic [hereinafter
Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic], in Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive
Judgment 397, 408 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter, Heuristics and Biases]
(referencing unpublished study showing respondents were more willing to support safety
program described as saving 98% of 150 lives than one described as saving 150 lives with no
other context). Notice, however, that affective factors will not always be as insignificant as
the "like new"/"torn cover" product characteristic in the dictionary experiment. Indeed,
affective dimensions of health and safety risks tend to carry great significance to lay
observers, even when they appear in the presence of readily evaluable actuarial
information. See infra text accompanying notes 258-274. Ideally, therefore, products
liability law should attempt to capture both quantitative and qualitative dimensions of risk
by employing the risk-utility and consumer expectations doctrines as complementary tests
for design defect. See infra text accompanying notes 275-309.
165. Cf. Stephen G. Gilles, On Determining Negligence: Hand Formula Balancing,
the Reasonable Person Standard, and the Jury, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 813, 818-19 (2001)
("[The] facts relating to the Hand Factors only set up the problem; they cannot solve it.
To compare $1,000 with a 1% chance of losing the use of a leg, the decisionmaker must
make a value judgment."); Little, supra note 21, at 1192 n.24 ("Though valuable in analysis
involving quantifiable economic costs, [the risk-utility test] is quickly rendered into
inescapable quagmires of conflicting values when applied in settings involving nonmonetary consequences, such as environmental disputes and disputes over loss of life and
personal injury."); Stapleton, supra note 60, at 379 (arguing that the risk-utility route has
the "same characteristic of impenetrability as the consumer expectations test"-it
"incorporates at its core a subjective judgment[, but] simply provides an elaborately
structured path in getting there").
166. See David A. Hoffman & Michael P. O'Shea, Can Law and Economics Be Both
Practical and Principled?, 53 Ala. L. Rev. 335, 394-407 (2002) (reviewing evidence that lay
citizens refuse to engage in utilitarian balancing in hypothetical tort law decisionmaking
contexts); cf. Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can't Do Well: The Jury's
Performance as a Risk Manager, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 901, 913 (1998) (observing that jurors
seem to have an "ingrained hostility towards rational, mathematical analyses of benefits
and costs in the domain of risk"); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Do People Want Optimal
Deterrence?, 29 J. Legal Stud. 237, 250 (2000) (concluding that "the public will be
skeptical of an effort" to adopt the economist's model of optimal deterrence for setting
punitive damages because it "could be widely perceived as unfair and wrong"); W. Kip
Viscusi, The Challenge of Punitive Damages Mathematics, 30 J. Legal Stud. 313, 314-15
(2001) (reporting evidence that mock jurors imposed punitive damages based on their
sense of appropriate punishment rather than the level calculated to achieve "optimal
deterrence" according to the economic model of punitive damages); W. Kip Viscusi,
Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 547, 552-59 (2000) (presenting
experimental evidence that jurors award higher punitive damages in fact settings in which
corporate actors perform explicit, monetized cost-benefit balancing of human safety and
products cost). In light of such evidence, Professor Gilles has advocated the use of 'juryfriendly Hand Formula instructions," that is, jury instructions that emphasize cost-benefit
balancing only "as a gloss on how reasonable people make decisions about accident
avoidance." Gilles, supra note 165, at 860-61.
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Rather, lay jury members seem to exhibit behavior that is consistent with
a deontological moral outlook in which human life is not viewed as properly subject to instrumentalist trading against inferior competing interests. 16 7 To be sure, judges facing summary judgment motions may be
better situated to conform to the risk-utility model, given their repeated
exposure to the relevant decisionmaking context. Nevertheless, evidence
suggests thatjudges are subject to many of the same human impulses and
cognitive predilections that affect lay individuals, including the reluctance to reduce personal injury risk tradeoffs to a simple economic costbenefit formula.' 68 Of course, such tradeoffs must and do occur at least
implicitly on a daily basis, but as psychologist Philip Tetlock explains,
nominal adherence to the proposition that life has infinite value serves
69
important social purposes that advocates of risk-utility analysis ignore.
In this sense, the reluctance of consumer expectations jurisdictions to
accept the stark instrumentalist balancing of risk-utility analysis may re-

167. Such behavior is consistent with psychological research regarding "taboo tradeoffs," in which individuals steadfastly refuse to make explicit comparisons between "sacred"
categories, such as human life, and "secular" categories, such as monetary profit. See Alan
Page Fiske & Philip E. Tetlock, Taboo Trade-offs: Reactions to Transactions that
Transgress Spheres ofJustice, 18 Pol. Psychol. 255, 256 (1997); Philip E. Tetlock et al., The
Psychology of the Unthinkable: Taboo Trade-Offs, Forbidden Base Rates, and Heretical
Counterfactuals, 78 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 853, 854 (2000) [hereinafter Tetlock et
al., The Psychology of the Unthinkable]; Philip E. Tetlock et al., Revising the Value
Pluralism Model: Incorporating Social Context and Context Postulates, in The Psychology
of Values 25, 36-37 (Clive Seligman et al.eds., 1996).
168. See W. Kip Viscusi, How Do Judges Think About Risk?, I Am. L. & Econ. Rev.
26, 43 (1999) (reporting that with respect to an empirical survey of judges, "in situations
involving personal injury, there is a much greater willingness to undertake repairs and
impose punitive damages than in situations involving property damage even though the
expected economic losses are the same in each instance"); id. at 59 ("Judges' application
of negligence rules became much more out of line with standard law and economic
prescriptions once substantial nonpecuniary damages were involved."); W. Kip Viscusi,
Jurors, Judges, and the Mistreatment of Risk by the Courts, 30 J. Legal Stud. 107, 114-15
(2001) (noting that judges are much more likely to impose punitive damages where harm
consists of injury to person than where harm consists of injury to property).
169. Tetlock writes:
The guiding idea is that our commitments to other people require us to deny that
we can compare certain things quantitatively. To transgress this normative
boundary, to attach a monetary value to one's friendships or to one's children or
to loyalty to one's country, is to disqualify oneself from certain social roles, to
demonstrate that one does not have the faintest idea of what it means to be a true
friend or parent or scholar ("Youjust don't get it"). We experience constitutive
incommensurability whenever treating values as commensurable subverts one of
the values in the trade-off calculus; to compare is to destroy. Merely thinking
about certain trade-offs degrades one's standing as a moral being.
Philip E. Tetlock, Intuitive Politicians, Theologians, and Prosecutors: Exploring the
Empirical Implications of Deviant Functionalist Metaphors, in Heuristics and Biases, supra
note 164, at 582, 596.
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flect an understanding that, although the description of life and limb as
'
priceless is nonsense, it is "useful nonsense. "170
Recent work by pioneering cognitive psychologist Paul Slovic concerning the critical role played by "affect" in individual cognition casts
further doubt on the ability of risk-utility analysis to provide a neat, stepwise solution to product design defect claims. 17' In light of the apparently powerful influence exerted by affect on cognition, a growing number of researchers are coming to view human thought according to a
dual-process model, in which individuals rely both on a deliberative, analytical system of reasoning and on an impressionistic, emotional, or experiential system. 172 The latter is driven by intuitive, affective reactions to
stimuli, while the former operates according to conscious, deliberative
processes of problem solving and information analysis. Neither system
appears to hold exclusive dominion over human motivations and actions.
Instead, the two systems seem to operate more or less concurrently, with
affective tags providing a quick, nontaxing means for responding to most
daily experiences, and cognitive reasoning standing in for more complex
73
or unfamiliar tasks.
The significance of the affect research for products liability and the
risk-utility test centers on the way in which affective and cognitive processing systems appear to interact. Specifically, affect has been shown to exert a strong influence over individual perceptions and understandings of
both risk and utility. 174 For instance, Slovic's well-known research on the
170. See Christopher H. Schroeder, Clear Consensus, Ambiguous Commitment, 98
Mich. L. Rev. 1876, 1911 (2000) (book review) (noting that "[e]mbracing the pricelessness
of life constitutes a 'useful nonsense' . . . 'precisely because we constantly must act in ways
that cause that value to be jostled and compromised by competing values"' (quoting
George Will, "Life is Priceless" is Useful Nonsense, in Suddenly: The American Idea
Abroad and at Home 1986-1990, at 204, 206 (1990))).
171. For an overview, see Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, supra note 164, at 397.
The concept of affect can be thought of as a "specific quality of 'goodness' or 'badness' (1)
experienced as a feeling state (with or without consciousness) and (2) demarcating a
positive or negative quality of a stimulus." Id. A vivid example of affect can be
experienced by considering one's reaction to the word "hate." Even before the formal
meaning associated with the term is processed, the mind has experienced a distinctly
negative sensation. The word has been coded previously with a negative affect that is
called to mind and experienced almost instantaneously upon reading it. Id.
172. See Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human
Brain (1994); Seymour Epstein, Integration of the Cognitive and Psychodynamic
Unconscious, 49 Am. Psychologist 709, 714 (1994); Thomas Gilovich & Dale Griffin,
Introduction-Heuristics and Biases: Then and Now, in Heuristics and Biases, supra note
164, at 1, 16 (noting consensus emerging around the "two-systems" view of mental
processing underlying heuristics and biases research); Steven A. Sloman, Two Systems of
Reasoning, in Heuristics and Biases, supra note 164, at 379, 379-96 (gathering evidence
for and discussing a dual-processing model ofjudgment and decisionmaking).
173. See Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, supra note 164, at 400.
174. For evidence regarding the role of affective inputs for individual preferences,
consider a study in which researchers asked participants to review Chinese characters and
their English meanings. David K. Sherman & Heejung S. Kim, Affective Perseverance:
The Resistance of Affect to Cognitive Invalidation, 28 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 224
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psychometric paradigm of risk' 75 demonstrates that individuals' perceptions of risk are strongly correlated with feelings of dread, a concept that
contains obvious affective dimensions. A subsequent study shows that
both perceived risk and perceived benefit are driven substantially by the
degree to which a stimulus item is associated with a generally positive or
negative affect. 176 Being associated with a positive affect tends to cause
an activity to appear of high benefit and low risk; conversely, a negative
affect coding causes an activity to appear of low benefit and high risk.
Rather than assessing risk and benefit as separate factors, individuals
seem to assess an activity or object through a sort of gestalt evaluation in
which determinations of risk and benefit are both inversely related and
influenced substantially by prior affective impressions. 177 As Slovic notes,
this research "implies that people base their judgments of an activity or a
technology not only on what they think about it but also on what they feel
78
about it.'
(2002). Half of the characters were described as having positive meanings (e.g., beauty),
and half negative (e.g., disease). When researchers asked the study participants to express
which characters they preferred, they selected characters associated with positive meanings
over 70% of the time. Researchers then told participants that the Chinese characters
actually had different, neutral meanings (e.g., desk). Participants were again asked to state
their preferred characters and, despite the apparent change in meaning associated with
the characters, their responses did not differ markedly from previous evaluations. As
Slovic describes, this study demonstrates that "affect [can be] a strong conditioner of
preference." Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, supra note 164, at 401. While the
meanings associated with the characters originally appeared to play a role in establishing
subjects' preferences, once the characters had been coded with positive affect, subsequent
changes in substantive meaning had little effect.
175. This research is described infra Part W.A.
176. Ali Siddiq Alhakami & Paul Slovic, A Psychological Study of the Inverse
Relationship Between Perceived Risk and Perceived Benefit, 14 Risk Analysis 1085 (1994).
177. Slovic and his collaborators also have tested whether information about an
activity designed to manipulate affect would alter individual perceptions of the activity's
risk or benefit accordingly. Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, supra note 164, at 412
(reporting results of study on influence of affective processes on toxicologists' judgments
of risks). As predicted, information designed to demonstrate high benefit resulted in
perceptions of low risk, while information suggesting low risk caused perceptions of high
benefit. Conversely, information designed to suggest low benefit resulted in perceptions of
high risk, while information suggesting high risk caused perceptions of low benefit. A still
more recent study by Slovic and colleagues found a less significant correlation between
perceived risk and benefit when subjects were urged to "'take as much time as desired"' in
evaluating stimulus items. The overall inverse pattern remained, however. Melissa L.
Finucane et al., The Affect Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and Benefits, 13 J. Behav.
Decision Making 1, 8 (2000).
178. Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, supra note 164, at 410-11. Indeed,
experiments designed to suppress affective inputs reveal that the quality of subjects'
decisionmaking for certain tasks actually suffers when they are required to think
systematically about the pros and cons of a decision. See, e.g., Timothy D. Wilson et al.,
Introspecting About Reasons Can Reduce Post-Choice Satisfaction, 19 Personality & Soc.
Psychol. Bull. 331, 337-38 (1993); Timothy D. Wilson & Jonathan W. Schooler, Thinking
Too Much: Introspection Can Reduce the Quality of Preferences and Decisions, 60 J.
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 181, 190-91 (1991). Similarly, evidence from neuroscientist
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The foregoing research findings suggest that efforts to cordon off
separate notions of "risk" and "utility" for products liability analysis may
be unsuccessful or even misconceived. Rather than existing as independent, stable concepts, the attributes of "risk" and "utility" appear both to
interact with each other in complex ways, and to be grounded substantially on the same underlying bed of affective reactions. 179 The risk-utility
problem therefore becomes polycentric, its variables interdependent. To
be sure, one could attempt to objectify the notion of risk, in the manner
that expert hazard assessment models do. 180 But one still would face the
complication that utility for hazardous products or activities is significantly affected by perceived risk. At bottom, individuals appear to care
about the total bundle of attributes presented by a potential hazard. Attempts to decouple "utility" for balancing purposes therefore may not
lead to especially meaningful judgments. Indeed, Slovic's research on
the interaction between affect and perceptions of risk and benefit may
help to explain the fact that many experimental subjects appear to resist
instrumentalist risk-utility balancing altogether. 18 1

Antonio Damasio and colleagues suggests that risky decisionmaking is impaired among
patients who suffer from neurological abnormalities that block affective reactions. See
Damasio, supra note 172, at 34-79; Antoine Bechara et al., Deciding Advantageously
Before Knowing the Advantageous Strategy, 275 Science 1293, 1293 (1997). This finding
may stem in part from the fact that the level of risk aversion that an individual experiences
is heavily affect-driven. See George F. Loewenstein et al., Risk as Feelings, 127 Psychol.
Bull. 267, 273-74 (2001). Decisionmaking under uncertainty therefore becomes
rudderless when the affective processing system is damaged, suppressed, or otherwise
impaired.
179. As Slovic puts it, "the neural and psychological substrate of utility" appears to
consist in no small part of affect, while affect simultaneously appears to be a strong
conditioner of perceptions and evaluations of risk. Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic,
supra note 164, at 420. Consider, for instance, the fact that experimental subjects were
willing to pay two times as much to insure a clock described as a beloved antique than to
insure an identical clock for which "[one does not] have any special feeling." Christopher
K. Hsee & Howard C. Kunreuther, The Affection Effect in Insurance Decisions, 20J. Risk
& Uncertainty 141, 150-52 (2000). In both cases, subjects were told that the insurance
would provide $100 on the claim, not restoration of the lost item. Apparently, then, $100
provided more utility to a person who had lost a beloved clock than to one who had lost an
identical, nondescript clock. Cf. Croley & Hanson, Pain-and-Suffering Damages, supra
note 28, at 1814-15 (comparing utility a person derives from money, "irrespective of that
individual's overall well-being, [and] the utility the individual derives from money with
reference to how well off, as a general matter, that individual is").
180. Even this solution would need to grapple with the fact that results similar to
those described in the text have been obtained among expert as well as lay observers. See
Yoav Ganzach, Judging Risk and Return of Financial Assets, 83 Organizational Behav. &
Hum. Decision Processes 353, 358-59 (2002) (stock analysts); Slovic et al., The Affect
Heuristic, supra note 164, at 412 (reporting results of earlier study) (toxicologists); Paul
Slovic et al., Violence Risk Assessment and Risk Communication: The Effects of Using
Actual Cases, Providing Instruction, and Employing Probability Versus Frequency Formats,
24 Law & Hum. Behav. 271 (2000) (psychologists and psychiatrists).
181. See supra notes 166-170 and accompanying text.
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The Reporters argue that "[n]o industrial colossus could function
without a comprehensible standard for defective design."' 82 As this subsection demonstrates, however, both formulations of design defectiveness
in American products liability law seem destined to result in a fair
amount of uncertainty in application. In light of such vagaries, courts
that retain the consumer expectations test may do so simply because they
do not believe that the risk-utility test provides a clearly preferable alternative. After all, the consumer expectations test asks a largely factual
question regarding the level of safety that the "ordinary consumer" expects a particular product to provide. 8 1 The risk-utility test, on the other
hand, contemplates a multi-factored analysis of competing product designs followed by an instrumentalist query that appears fundamentally inconsistent with the moral intuitions and cognitive processes of wide segments of the population, including many judges. 18 4 Given such a choice
182. Henderson & Twerski, Politics, supra note 97, at 682. For a contrary argument
that vagueness in legal rules is desirable under certain circumstances because it promotes
"customized compliance," see Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, The Vagueness of Limits and
the Desired Distribution of Conducts, 32 Conn. L. Rev. 451 (2000).
183. Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 435 P.2d 806, 809 (Or. 1967).
184. Yet another element of uncertainty plagues the risk-utility test. As the Reporters
indicate, the elimination of one product risk through a safety improvement often is
accompanied by one or more new risks that are generated by the alternative design. See
Restatement (Third), supra note 7, § 2 cmt. f ("It is not sufficient that the alternative
design would have reduced or prevented the harm suffered by the plaintiff if it would also
have introduced into the product other dangers of equal or greater magnitude."). Thus,
in order to "evaluat[e] the reasonableness of a design alternative, the overall safety of the
product must be considered." Id.; see also Crespo v. Chrysler Corp., 75 F. Supp. 2d 225,
228 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting that risk-utility analysis requires "not simply that the
manufacturer could have designed the product so that it would not have caused the
victim's injuries, but also that doing so would not have rendered the product more-thanoffsettingly unsafe for other relevant users"); James A. Henderson, Jr., Extending the
Boundaries of Strict Products Liability: Implications of the Theory of the Second Best, 128
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1036, 1037-38 (1980) (arguing that consumers may shift to even riskier
substitute products or services when products liability raises the cost of a particular
activity); J. Gregg Miller, Jr., Comment, Risk Homeostasis and California Design Defect
Products Liability: Rethinking the Consumer Expectations and Risk-Benefit Tests, 32
U.S.F. L. Rev. 587, 588 (1998) (discussing implications for products liability law of
consumers' tendency to increase risky behavior in response to safety measures).
However, as commentators from the environmental law and risk regulation disciplines
have noted, this type of risk-risk analysis is extremely costly and difficult to conduct. In
order to analyze alternative product designs comprehensively, factfinders must be
prepared to consider not only the new risks that may be posed by a design, but also the
many other secondary effects that the design may create, including risks that are
eliminated other than those that specifically harmed the plaintiff, functional advantages or
disadvantages of the alternative design, and changes in the aesthetic desirability of the
redesigned product. Restatement (Third), supra note 7, § 2 cmt. f. Such a comprehensive
analysis is not only dauntingly complex to conduct, but also is subject to considerable
manipulation by parties who strategically highlight only those ancillary effects that support
their preferred outcome.
Douglas A. Kysar, Some Realism About Environmental
Skepticism: The Implications of Bjorn Lomborg's The Skeptical Environmentalist for
Environmental Law and Policy, 30 Ecology L.Q. 223, 259-61 (2003) [hereinafter Kysar,
Some Realism]; see also Richard A. Epstein, The Risks of Risk/Utility, 48 Ohio St. L.J. 469,
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of imperfect doctrines, some courts simply may prefer the former brand
of uncertainty to the latter.
3. An Independent Role for Consumer Expectations? One important
doctrinal reason for consumer expectations courts to object to the Third
Restatement framework is that the res ipsa inference provided by section 3
seems to be merely that, an inference. Although the Restatement does not
address the issue definitively, it seems likely that defendants may attempt
to rebut a section 3 inference with evidence that no reasonable alternative design exists that could have avoided the product-caused harm at an
acceptable cost.1 85 Under the consumer expectations test, on the other
hand, such rebuttal evidence would be largely beside the point.'8 6
This objection helps to sharpen the focus of the conceptual debate
between supporters and opponents of the consumer expectations test.
The question of whether defendants may attempt to rebut the consumer
expectations showing only becomes pressing if there is a class of cases in
which the consumer expectations test would find liability while the riskutility test would not.187 In other words, if the universe of compensable
476 (1987) (warning that "the ingenuity of lawyers should never be doubted," and that
"[w]hat starts out as a faithful application of the utilitarian calculus ends up as an
unprincipled battle of the experts").
185. To be sure, it is difficult to imagine the circumstances under which a defendant
would be able to prove that, although a product failed under manifestly unreasonable
circumstances, it nevertheless constituted the best design alternative available. Such a
showing would essentially require proving a negative. Perhaps for this reason, the
Reporters did not think it necessary to resolve whether the defendant may rebut the
section 3 inference by offering proof of the type required under section 2(b)'s reasonable
alternative design standard. At any rate, courts seem to equate section 3 with res ipsa
loquitur in practice, given the obvious conceptual linkages between the doctrines. See
Myrlak v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & NJ., 723 A.2d 45, 56-57 (N.J. 1999) (noting that "the
historical antecedent to Section 3 of the Restatement is traceable to the negligence
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur" and that "Section 3 of the Restatement in a products liability
case does precisely what res ipsa loquitur does in a negligence context").
186. See Arena v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580, 585 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1998) (noting that a defendant may not rebut a consumer expectations showing "with
evidence of the design's relative risks and benefits"); Henderson & Twerski, Closing the
Frontier, supra note 20, at 1295 (" [S] ince the consumer-expectations rationale stands as an
independent basis for liability separate and apart from risk-utility, the defendant would not
be absolved of liability even upon establishing that an alternative design would have been
more dangerous than the one actually used." (citation omitted)); Schwartz, Foreword,
supra note 4, at 472 n.217 ("Given the finality under Barker of a negative consumer
expectation finding, . . . it is clear that Barker's consumer expectations test cannot be
regarded as merely a res ipsa approach to risk-benefit."); Twerski, From Risk-Utility to
Consumer Expectations, supra note 21, at 906 ("If, instead, the plaintiff could recover on a
strict liability theory grounded on the doctrine that when a product fails in normal use,
liability attaches because it disappoints consumer expectations, there would be no rebuttal
on the basis of risk-utility evidence."); Twerski, Inside the Restatement, supra note 77, at
845 ("[T]here is a vast difference between utilizing the consumer expectations test as a
black-letter test for defect and using it in the context of res ipsa. The former is a clear-cut
liability rule, the latter is an inference of defect that the defendant can rebut.").
187. See Henderson & Twerski, Proposed Revision, supra note 10, at 1533 n.25
(noting that "[t]he acid test determining whether liability will attach based on consumer
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product-caused accidents fits either the depiction of Figures 1 or 2, then
whether the defendant is allowed to rebut the consumer expectations
showing is irrelevant, given that no litigation outcome in theory would be
altered by changing the doctrine.' 8 8 On the other hand, if the backdrop
of products liability litigation resembles Figure 3, in which the consumer
expectations test does in fact capture cases that are not reached by the
risk-utility test, then courts have legitimate reason to be concerned about
the practical distinction between a res ipsa inference and an independent
formulation of the consumer expectations test.' 9 On this account, some
normatively desirable settings for manufacturer liability would become
lost if defendants were allowed to rebut the consumer expectations showing by using evidence from the altogether different category of risk-utility
analysis. 191
Thus, putting aside the practical and symbolic interests served by
treating the consumer expectations test as a nominally independent doctrine, '1l the most fundamental question to be addressed by courts and
products liability scholars is whether consumer expectations ever can result in a finding of manufacturer liability under circumstances that the
risk-utility test would not (but that still would serve the normative goals of
products liability).' 92 In order to answer this question, one must address
an issue that courts heretofore have failed to confront with sufficient
expectations alone asks whether, if the product met risk-utility norms, liability could be
separately established based on failed consumer expectations").
188. But see supra Part II.C.1 (describing practical and symbolic reasons why courts
may favor construction of the consumer expectations test as an independent doctrine).
189. Cf. Ray v. BIC Corp., 925 S.W.2d 527, 531 (Tenn. 1996) (noting that the
consumer expectations and risk-utility tests are "neither mutually exclusive nor mutually
inclusive").
190. This might be the concern of jurisdictions that have reaffirmed their allegiance
to the Barker test rather than adopting the Third Resatenent formulation, particularly in
light of their frequent refusal to limit application of the consumer expectations prong to
simple, res ipsa-like product malfunctions. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Farnsworth, 965 P.2d
1209, 1220-21 (Alaska 1998) (refusing manufacturer's invitation to abandon consumer
expectations test or, in the alternative, to limit application of test to simple product
failures); Hansen v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 764 N.E.2d 35, 44-45 (Ill.
2002) (declining
to hold that consumer expectations test was inappropriate for assessing a medical device);
Jackson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 60 S.W.3d 800, 803-06 (Tenn. 2001) (refusing to hold that
risk-utility factors must displace consumer expectations for certain types of product
failures).
191. See supra Part II.C.I.
192. The Reporters clearly answer this question in the negative. They write:
[n]o substitute exists in non-res ipsa cases for a full presentation of evidence that
addresses such factors as the magnitude and probability of foreseeable risks of
harm, the instructions and warnings that accompany the product, and the relative
advantages and disadvantages of the product as designed and as it alternatively
could have been designed.
Henderson & Twerski, Politics, supra note 97, at 678 (emphasis added); see also Keeton,
supra note 4, at 304 ("[The only way to evaluate the design of a product is to weigh the
danger inherent in the way the product was designed with the utility of that design."
(emphasis added)).
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FIGuRE 3:

CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS AS A STAND-ALONE DESIGN DEFECT TEST
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clarity: What precisely are the theoretical bases of the consumer expectations test? As is well recognized, the competitor test of risk-utility analysis
can be grounded firmly in economic theory.1 1- By measuring the marginal costs and benefits posed by alternative product designs, the risk-utility
test seems to ensure that manufacturers face legal incentives to maximize
consumer welfare. The consumer expectations test, on the other hand,
purports to effectuate the safety expectations of the ordinary consumer,
but generally fails to explain how those expectations are to be ascertained
or, indeed, why they should be vested with adjudicatory significance.
The court's opinion in Potter demonstrates this problematic indeterminacy. According to the court,
the relevant factors that a jury may consider [under the consumer expectations test] include ... the usefulness of the product, the likelihood and severity of the danger posed by the design, the feasibility of an alternative design, the financial cost of
an improved design, the ability to reduce the product's danger
without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive, and
of spreading the loss by increasing the product's
the feasibility
94
price.1
Of these factors, only the first ("the usefulness of the product")
seems intuitively to be the subject of consistent consideration by consumers in their everyday market interactions. The second factor ("the likeli193.
(arguing
pursuing
194.

Cf. Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1J. Legal Stud. 29, 32-34 (1972)
that cost-benefit balancing formulations of negligence law can be seen as
economic efficiency).
694 A.2d 1319, 1333-34 (Conn. 1997) (emphasis omitted).
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hood and severity of the danger posed by the design") also may be an
item of contemplation by consumers, but generally only for cases in
which the dangers posed by a product for one reason or another have
become salient to consumers.19 5 In contrast, the remaining factors comprising the Potter court's consumer expectations test seem to have little if
any relevance to the behaviors, beliefs, and decisionmaking processes
that characterize the ordinary consumer. Rather, they seem to represent
the ordinary engineer cum actuary cum economist.
One is left then with a sense that either the consumer expectations
test must devolve in practice into risk-utility analysis, as the Potter opinion
demonstrates, or that the area occupied independently by the consumer
expectations test is, as the critics argue, so vague and indeterminate as to
render continued adherence to the test outside of the res ipsa context
untenable.' 9 6 The remainder of this Article, therefore, attempts to ascertain whether the consumer expectations test can be placed on a more
solid theoretical base. Assuming, in other words, that Figure 3 does represent the appropriate conception for design defect litigation, how are
courts and commentators to describe and understand the content of the
consumer expectations sphere of liability? If sufficiently concrete, analytically independent substance can be identified (or placed) within that
sphere, then the consumer expectations test might finally provide the important alternative to risk-utility analysis that its purveyors are struggling
to identify.
III.

EXISTING CONSUMER DEPICTIONS WITHIN PRODUCTS LIABILITY

The emergence of products liability law reflected a concern among
judges that the interests of consumers were not receiving adequate expression in modern product markets. 19 7 Similarly, the steadfast opposition of many courts to the Third Restatement design defect standard seems
to reflect a concern that risk-utility analysis fails to adequately express certain significant health and safety interests of consumers. The consumer
expectations standard offered as an alternative to risk-utility analysis, however, has appeared thus far as an amorphous, almost unprincipled doctrine, leaving one to wonder what exactly it is that courts are aiming to
capture through its application. To begin answering that question, this
Part considers several accounts of consumer behavior that have been or
could be offered as conceptual foundations for the consumer expectations test. As will be seen, existing depictions of consumer behavior tend
to vacillate between extremes of descriptively weak but parsimonious theoretical models, and descriptively rich but indeterminate cultural accounts, with neither approach providing a wholly satisfactory basis on
195. See Hanson & Kysar, TBSIII, supra note 28, at 324-70.
196. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
197. See Marshall S. Shapo, Products Liability and the Search forJustice 26-29 (1993)
[hereinafter Shapo, Search for Justice].
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which to conduct products liability litigation. Accordingly, Part IV moves
beyond these existing depictions of consumer beliefs and behaviors to
identify a new, conceptually distinct role for consumer expectations analysis within products liability law, one that aspires to be both theoretically
tractable and descriptively attractive.
A. Consumer as Sovereign
Perhaps the most widely influential academic account of consumer
behavior has been the neoclassical economic portrayal of individuals as
rational calculators seeking an optimal mix of goods and services in the
marketplace. Professor Viscusi provides a concise introduction to this
consumer sovereignty vision: "In idealized market situations, the unconstrained choices of consumers, coupled with the provision of goods in the
marketplace by competitive firms, lead to efficient outcomes as consumers select the bundle of goods they most prefer." 198 This section describes more fully the economic understanding of consumer behavior
and examines its implications for the consumer expectations doctrine in
products liability law.
In its strongest form, the consumer sovereignty viewpoint denies any
role to regulators in product markets, assuming instead that competition
will ensure the satisfaction of consumer preferences or, at least, that it will
do a better job than can be accomplished by government interlopers. 199
In the products liability arena, this robust conception of consumer sovereignty appears in the work of scholars who advocate judicial enforcement
of liability disclaimers and deference to market-derived product safety
standards. 20 0 Indeed, deep faith in the ability of consumers to maximize
their welfare counsels a fairly wholesale abandonment of products liability law. 20 1
A more cautious form of the consumer sovereignty account views
government actors as market referees, intervening in markets only as necessary to ensure their structural integrity. Professor Pitofsky articulates an
important expression of this view in his famous article on consumer pro198. W. Kip Viscusi, Using Warnings to Extend the Boundaries of Consumer
Sovereignty, 23 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 211, 212 (1999).
199. As Professors Cayne and Trebilcock write, "In few circumstances ... should
[legal] rules attempt to protect the consumer from an assumed inability to make rational
purchasing decisions ....
Controlling effect should generally be given to the will of the
market participant rather than to the dictates of the legislator." David Cayne & M.J.
Trebilcock, Market Considerations in the Formulation of Consumer Protection Policy, 23
U. Toronto L.J. 396, 409 (1973).
200. See Croley & Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution, supra note 20, at 715-35
(reviewing products liability scholarship of Peter Huber, Richard Epstein, George Priest,
and Alan Schwartz and noting their general trust in market forces to optimally regulate
consumer product safety).
201. See W. Kip Viscusi, Reforming Products Liability 63 (1991) [hereinafter Viscusi,
Reforming] ("If [the] market ideal was generally applicable, there would be no need for
social risk management institutions such as products liability or regulatoiy agencies.").
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tection: "[P]rotection of consumers ... should not be a broad, theoretical effort to achieve Truth, but rather a practical enterprise to ensure the
existence of reliable data which in turn will facilitate an efficient and reliable competitive market process." 20 2 Translated into the products liability context, courts on this account should impose liability on product
manufacturers only if some significant failure in the marketplace renders
consumer decisionmaking unreliable. Within law and economics literature, the most commonly cited ground for intervention by courts in product markets consists of informational failures that prevent consumers
from adequately understanding and appreciating product health and
20 3
safety hazards.
A number of theoretical presuppositions lie behind this consumer
sovereignty account. First, the individual, rationally pursuing self-interest
through the satisfaction of ordered preferences, is taken to be the appropriate unit of theoretical analysis. One need not ask whether various
forms of market activity serve the "collective good," for no such entity
exists. 2°14 In a related manner, the consumer sovereignty viewpoint holds
that social welfare generally is maximized by allowing individual consumers to pursue their private preferences unimpeded by government regulation or other forms of collective control. 9 15 Finally, the consumer sover202. Robert Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation of
Advertising, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 661, 671 (1977).
203. See Viscusi, Reforming, supra note 201, at 64 ("For the most part ....
the chief
inadequacy of the market is inadequate risk information."). In general, under a legal
economic approach, informational remedies to market failures are favored because they
"still leave consumers free to make their own choices." Howard Beales et al., The Efficient
Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J.L. & Econ. 491, 513 (1981); see also Alan
Schwartz, Unconscionability and Imperfect Information: A Research Agenda, 19 Can. Bus.
L.J. 437, 441 (1991) ("Often the best remedy is a plain-language law, to make the contract
readable, or a disclosure scheme, whereby consumers are given the information requisite
to making a rational decision."); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets
on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev.
630, 666-68 (1979) (arguing that substantive regulation, in contrast to informational
strategies, harms consumers by restricting market choice). In the products liability
context, however, manufacturer liability for product defects is generally seen as necessary
to supplement informational remedies, in light of both the manufacturer's superior ability
to identify and guard against many product hazards and the consumer's tendency to
ignore or discount information provided in product warnings. See Restatement (Third),
supra note 7, § 2 cmt. a; Latin, supra note 105, at 1198, 1287.
204. As former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher famously put it, "there is no
such thing as society." M.M. Slaughter, Fantasies: Single Mothers and Welfare Reform, 95
Colum, L. Rev. 2156, 2191 n.150 (1995) (book review).
205. See W.H. Hutt, Economists and the Public 257 (1936) (describing the influence
of consumer demand on the ends of production as "the social control which maximizes
liberty and justice"). Professor Hutt is generally credited with coining the phrase
"consumer sovereignty." See Joseph Persky, Consumer Sovereignty, J. Econ. Persp., Winter
1993, at 183, 183-84. The themes lying behind the consumer sovereignty vision, however,
have a much longer pedigree. See, e.g., Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and
Causes of the Wealth of Nations 625 (Edwin Cannan ed., The Modern Library 1937)
(1776) ("Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production; and the interest of
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eignty framework tends to treat the development, content, and integrity
of consumer preferences as exogenous factors. As a result, consumer
preferences appear as largely unexamined desires that enter the theoretical account of consumer behavior independent of cultural context, in20 6
cluding the markets within which they are satisfied.
The foregoing analysis has a number of implications for design defect litigation. To begin with, the consumer sovereignty norm provides
an aspirational focus for products liability law in general and the consumer expectations test in particular: Courts should design rules of products liability to address situations in which market forces cannot be relied
on to ensure the fulfillment of consumer safety demands. The goal of
products liability law therefore should be to hold manufacturers to the
level of safety that consumers would demand through market choices if
they were adequately informed about product risk characteristics. In this
regard, the consumer expectations test can be seen as a continuation of
the contractual, warranty-based tradition of products liability law. Product users are entitled to the benefit of the hypothetical safety bargains
that they would have struck with manufacturers, given a more textbook
market setting. 20 7 The underlying normative claim, of course, is that bargaining, whether real or hypothetical, maximizes social welfare.
Nevertheless, despite the normative focus provided by the consumer
sovereignty account, it is not clear that the construct provides a basis on
which to distinguish the consumer expectations test from risk-utility analysis. In neoclassical economic theory, consumer decisionmaking generally is conceived of in a manner that closely resembles the cost-benefit
balancing of the risk-utility test. Consumers are believed to assemble a
"bundle of goods" by constantly trading their monetary and other economic resources for higher-valued items. Ideally, an array of offerings
confronts the typical consumer within any given product category, each
presenting a different blend of safety, functional, aesthetic, and price
characteristics. The consumer then selects a desired combination of such
characteristics in light of some personal valuation of the harm posed by
the producer ought to be attended to, only so far as it may be necessary for promoting that
of the consumer.").
206. As judge Irving Kaufman wrote in an antitrust decision:
[Njo one can determine with any reasonable assurance whether one product is
"superior" to another. Preference is a matter of individual taste. The only
question that can be answered is whether there is sufficient demand for a
particular product to make its production worthwhile, and the response, so long
as the free choice of consumers is preserved, can only be inferred from the
reaction of the market.
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 287 (2d Cir. 1979).
207. See Fischer, supra note 57, at 348 ("The consumer expectations test is natural
since strict liability in tort developed from the law of warranty. The law of implied warranty
is vitally concerned with protecting justified expectations since this is a fundamental policy
of the law of contracts."); Korzec, supra note 84, at 232 ("Historically, the consumer
expectations test is the natural, logical result of strict products liability as the extension of
implied warranty law.").
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health and safety risks, 21M
0 just as the decisionmaker applying risk-utility
analysis balances various benefits and costs posed by alternative product
20 9
designs.
In this conception of how the "ordinary consumer" makes decisions,
the two primary design defect tests in products liability again can be seen
to substantially overlap. 2 111Indeed, a number of courts appear to have
expressly adopted this utility-maximizing vision of consumer behavior by
defining consumer expectations in a manner that explicitly requires riskutility analysis. 2' Furthermore, from a consumer sovereignty viewpoint,
jurisdictions that apply the consumer expectations test without expressly
incorporating risk-utility factors must simply assume that judges and ju2 12
rors naturally will replicate welfare-maximizing market transactions.
208. See Hubbard, supra note 21, at 469-70 (emphasizing aim of "achieving the best
ratio of benefits to costs for each individual" and "the proper perspective that production
is to maximize choices and options in order to enrich people's lives as they desire and
expect to live them"); David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law:
Toward First Principles, 68 Notre Dame L. Rev. 427, 460 (1993) (describing
decisionmaking process of consumers and noting that such behavior is designed "to
promote the autonomy of human beings"); Shapo, The ALI Restatement Project, supra
note 30, at 677 ("It is axiomatic that consumers trade off dollars against safety when
acquiring the specific packages of benefits and risks we call products."). As with the
"micro-balancing" approach of the reasonable alternative design test, such evaluation by
consumers occurs "at the margin." Consumers are not required to state, in other words,
the full value or utility that they derive from a can of soda. Rather, they simply ask whether
they prefer the soda to a pocketful of change.
209. See Hoffman & O'Shea, supra note 166, at 358 n.116 (noting conceptual
likenesses between individual wealth maximization and cost-benefit analysis).
210. An especially ambitious implementation of the consumer sovereignty viewpoint
might require assessing manufacturer responsibility in light of the subjective expectations
of the actual consumer who is injured, thereby going well beyond the risk-utility test. For a
variety of reasons, however, no jurisdiction ever has adopted such a subjective test. Rather,
the consumer expectations test hinges on the expectations of an "ordinary consumer." See
Owen et al., supra note 133, § 5:6, at 298 ("Like most other standards of tort law, the
consumer expectations test is an objective test: it is based on the average, normal, or
'ordinary' expectations of a reasonable person."). As Professor Korzec indicates, the
language of the European Union's Council Directive regarding products liability lawwhich emphasizes the "safety which a person is entitled to expect," rather than the actual
expectations of the individual consumer-helpfully distinguishes between such subjective
and objective consumer expectations perspectives. See Korzec, supra note 84, at 233, 235
(referencing Council Directive 85/374 of 25July 1985 on the Approximation of the Laws,
Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability for
Defective Products, arts. 1, 6(1), 1985 O.J. (L 210) 2, 4-5 (amended 1999), available at
http://www.cebec.be/en/pdfs/ 1985L0374%2OCons I9990604%20EN.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review)).
211. See supra notes 136-138 and accompanying text.
212. If, on the other hand, such an assumption does not underlie the consumer
expectations test, then from a law and economics perspective the doctrine lacks a sound,
identifiable normative foundation. Professor Viscusi appears to imply such a view through
the following hypothetical:
Consumers may, for example, expect that a car driven into a lake will float. When
cars do not perform in this way, they will fail to meet consumers' expectations.
The product, however, would not necessarily be considered defective because
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In either case, the account of consumer behavior that emerges from neoclassical economics fails to provide a conceptually independent role for
the consumer expectations test. Rather, the consumer sovereignty norm
simply demonstrates another manner in which consumer expectations
21 3
seem to serve as shorthand for risk-utility analysis.
B. Consumer as Susceptible
Even within economics, there long have been dissenters from the
consumer sovereignty viewpoint. As early as 1898, Professor Veblen disparaged the neoclassical view of consumer choice as being "some generations" out of date:
The psychological and anthropological preconceptions of the
economists have been those which were accepted by the psychological and social sciences some generations ago. The hedonistic conception of man is that of a lightning calculator of
pleasures and pains, who oscillates like a homogeneous globule
of desire of happiness under the impulse2 14of stimuli that shift
him about the area, but leave him intact.
In contrast to this view of atomistic pleasure seeking, Veblen developed an account of preference formation that occurs within an interactive environment in which the behaviors of other actors matter signifi2 15
cantly to consumer desires and decisionmaking.
these expectations are unreasonable. Ultimately, one must address the overall
merits of a design change, which is the object of the risk-utility test.
Viscusi, Wading, supra note 161, at 579 n.26. This hypothetical appears to suggest that
consumer expectations must either conform to risk-utility analysis or be deemed
unreasonable, an account that is conceptually similar to Figures 1 and 2 above, rather than
Figure 3, in which consumer expectations and risk-utility doctrines are not seen as wholly
overlapping. As noted infra Part IVA, however, one can identify a rival rationality account
of consumer behavior and decisionmaking that challenges Viscusi's implicit assumption
that cost-benefit balancing is the only "reasonable" way in which to think about product
hazards.
213. This collapsing of the consumer expectations and risk-utility tests is evident even
among scholars who advocate retention of the consumer expectations standard. Professor
Korzec, for instance, argues that "consumers are entitled to an expectation that
manufacturers, as experts in the field, will sell products which are as safe as possible, given
technological and scientific feasibility." Korzec, supra note 84, at 236. A liability standard
that requires manufacturers to produce "products which are as safe as possible" in light of
"technological and scientific feasibility," however, seems to suggest that in practice
consumers can expect products to be withheld only when an alternative design exists that
could eliminate or reduce product safety risks cost-effectively. Thus, although the
consumer expectations test purports to protect "[c]onsumer autonomy," id. at 237, it again
appears to do so in a manner that is difficult to distinguish from the risk-utility test.
214. Thorstein Veblen, Why Is Economics Not an Evolutionary Science?, 12 Q.J. Econ.
373 (1898), reprinted in The Place of Science in Modern Civilisation and Other Essays 56,
73 (1919).
215. See Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class 29-30 (Penguin Books
1979) (1899) (arguing that consumption serves a signaling function to indicate wealth and
social status to others).
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Economists who follow Veblen in this contextual analysis of consumer preferences frequently have been led to the conclusion that individual choice is not generally rational and utility-maximizing after all.
Some thinkers, like Veblen himself, focus on the manner in which prefer2 6
ences are influenced by competitive relations with other consumers. 1
In an approach more directly relevant to products liability, others claim
that consumers are vulnerable to exploitation by the producers of consumer goods, given that those actors frequently are in a position to shape
the informational and aesthetic environment within which economic
decisionmaking occurs. In the 1920s, for instance, Professor Chamberlin
argued that
selling methods which play upon the buyer's susceptibilities,
which use against him laws of psychology with which he is unfamiliar and therefore against which he cannot defend himself...
all of these have nothing to do with his knowledge. They are
not informative; they are manipulative. They create a new
scheme of wants .... 217
From the economic tradition, Professor Galbraith is most famously
associated with the view that consumers are subject to manipulation by
the marketing ploys of manufacturers. His classic account of the "Dependence Effect" remains a challenging and influential critique of consumer
sovereignty. 2 ' He begins by ridiculing the conventional economic notion that declining marginal utility only applies to specific goods, while an
individual's wants in their totality remain constant and insatiable. 219 Galbraith then advances the case that most modern consumer wants are a
216. See, e.g., James S. Duesenberry, Income, Saving and the Theory of Consumer
Behavior 28-32 (1949) (describing individuals' drive to maintain level of consumption
comparable to others of higher status); Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth 6, 102-07
(1976) (describing concern with relative consumption or income as leading to various
social problems); Robert H. Frank, The Demand for Unobservable and Other
Nonpositional Goods, 75 Am. Econ. Rev. 101, 102-03 (1985) (providing an expanded
account of relative preferences and their implications for law and policy); H. Leibenstein,
Bandwagon, Snob, and Veblen Effects in the Theory of Consumers' Demand, 64 Q.J. Econ.
183, 190-99 (1950) (describing ways in which consumers' perception of other individuals
and their desires can influence choice).
217. Edward Hastings Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition 119-20
(7th ed. 1956).
218. See John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society 124-31 (4th ed. 1998).
219. Galbraith's famous passage is worth quoting at length:
Were it so that a man on arising each morning was assailed by demons which
instilled in him a passion sometimes for silk shirts, sometimes for kitchenware,
sometimes for chamber pots, and sometimes for orange squash, there would be
every reason to applaud the effort to find the goods, however odd, that quenched
this flame. But should it be that his passion was the result of his first having
cultivated the demons, and should it also be that his effort to allay it stirred the
demons to ever greater and greater effort, there would be question as to how
rational was his solution. Unless restrained by conventional attitudes, he might
wonder if the solution was more goods or fewer demons.
Id. at 124-25.
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creation of the system of production. He argues that an individual's
desires only remain constant amidst rising levels of affluence if some external force constantly produces new and urgent wants that are foisted
upon her. To Galbraith, key elements in that process are "the institutions
of modern advertising and salesmanship . . . [whose] central function is
to create desires-to bring into being wants that previously did not
exist."12211

Although it has never achieved widespread currency among economists, at times this view of readily manipulable consumers has found acceptance among torts scholars 22 1 and within products liability decisions.
Indeed, one might say that to the extent the consumer expectations doctrine has rested on a coherent view of consumer behavior and decisionmaking at all, it has been the vision of consumer susceptibility. Observe,
for instance, Justice Traynor's often quoted passage from Escola v. Coca
Cola Bottling Co.: "The consumer['s] . . . erstwhile vigilance has been lulled by the steady efforts of manufacturers to build up confidence by advertising and marketing devices .... ,222 Likewise, in Henningsen, the
court claimed that "a modern manufacturer . . . not only processes [its
product] and dresses it up so as to make it appear appetizing, but he uses
the newspapers, magazines, billboards, and the radio to build up the psychology to buy and consume his products. '2 23 Later, the Connecticut
Supreme Court took this beleaguered consumer and reduced him finally
to a gelatinous spendthrift: "f[T] he customer.., is bewitched, bewildered
and bedeviled by the glittering packaging in riotous color and the allur224
ing enticement of the products' qualities as depicted on labels.
220. Id. at 127.
221. See, e.g., Thomas A. Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Products Liability, 17 Stan. L.
Rev. 1077, 1087 (1965) ("The combination of low quality production and high quality lying
[by manufacturers] makes it impossible for those using the products of mass manufacture
to distinguish good merchandise from bad .... "); Ellen Wertheimer, Unavoidably Unsafe
Products: A Modest Proposal, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 189, 198-99 (1996) (arguing that "the
manufacturer ... decide [s] that a certain level of risk to the consumer is acceptable," and
that by designing a potentially hazardous product the "manufacturer has assigned the risk
to the consumer"). Such arguments implicitly deny a strong role to consumer demand or
choice in determining market outcomes. Rather, the consumer appears vulnerable to the
manufacturer's unilateral decisions about product design and risk allocation.
222. 150 P.2d 436, 443 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
223. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 82 (NJ. 1960) (quoting
Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 164 S.W.2d 828, 833 (Tex. 1942)).
224. Hamon v. Digliani, 174 A.2d 294, 297 (Conn. 1961). Similar arguments also
have been entertained by courts in the fields of trademark, antitrust, and consumer
protection law. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, for instance, once painted a picture of
almost Pavlovian consumer responses to manufacturer trademarks: "The primary value of
the modern trademark lies in the 'conditioned reflex developed in the buyer by
imaginative or often purely monotonous selling of the mark itself.' To the extent that
economically irrational elements are introduced into
advertising of this type succeeds ....
consumer choices ..
" Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 567 (9th Cir. 1968) (internal
citations omitted). Similarly, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the FTC's ceaseand-desist order against a beauty product's claim of age-defying qualities by noting, "[T] he
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Courts have been drawn to the consumer susceptibility vision with
good reason. At least initially, Galbraith's account of consumer product
markets seems to provide a strong foundation both for intervening in
product markets and for utilizing the liability system to ensure the satisfaction of consumer expectations. After all, to the extent that the consumer susceptibility critique is accurate, hinging manufacturer liability on
the expectations of consumers would seem to introduce a self-correcting
force into product market dynamics. That is, whenever a manufacturer
successfully misleads consumers about the risky attributes of its products,
then the expectations of ordinary consumers will bear the imprint of the
manufacturer's manipulation. Such inflated expectations in turn will
subject the manufacturer to liability if its product turns out to pose more
danger than consumers have been led to believe. Thus, at first glance,
the consumer susceptibility depiction seems to provide a sound theoretical basis for comprehending and guiding the consumer expectations
doctrine.
For at least two reasons, however, the consumer susceptibility viewpoint should be rejected as a conceptual basis for the consumer expectations doctrine. First, because the doctrine is designed to respect the beliefs of the ordinary consumer, courts applying the doctrine can draw
only mixed support from a positive account that views consumer expectations as fundamentally tainted by undesirable market dynamics. After all,
the strong susceptibility viewpoint implies an ability by manufacturers
both to lower and to raise consumer expectations of product danger. Advocates of the consumer expectations test tend to assume that product
manufacturers portray their wares as being more safe and more useful
than they really are. As an empirical matter, they seem to be generally
correct in that assumption. 225 In some instances, however, manufacturer
shaping of consumer safety expectations instead could be used to avoid
liability for a dangerous product by creating or enhancing consumer per-

average woman, conditioned by talk in magazines and over the radio of vitamins,
hormones, and God knows what, might take 'rejuvenescence' to mean that this is one of
the modern miracles and is something which would actually cause her youth to be
restored." Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 1944)
(internal quotations omitted); see also Roger E. Schechter, The Death of the Gullible
Consumer: Towards a More Sensible Definition of Deception at the FTC, 1989 U. Ill. L.
Rev. 571, 574-75 (criticizing Ritz opinion).
225. See Hanson & Kysar, TBSIII, supra note 28, at 324-70. Indeed, for intuitively
understood reasons, most product manufacturers tend not to emphasize the health and
safety dangers of their wares at all. Even when a manufacturer's product offers a relative
safety advantage over competing offerings, emphasizing such safety attributes raises the
salience of product dangers in the minds of consumers, possibly leading to an overall
reduction in demand for the product category. Thus, safety advertising tends only to occur
with regard to products that consumers, for one reason or another, have come to
appreciate as significantly and inherently dangerous (e.g., automobiles, cigarettes,
pharmaceuticals). See id.
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ceptions of product hazards. 22 6 The conditions under which such manipulation would be advantageous to the manufacturer are limited, of
course, yet they seem to include important product categories such as
automobiles and cigarettes, in which generic product risks have become
salient to consumers over time and in which manufacturers therefore
face fewer disincentives to raising product dangers in their communications to consumers. 227 Thus, to the extent that the consumer susceptibility vision is accurate, hinging products liability on consumer expectations could become a double-edged sword-a possibility that appears to
be underappreciated by consumer advocates, plaintiffs' representatives,
and others who have argued in favor of the consumer expectations test.
A second problem with the consumer susceptibility vision is that,
however rhetorically powerful its proponents have been over the years,
the viewpoint remains a distinctly minority position. In particular,
groundbreaking articles by Professors Stigler 228 and Nelson 229 have
helped to establish a view of advertising that preserves the economist's
depiction of the consumer as a rational agent responding to pertinent
product information, despite the critique of scholars like Galbraith. On
this account, trademarks, product jingles, celebrity endorsements, and
other seemingly vacuous trappings of modern marketing serve an important but previously underappreciated economic function: They reduce
consumer search costs for certain categories of goods by providing an
outward display of the manufacturer's confidence in the quality of its
products. In other words, all advertising conveys at least some information.2 30 Even an unadorned product logo emblazoned across a billboard
226. Consider, for example, the following language from R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Company's website: "There is universal awareness of the conclusions of the Surgeon
General, and public health and medical officials that smoking causes serious diseases,
including lung cancer and heart disease. Individuals should rely on these conclusions
when making any decision regarding smoking." R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Tobacco
Issues: Health Issues, at http://www.rjrt.com/TI/TIHealth-Issues.asp (last visited August
8, 2003) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). The company portrays smoking health
risks as both widely known and willingly accepted by tobacco users, thereby reducing the
level of safety that consumers otherwise may have expected from the product. The rub, of
course, is that public appreciation of the health hazards of smoking, to the extent that it
does exist, only has come about after decades of attempts by R.J. Reynolds and other
tobacco manufacturers to prevent, distort, and minimize such awareness. See Hanson &
Kysar, TBSII, supra note 28, at 1467-1502 (reviewing evidence uncovered during tobacco
litigation establishing tobacco companies' campaigns to lower consumers' estimates of
tobacco risks); Hanson & Kysar, Joint Failure, supra note 28.
227. See supra note 225.
228. George J.Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. Pol. Econ. 213 (1961).
229. Phillip Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82J. Pol. Econ. 729 (1974); Phillip
Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. Pol. Econ. 311 (1970).
230. Cf. R. H. Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6J. Legal Stud. 1, 9 (1977) ("Any
advertisement which induces people to consume a product conveys information, since the
act of consumption gives more information about the properties of a product or service
than could be done by the advertisement itself."); Pitofsky, supra note 202, at 663
("Advertising substitutes for search costs by consumers by providing in a convenient and
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carries the implicit assurance that the manufacturer believes in its products, at least to the extent of its advertising outlays. Consequently, consumers who respond to the bells and whistles of seemingly uninformative
advertising can be seen as rationally maximizing the chance that their
23
purchase will be a sound one. '
Subsequent defenders of the consumer sovereignty model have
picked up on this motif, arguing for the reconception of advertising itself
as a "good" that individuals "consume. ' 23
" 2 Television commercials on
this account, no matter how frivolous, need not be deemed uninformative and unrelated to a consumer product. They are the product. A celebrated article by Professors Becker and Stigler, for instance, conceives of
households as being engaged in the maximization of utility, not just
through the consumption of goods, but through consumption in connection with certain productive capacities, such as household labor, that
transform the goods in some manner, or cultural knowledge, that invest
the goods with a particular meaning. 233 On this account, advertising can
be explained as the provision of knowledge-"whether real or fancied" 2 34 -for use in connection with a consumer good to produce an output of utility. The Marlboro Man endures, therefore, not because consumers are psychologically vulnerable to rustic, romantic imagery, but
because they rationally utilize the imagery to construct their own escapist
fantasies.
These are strong claims. Moreover, because Becker and Stigler's
model is essentially nonfalsifiable, sympathizers of the Galbraithian viewpoint are unlikely to find it persuasive. Whatever the merits of the
model, however, in contemporary policy discussions, the burden of proof
tends to rest squarely on those who seek to deny the wisdom of consumer
choice, rather than to assert it. 23-5 Because the consumer expectations
usable form information necessary for consumers to make choices among available brands,
and in the process facilitates the functioning of a market economy.").
231. Justice Harlan provided an early expression of this reasoning in a 1967
concurrence that addressed the supposed anticompetitive effects of Procter & Gamble's
advertising advantages in the market for household bleach. Noting that "[t]he advertiser's
brand name may . . . be an assurance of quality," Harlan argued that "[i]t is not the
[government's] function to decide which lawful elements of the 'product' offered the
consumer should be considered useful and which should be considered the symptoms of
industrial 'sickness.' It is the consumer who must make that election through the exercise
of his purchasing power." FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 603-04 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurring). Put differently, consumer willingness to pay premiums for
branded versions of products-even chemically identical products like bleach-is not
irrational if one views the brand itself as part of the product, providing its own utility in the
form of reduced search costs.
232. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, A Simple Theory of Advertising as
a Good or Bad, 108 Q.J. Econ. 941, 941 (1993).
233. See George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67
An. Econ. Rev. 76, 77, 83-89 (1977).
234. Id. at 84.
235. Recent products liability scholarship focusing on cognitive heuristics and biases
research has provided a more sophisticated theoretical account of how and why
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doctrine has been under siege by academic critics for nearly four decades, courts would be unwise to rest the doctrine on controversial assertions of wholesale consumer vulnerability. Such a vision of consumer susceptibility is likely to be viewed by many as inaccurate and, to the extent
that the vision nevertheless is accurate, resting liability on the expectations of consumers would raise the risk of delegating product standard
setting to manufacturers who are able to shape and influence consumer
expectations accordingly.
23 6
C. Consumer as Socially Situated

The common ground of both the sovereignty and susceptibility viewpoints is their construction of consumers as primarily economic beings.
Under both paradigms, consumption appears simply to be the fulfillment
of human needs through a purely commercial transaction. From that
common starting point, the sovereignty and susceptibility camps then diverge on the question of whether consumer decisionmaking is reliable, or
whether instead manufacturers manipulate consumers into unwise
purchases through their superior market position. In contrast, according
to cultural studies theorists, consumption should be viewed as a messy
communicative act that combines pleasure seeking with elements of selfdefinition and social expression. 237 Those who view consumer goods
merely as vehicles for satisfying individual, unspecified desires ignore the
many ways in which consumer product markets are culturally inflected.
Accordingly, theorists should assume an insatiable desire, not for objects,
but for the meanings, implications, and values that objects import.238 On
manufacturer manipulation of consumer risk perception occurs. See generally Hanson &
Kysar, Joint Failure, supra note 28; Hanson & Kysar, TBSIII, supra note 28; Hanson &
Kysar, TBSII, supra note 28; Hanson & Kysar, TBSI, supra note 28. Nevertheless, this
research also concludes that a products liability regime of true strict or enterprise liability
is necessary to combat the multifarious ways in which such manipulation actually can
occur.
236. The discussion in this section is based on Douglas A. Kysar, Kids & Cul-de-Sacs:
Census 2000 and the Reproduction of Consumer Culture, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 853, 890-92
(2001) (book review) [hereinafter Kysar, Kids & Cul-de-Sacs].
237. As Jean Baudrillard writes, "Consumer behavior, which appears to be focused
and directed at the object and at pleasure, in fact responds to quite different objectives:
the metaphoric or displaced expression of desire, and the production of a code of social
values through the use of differentiating signs." Jean Baudrillard, Consumer Society, in
Selected Writings 29, 46 (Mark Poster ed., 1988). James Twitchell expresses a similar
sentiment with considerably less jargon:
What characterizes commercial culture is that [the mythological world], our
utopian otherland, has been populated by new beneficent spirits, spirits magically
residing not in nature, holy books, magical signs, or chants but in objects as
mundane as automobile tires, rolled-up tobacco leaves, meat patties, green beans,
and sugar water.
James B. Twitchell, Lead Us into Temptation: The Triumph of American Materialism 68
(1999).
238. See Baudrillard, supra note 237, at 45 ("[1f we acknowledge that a need is not a
need for a particular object as much as it is a 'need' for difference (the desire for social
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this account, consumers appear neither purely sovereign nor purely susceptible, but rather permanently engaged in a dialectical conversation
with product manufacturers, marketers, regulators, and others regarding
the social significance of consuming activities.
According to sociologist Don Slater, this consumer culture, in which
individuals consume not simply to satisfy basic needs, but to package an
identity for consumption by others, arose out of necessity. Western modernity, which orients itself around core concepts of individuality, rationality, and market relations, is characterized also by the erosion of tradition and social rigidity. The previous three centuries have seen the
decline of various sources of regulation of people's lifestyles, including
religious prohibitions on excess, sumptuary laws, community norms, and
philosophical conceptions of a "natural" social order. 23 9 Similarly, the
rise of capitalist relations has contributed to the decline of productive
activities as a source for cultural meaning. One's identity is no longer
bound up in the craft guild to which she belongs, for much of productive
labor has become anonymous and devoid of distinction. As a consequence, "[m]odern man spends less and less of life in production, and
more and more in the continuous production and creation of personal
needs and of personal well-being." 24°1 Individuals in contemporary consumer cultures accordingly define their values, aspirations, and identities
by reference to the goods they consume, the leisure activities they undertake, and the locations to which they travel. In Jean Baudrillard's terms,
24 1
"consumption is social labor."
The foregoing ideas have significant implications for the underlying
assumptions of both the consumer sovereignty and the consumer susceptibility models. For instance, the models' emphasis on individual choice,
whether conceived as responsible, autonomous decisionmaking or as
harmful, induced error, seems misplaced from the consumer culture
standpoint. Individuals exercise choice primarily in the sense that they
select a pattern of consumption, a way of living, from among various socially constructed alternatives. As Baudrillard writes, "[c]hoices . . . are
socially controlled, and reflect the cultural model from which they are
produced. We neither produce nor consume just any product: the prod2' 42
uct must have some meaning in relation to a system of values.
Additionally, the notion that preferences are exogenous to markets
is incoherent from the consumer culture viewpoint. Markets consist of
social relations that unavoidably affect the disposition and development
meaning), only then will we understand that satisfaction can never be fulfilled ....
). As
Professor Shapo puts it in his products liability treatise, "Americans often define the good
by their goods." 1 Marshall S. Shapo, The Law of Products Liability 11 (4th ed. 2001).
239.
240.
241.
242.

Don Slater, Consumer Culture and Modernity 22 (1997).
Baudrillard, supra note 237, at 48.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 36 (quoting unknown source).

HeinOnline -- 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1758 2003

2003]

THE EXPECTATIONS OF CONSUMERS

1759

of participants. 24 3 Preferences are not exogenous to markets at the very
least because marketers construct sophisticated lifestyle visions that, in
part, define people's desires.2 44 Indeed, advertising and media agents
must remain aware of consumers' tendency to mediate social meaning
through product markets: "In an age of overwhelming consumer
choices, [individuals] look to brand names and product myths as distinguishing lifestyle markers. '245 Again, these habits are not autonomous,
spontaneous acts of free will on the part of individual consumers. Instead, they are the product of an ongoing dialogue between and among
consumers and the multitude of manufacturers and other entities who
have an interest in helping to shape the identities and aspirations signified by particular modes of consumption. Put pejoratively, whether the
Pepsi Generation existed before advertising aimed at the Pepsi Genera246
tion is simply not a resolvable question.
In short, the socially situated consumer cannot be extricated from
her formative environment, nor can her acts of consumption be reduced
to the satisfaction of stable needs and desires. The consumer sovereignty
model seeks to invest the consumer with heroic stature, embodying the
modernist principles of liberty, rationality, and progress through her selfdetermined, calculated market choices, which, collectively with other
consumers, spur technological innovation and social advancement. The
consumer susceptibility model, on the other hand, seeks to invest the producer with an almost demonic stature, capable of fostering false needs
and illegitimate preferences in order to unload the formless fruits of its
production. Neither vision seems to admit the complexity of its subject.
Even the sophisticated model of Becker and Stigler, which allows consumer desires to rest on such seemingly irrational bases as advertising
images, refuses to permit inspection of how or why the desires emerge.
Preferences have been expanded to include myths and magic, in addition
to goods and services, but they remain emphatically exogenous to the
regulatory calculus. From the cultural studies viewpoint, therefore,
Becker and Stigler's model incorporates the profound indeterminacy of
243. See Samuel Bowles, Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of
Markets and Other Economic Institutions, 36J. Econ. Literature 75, 75 (1998) ("Markets
and other economic institutions do more than allocate goods and services: they also
influence the evolution of values, tastes, and personalities.").
244. Kysar, Kids & Cul-de-Sacs, supra note 236, at 892.
245. Michael J. Weiss, The Clustered World 20 (2000).
246. This close relationship between consumption habits and identity representation
is sometimes oddly evident in the way marketers describe their customers. An advertising
executive for Mazda, for instance, explains the company's increasing efforts to target
minorities this way: "It's not just because of [increases in minority populations], but more
importantly, as we worked out our psychographic target, people who have that
psychographic have skewed to Hispanics and Asians." Ira Teinowitz, Counting Change,
Advertising Age, May 14, 2001, at 16, 20. The executive seems almost to believe that one is
first and foremost an automobile-consumer type. Racial identities are tried on only after
the fact, and they sometimes "skew" one way or another in relation to the prior vehicular
persona.
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consumer culture only so far as necessary to cloak the model's own preposterous determinacy.
As Professor Ramsay notes, "[v] ery little of [the cultural studies] literature has influenced legal thinking about advertising in consumer markets, or legal theories as to the power of advertising over consumer taste
and behaviour." 247 Instead, judicial and legal academic depictions of
consumers have tended to alternate between paradigms of sovereignty
and susceptibility, ignoring the ways in which such analyses fail to provide
a fully satisfactory explanation of consumer behavior and motivation.
Among products liability scholars, Professor Shapo has provided the most
notable exception to this pattern. His well-known 1974 article, for instance, engages in an extended analysis of the consumer's decisionmaking environment with particular attention to packaging, advertising, and
other forms of product representation. 248 He also seems quite receptive
to the ideas that emerge from cultural studies accounts of consumer behavior, referring to products liability law as a "cultural mirror" that re2 49
flects the deep social and psychological content of our "inner selves.
Consumer goods on Professor Shapo's account serve far deeper and
more complicated purposes than simply the satisfaction of utilitarian
desires.2 5 1 In light of such socially imbued aspects of product production, marketing, and consumption, Shapo has argued for nearly thirty
years that products liability law must remain attentive to the "impact of
25 1
modern methods of product portrayal.

247. lain Ramsay, Advertising, Culture and the Law 3 (1996). Ramsay's own work is
an important and sophisticated exception.
248. See Shapo, Representational Theory, supra note 21.
249. Shapo, The ALI Restatement Project, supra note 30, at 638; Shapo, The Next
Act, supra note 11, at 771. Professor Shapo also acknowledges the dialectical process that
cultural studies accounts describe as ultimately fashioning consumer identities. See Shapo,
The Al Restatement Project, supra note 30, at 664 ("The sources of [product] meaning
include sales literature, media advertisements, and even the uses to which significant
numbers of consumers put the product-the last being a point picked tip by advertising in
what becomes a continuing, and profitable, cycle.").
250. See Shapo, The ALl Restatement Project, supra note 30, at 664 ("Products come
to the consumer with an image, and a meaning, attached to them."); Marshall S. Shapo, In
the Looking Glass: What Torts Scholarship Can Teach Us About the American
Experience, 89 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1567, 1577 (1995) (describing products liability as "an
especially faithful mirror of the tensions that arise from our search for the good through
goods"); Shapo, The Next Act, supra note 111, at 762 (describing the concept of defect as
"a proxy for judicial responses to consumer disappointment with products in a culture in
which people significantly define themselves by their possessions").
251. Shapo, The Next Act, supra note 111, at 766-67; see also Shapo,
Representational Theory, supra note 21, at 1370 ('judgments of liability for consumer
product disappointment should center initially and principally on the portrayal of the
product which is made, caused to be made or permitted by the seller."); Shapo, The ALI
Restatement Project, supra note 30, at 664 ("[I]t would be well for any Restatement of
products liability to acknowledge the pervasiveness of product promotion in consumer
decision making.").
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Professor Shapo's work notwithstanding, however, there is good reason for the reluctance of products liability scholars to embrace the cultural studies account of consumer behavior. Although far more descriptively rich than competing accounts of consumer behavior, the cultural
studies viewpoint remains immanently less tractable. How predictably or
consistently, for instance, would a consumer expectations test operate using the loose, ephemeral guidance of cultural studies accounts of consumer behavior? At what temporal point would one attempt to identify
consumer expectations, given that they are constantly in flux? 252 How
would one separate the consumer's supposed safety expectations from
more complex attitudes about identity and self? Do "extreme sports" aficionados deserve less protection given their espoused desire to live on the
edge, or are their purchases designed to project an image rather than a
reality of risk? Do organic food purchasers deserve more protection
given their apparent willingness to pay a premium for perceived safety, or
are their behaviors driven by still more complex social dynamics?
In the view of many theorists from the fields of sociology and cultural
studies, consumers should be seen as neither incapable of resisting social
influence-including the influence of the supposed "culture industry" 253
of manufacturers and marketers-nor impervious to it. Rather, consumers and the market should be seen as joined in a constant dance of definition and redefinition, a formless cultural duet in which improvisation defies attribution. 254 However accurate this depiction of consumer
behavior may be in theory, it is precisely this type of indeterminacy that
has led commentators to denounce the consumer expectations test as being unworkable in practice. In the long run, the legitimacy of any doctrine depends in no small part on the perceived coherence of its outcomes. By providing a standard so expansive in scope, so nuanced in
detail, and so liberal in interpretation as to render predictions about future consumer behavior almost meaningless, the socially situated consumer entails an intolerable level of uncertainty for use in products
liability.
IV. CONSUMER AS LAY SCIENTIST: A RIINVIGORATED ROLE FOR
CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS

Somewhere between theoretical parsimony and descriptive vitality
lies a workable compromise. Increasingly, legal scholars seeking that
252. Cf. Miller, supra note 184, at 596 ("How can a consumer expectations test
provide a reliable indication of a product's design soundness when those expectations
change as consumers interact with the product?").
253. See Theodor W. Adorno & Max Horkheimer, The Culture Industry:
Enlightenment as Mass Deception (1944), reprinted in The Consumer Society Reader 3, 4
(Juliet B. Schor & Douglas B. Holt eds., 2000).
254. As Professors Mensch and Freeman write, "taste cannot be wholly engineered,
yet it also does not exist in splendid, ahistoric exogenism." Elizabeth Mensch & Alan
Freeman, Efficiency and Image: Advertising as an Antitrust Issue, 1990 Duke L.J. 321, 354.
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compromise have focused on a vision of individual perception and decisionmaking that incorporates the empirical findings of cognitive and social psychologists, behavioral economists, and other careful observers of
human behavior. 255 As noted in the previous Part, economists traditionally have relied on a view of human behavior in which individuals are
assumed to process available information in order to maximize utility
over time. In contrast, researchers who study human judgment and decisionmaking have found that individuals frequently process information
and make decisions in ways that depart from the expected-utility maximizer of textbook economic accounts. Moreover, one important feature
of these departures from rational utility maximization is that they are
consistent and predictable-that is, they are "orderly, although not always
rational. '2 5 6 As such, they offer the potential to significantly enhance the
descriptiveness of the economic account of human behavior, while stopping short of the radical indeterminacy implied by the cultural studies
account.
This Part argues that the psychological and behavioral law and economics literatures can provide a reinvigorated understanding of the role
of consumer expectations in design defect litigation. As will be seen, the
standard approach to risk-utility analysis in many respects presupposes a
notion of risk that is more narrow and less morally inflected than the
understanding typically held by lay persons. The consumer expectations
doctrine, by contrast, has the potential to provide an important avenue
for the expression of lay values associated with product risks that might
otherwise be ignored within products liability law. 2 57 Such an approach
would help to give effect to the populist, pro-plaintiff aspirations of products liability law without entailing the same degree of vagueness that heretofore has been associated with the consumer expectations doctrine. In
that manner, the consumer expectations test might finally offer a substantive reality worthy of its rhetoric.
255. See generally Behavioral Law and Economics (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000);
Hanson & Kysar, TBSI, supra note 28; ChristineJolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law
and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law
and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics,
88 Cal. L. Rev. 1051 (2000);JeffreyJ. Rachlinski, The "New" Law and Psychology: A Reply
to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 739 (2000); Cass R.
Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175 (1997). For an exhaustive
overview of legal scholarship employing findings from psychology, see JeffreyJ. Rachlinski,
The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1165 (2003).
Professor Guthrie also recently has provided an extensive survey of the use of prospect
theory and risk preference studies within legal scholarship. Chris Guthrie, Prospect
Theory, Risk Preference, and the Law, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1115 (2003).
256. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative
Representation of Uncertainty, 5J. Risk & Uncertainty 297, 317 (1992).
257. Cf. Shapo, Tort Law and Culture, supra note 16, at 220 (noting that the
consumer expectations test reflects "a viewpoint that emphasizes the particulars of the
mental life of specific individuals and the concreteness, or lack of concreteness, of their
understanding of particular risks").
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A. Expert and Lay Conceptions of Risk
A great deal of human judgment and decisionmaking research focuses on the manner in which individuals perceive and process information regarding risks. 2 58 As it turns out, the notion of "risk" for most individuals is not a purely actuarial concept involving probabilistic estimates
of harm. Rather, according to proponents of the "psychometric paradigm" view of risk perception, risk is a complex, textured assessment of
numerous variables that surround a given environmental, health, or
safety hazard. In addition to the likelihood and severity of a harm, individuals also appear to care about a variety of qualitative attributes, such as
whether a risk is voluntarily confronted by the victim, whether its potential harm is equitably distributed among the population, whether it poses
a particularly dreaded form of death or illness, whether it threatens future generations, and whether the perceived source of the risk is believed
to be a trustworthy actor.2 59 Such factors do not appear within the basic
model of cost-benefit analysis, which tends to abstract away from qualita258. See Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risks, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1027, 1075 (1990) (reviewing evidence suggesting that "[f]or lay people, Iriskiness'
means more than 'expected number of fatalities"' and that "[flor experts, it doesn't"
(internal citations omitted)); see also Barcuh Fischoff et al., How Safe Is Safe Enough? A
Psychometric Study of Attitudes Towards Technological Risks and Benefits, 9 Pol'y Sci. 127
(1978); Barcuh Fischoff et al., Weighing the Risks: Which Risks Are Acceptable?, Env't,
May 1979, at 17, 32; Paul Slovic, Informing and Educating the Public About Risk, 6 Risk
Analysis 403 (1986); Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 Science 280 (1987) [hereinafter
Slovic, Perception of Risk], reprinted in The Perception of Risk 220 (Paul Slovic ed., 2000)
[hereinafter The Perception of Risk]; Paul Slovic et al., Facts and Fears: Understanding
Perceived Risk, in Societal Risk Assessment: How Safe Is Safe Enough? 181 (Richard C.
Schwing & Walter A. Albers, Jr. eds., 1980); Paul Slovic et al., Rating the Risks, Env't, Apr.
1979, at 14, 36-37. Professor Keating recently has explicated the social "significance" of
risk in a manner that bears a strong resemblance to the teachings of the risk perception
literature. He writes:
The significance of a risk ...is not fundamentally a quantitative matter, a matter
of statistical probability, and magnitude measured quantitatively. Significance
depends on both gravity and salience. Determining the gravity of a risk requires
evaluative and qualitative judgments-judgments about how much we should fear
a particular kind of harm or harms, how much a particular harm impairs the
pursuit of a normal life, how bad it would be to live with that harm, and so on.
Determining the salience of a risk requires not just an appraisal of the risk's
numerical probability, but also an evaluation of how prominent the risk is in
comparison to the other risks of an activity, how expected it is, how gratuitous it
is, and so forth.
Gregory C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of Cost-Justification, 56 Vand. L.
Rev. 653, 697 (2003).
259. Professor Slovic has organized the various qualitative determinants of risk
perception into two primary categories: dread, which includes such sensations as perceived
lack of control, feelings of dread, and apparent catastrophic potential, and risk of the
unknown, which includes perceptions that a risk is unobservable, unknown, new, or capable
of producing negative effects long into the future. See Ellen Peters & Paul Slovic, The
Role of Affect and Worldviews as Orienting Dispositions in the Perception and Acceptance
of Nuclear Power, 26J. Applied Soc. Psychol. 1427, 1428 (1996).
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tive characteristics in order to provide a uniform basis for assessing a wide

range of health and safety risks.26tt Thus, as cognitive psychologist Paul
Slovic has put it, lay individuals' "basic conceptualization of risk is much
richer than that of the experts and reflects legitimate concerns that are
'2 1
typically omitted from expert risk assessments." "
Some analysts have argued against legal or regulatory acknowledgment of these perceptual differences.
Professors Nichols and
Zeckhauser, for instance, recognize the standard "rationale ... that the
simultaneous death of 1,000 people in the same incident is somehow
worse than the isolated deaths of 1,000 otherwise identical people in separate incidents," but explain that they "are extremely skeptical of such
views." 262 Such a conclusion reflects the impact of a methodological individualism in which death only matters to the dead. Risks and harms undeniably connote social meanings, however, some of which demand more
attention than others, irrespective of whether purely numeric body
counts reach similar results. Consider, for instance, a contrast between
the tragic and the tragically mundane: 2,800 people lost their lives in the
collapse of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001.263 By approximately 7:30 p.m. that day, the same number of people were expected to die worldwide in traffic accidents.2 6 4 Although both figures
may be cause for concern, failure to see a distinction between these two
categories of harm for purposes of regulatory decisionmaking would be,
as Professor Sunstein puts it, "genuinely obtuse. '2 5 It would fail to acknowledge the myriad ways in which "social amplification of risk" 266 can
result in enormous secondary emotional, physical, and economic costs,
260. See Gillette & Krier, supra note 258, at 1071, 1072 (referring to expert
evaluations of risk as "body counts" and noting that they are typically restricted to a
"function of expected mortality or morbidity"); Slovic, Perception of Risk, supra note 258,
at 226 (noting that "experts appear to see riskiness as synonymous with expected annual
mortality").
261. Slovic, Perception of Risk, supra note 258, at 231.
262. Gillette & Krier, supra note 258, at 1083 (citing Albert L. Nichols & Richard J.
Zeckhauser, The Perils of Prudence: How Conservative Risk Assessments Distort
Regulation, Regulation, Nov.-Dec. 1986, at 13, 23).
263. Brett Taylor, Sept. 11 ... And a Year of War, Anxiety and Questions, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 11, 2002, at G29.
264. According to the World Health Organization, the death toll from traffic
accidents in the year 2000 was 1,260,000. World Health Org., World Health Report 2001,
Annex, tbl.2 at 148. Assuming (arbitrarily) an even distribution of such deaths throughout
the hours of the year, the number of deaths from traffic accidents on September 1] would
have reached the World Trade Center death toll after nineteen hours and twenty-eight
minutes, around the time that members of the U.S. Congress gathered on the steps of the
Capitol in Washington, D.C., to condemn the attacks.
265. Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1119, 1156 (2002)
[hereinafter Sunstein, The Laws of Fear] (reviewing The Perception of Risk, supra note
259).
266. Roger E. Kasperson et al., The Social Amplification of Risk, 8 Risk Analysis 177
(1988), reprinted in The Perception of Risk, supra note 258, at 232, 234. The authors cite
the near disaster of Three Mile Island as a dramatic example of the fact that "factors other

HeinOnline -- 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1764 2003

20031

THE EXPECTATIONS OF CONSUMERS

1765

separate and apart from the direct tolls that figure exclusively in Nichols
and Zeckhauser's calculus.
A further set of findings from the risk perception literature examines
the way in which individual risk perceptions are deeply intertwined with
concerns of trust and participation. Stark differences in lay reactions to
the risks associated with medical versus industrial uses of radiation and
chemicals seem explicable primarily by reference to different levels of
2 67
trust that the public invests in the respective managers of such risks.
Research by Slovic and his colleagues further demonstrates that trust is
both difficult to create and easy to destroy in risk settings. This fragility
seems to be driven by a number of factors: Trust-destroying events are
typically dramatic and well publicized, while trust-creating events are incremental and difficult to notice; negative events are weighted by individuals as more important than positive events; sources of negative news
tend to be seen as more credible than sources of positive news; and distrust is readily perpetuated through belief ossification. 268 On the other
side of the balance, evidence suggests that perceived lay or citizen participation in the risk management process increases trust 2 6 9 Indeed, in one
study, among forty-five hypothetical news events regarding a nuclear
power plant, only one was judged by subjects to increase trust substantially: "An advisory board of local citizens and environmentalists is established to monitor the plant and is given legal authority to shut the plant
down if they believe it to be unsafe. 2 7°1 Thus, lurking behind risk perceptions may be strong feelings about the distribution of power and control
in society, as well as assessments of the openness, accessibility, and re2 71
sponsibility of risk managers.
In light of findings such as those described in this subsection, divergences between lay and expert observations of risk should not be written
off as the result of mere ignorance or error on the part of lay observthan injury, death and property damage can impose serious costs and social
repercussions." Id. at 234.
267. Paul Slovic, Perceived Risk, Trust, and Democracy, in The Perception of Risk,
supra note 258, at 316, 317 [hereinafter Slovic, Perceived Risk].
268. Id. at 320-23.
269. See Paul Slovic, Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics and Science: Surveying the RiskAssessment Battlefield, in The Perception of Risk, supra note 258, at 390, 410-11
[hereinafter Slovic, Trust].
270. See Slovic, Perceived Risk, supra note 267, at 320-21.
271. As Professor Shapo has argued, one also may discern the influence of such
considerations in modern tort law. See Shapo, Tort Law and Culture, supra note 16, at
293-95 (describing the role of social power in rhetoric and reasoning of tort decisions);
Marshall S. Shapo, Changing Frontiers in Torts: Vistas for the 70's, 22 Stan. L. Rev. 330,
333 (1970) (describing growing concern of tort law with "the abuse of power-political,
economic, intellectual, as well as physical"). Consider also the related argument of
Professors Blair and Stout that corporate law should remain attentive to the importance of
trust and trustworthiness as influences on behavior within firms. See Margaret M. Blair &
Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law,
149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1735 (2001).
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ers.2 72 Instead, lay and expert approaches to risk reflect rival rationalities
in which "[e]ach side, expert and public, has something valid to contribute"2 73 to decisions about the regulation of risk. Significantly, because
expert assessments utilize thinner notions of risk and relevant detail, they
often understate the desirability of avoiding or preventing the imposition
of a risk. That is, expert assessments typically measure only the expected
quantitative level of death or bodily harm from a risk, without considering the lessons of the psychometric paradigm or other findings from the
risk perception literature.2 74 As the World Trade Center example demonstrates, however, qualitative aspects of danger matter tremendously to
our shared vision of what risks signify and how strenuously they should be
avoided.
B. Giving Content to Consumer Expectations
In contrast to the picture that is emerging from cognitive psychology, the Reporters of the Third Restatement argue that one does not evaluate a risk; rather, one "discovers" it. 275 The notion of discovery suggests a
conceptual scheme in which risk occupies an objective reality capable of
being described without regard to human values. Accordingly, within
products liability law, the risk-utility test is heralded as focusing on relatively objective factors, while the consumer expectations test is derided as
capturing only the subjective, unpredictable impressions ofjurors. 276 It is
precisely this determination to remain "objective," however, that prevents
the risk-utility test from adequately grappling with the rich, contextual
manner in which lay individuals conceive of risk. As the previous subsection describes, risk is in large part a constructed concept that depends
critically on the observer's prior selection of relevant variables. Because
product risk is assessed under the Third Restatement only in relation to
alternative product designs, the sphere of relevant variables becomes confined to expected harm, product functionality, and other manifest physical characteristics of the product and its proffered alternatives. In that
manner, the risk-utility test closely resembles the type of risk assessment
associated with expert decisionmaking.
272. See Gillette & Krier, supra note 258, at 1075.
273. Slovic, Perception of Risk, supra note 258, at 231.
274. See Gillette & Krier, supra note 258, at 1075 ("Given that risk means more to
ordinary people than a mere body count, expert assessments of the high-technology
hazards so prominent in the public risk debate will commonly be understated when viewed
from the popular perspective .... ").
Some recent proponents of cost-benefit analysis,
including most prominently Professor Sunstein, do advocate altering quantitative
assessments in some fashion to account for well-recognized qualitative risk values. See
infra text accompanying note 315.
275. See Henderson & Twerski, Europe, Japan, supra note 55, at 13-14 (positing that
"[o]ne 'discovers' risks, [and] one 'evaluates' whether value-based rules render a product
design defective").
276. See infra note 333 and accompanying text.
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By contrast, consumer expectations are poised to reflect variables
that are left out of expert decisionmaking. Just as lay reactions to risk
depart from those of experts, consumer expectations of product safety
can be expected to depart from the standards that would be derived
under a risk-utility test. Importantly, many of these departures cannot
easily be dismissed as irrationalities that should be ignored in favor of
more narrow instrumentalist balancing. Rather, as the previous subsection argues, many aspects of consumer beliefs and behavior can be said to
represent a rival rationality that is wider in scope and richer in detail than
the stark logic of risk-utility analysis. Thus, contrary to both the Reporters' argument and the manner in which courts previously have employed
the doctrine in practice, consumer expectations can serve as something
more than a mere surrogate for risk-utility analysis to be used in obvious
cases. Rather, consumer expectations can capture the many important
ways in which lay attitudes toward risk differ from the dictates of strict
risk-utility analysis. 277 The risk perception literature therefore suggests a
possible independent role for consumer expectations analysis in products
liability.
Consider a concrete example. In a series of cases arising out of injuries and deaths caused by the Black Talon hollow-point bullet-which was
allegedly designed with "razor sharp edges" so that it would "severely rip
through and mutilate body parts of the individual shot by such bullets" 278 -courts rather reflexively rejected design defect claims against
the bullet manufacturer on the ground that such products "are designed
to cause injuries and are thus not unfit for their intended purpose." 279
Such reasoning resembles the expert mode of risk analysis, in which all
deaths from guns are treated as equal, thereby eliminating any basis on
which to distinguish the hollow-point bullet from other types of ammunition. Lay individuals, on the other hand, care a great deal about the manner in which a death occurs, particularly when it is accompanied by pain
and suffering, terror, or some other dread-inducing characteristic. 2 80 Accordingly, factfinders employing a newly sensitized consumer expectations test might reasonably conclude that the hollow-point bullet was in
28 1
fact defectively designed.
277. Cf. Shapo, Search forJustice, supra note 197, at 119 (stating that the judgment
whether a product is defective "isone that usually embodies a determination of whether a
risk is socially acceptable" (emphasis omitted)).
278. Leslie v. United States, 986 F. Supp. 900, 902 (D.N.J. 1997).
279. Id. at 909; see also McCarthy v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 916 F. Supp. 366, 371
(S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd sub nom., McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 1997);
Downs v. R.T.S. Sec., Inc., 95-835, pp. 5-7 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1/31/96), 670 So. 2d 434,
438-39; Forni v. Ferguson, 648 N.Y.S.2d 73, 74 (App. Div. 1996) (mem.).
280. See Cass R. Sunstein, Bad Deaths, 14J. Risk & Uncertainty 259, 268 (1997).
281. This is speculation, of course. Much would depend on the particular category of
.ordinary consumer" that a court chose to identify as being determinative of liability. A
purchaser of conventional ammunition, for instance, might regard hollow-point bullets as
unexpectedly and inappropriately dangerous, while the purchaser of hollow-point bullets
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Consider also a hypothetical manufacturer faced with a choice of two
automobile air bag designs: Design A, which will save 3,000 lives over a
given time period but induce the death of 100 others who would have
survived in the absence of the device; and Design B, which also will save
3,000 lives while only costing the lives of 90 others. A "macro-balancing"
risk-utility test clearly approves of either design. Equally as clear, a
"micro-balancing" test favors Design B over Design A, assuming that any
increased production costs associated with Design B yield a "reasonable"
value per life saved. Suppose, though, that the 100 lives lost by Design A
are divided equally among adult men and women, while the 90 lives lost
by Design B consist primarily of women.28 2 From the more nuanced risk
perspective of cognitive and social psychology, it is no longer clear that
Design B is preferable to Design A, given its disparate gender impacts.
presumably would expect the product to perform precisely in the described manner. A
separate possibility altogether would be to hinge liability on the expectations of all
"ordinary bystander," given the special relevance of such a perspective in the case of
product-caused harin to third parties. But see Ewen v. McLean Trucking Co., 706 P.2d
929, 935 (Or. 1985) (determining that state products liability statute precluded
development of an ordinary bystander ("ordinary pedestrian") version of the consumer
expectations test).
282. Although purely hypothetical, these facts are not entirely implausible. See Nat'l
Highway Traffic Safety Admin., U.S. Dep't of Transp., Air Bags & On-Off Switches:
Information for an Informed Decision, available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/airbags/
brochure/ (last visited Aug. 11, 2003) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). According to
the NHTSA brochure, as of November 1, 1997, air bags had saved approximately 2,620
lives but caused approximately 87 deaths, primarily among drivers who sat too close to the
steering wheel. Id. Quite possibly, these drivers sat too close because their physical stature
required it. For evidence that the public might be reluctant to countenance gender
disparities in automobile safety contexts, consider the case of General Motors Corp. v.
Farnsworth, in which ajury awarded $5.6 million in punitive damages to a female plaintiff
who was severely injured as a passenger in a 1984 GMCJimmy truck while the male driver
walked away from the accident. 965 P.2d 1209 (Alaska 1998). The plaintiff had argued to
the jury that General Motors "used only a 50th percentile male dummy in testing the
[truck's] restraint system," and as a result the design "only protected individuals the size of
an average man or larger." Id. at 1212-13. For further suggestive evidence along these
lines, see Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Ins. Comm'r, 442 A.2d 382, 386 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1982) (upholding insurance regulator's refusal to permit automobile insurers to price
premiums differently based on gender); Tetlock et al., The Psychology of the Unthinkable,
supra note 167, at 854 (using the phrase "forbidden base rates" to describe factors such as
race or ethnicity that could provide actuarial justifications for differential insurance
premiums but that are treated as unacceptable bases for distinction by experimental
subjects); Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis
of Environmental Protection, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1553, 1575 (2002) (noting that air bags
might save five lives for every one death caused, but the lives lost might consist primarily of
children, something that many find "troubling or unacceptable"). Finally, as Sunstein has
noted, the ordinary individual's reaction to threats posed by safety devices is far more
complicated than a simple exercise in expected utility maximization. See Cass R. Sunstein,
Hazardous Heuristics, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 751, 781 (2003) [hereinafter Sunstein, Hazardous
Heuristics] ("People are especially averse to risks of death that come from products
designed to promote safety, so much so that people have been found to prefer a greater
chance of dying, as a result of accidents from a crash, to a significantly lower chance of
dying in a crash as a result of a malfunctioning air bag.").
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Indeed, there is strong reason to suppose that a majority of consumers
would be willing to accept the increased risk of death associated with Design A in order to impose a more equitable distribution of risk. 28 3 Again,
a properly attuned consumer expectations standard for design defect may
be capable of capturing important psychological variables such as these,
which tend to be left out of the standard risk-utility approach.
Tobacco products provide a further example of how the two formulations of design defect may differ importantly in their application.
Under the risk-utility test, for instance, plaintiffs pursuing a design defect
claim against tobacco manufacturers face the challenge of proving the
existence of a reasonable alternative design for an inherently deadly
product. Although cigarette companies long have conducted marketing
campaigns for "filtered," "light," "low-tar," "no-additive," and other types
of cigarettes designed to provide an appearance of safety, the products in
actuality have provided little or no safety benefit over other cigarette designs.284 Thus, under the Third Restatement, unless a plaintiff were able to
demonstrate that cigarettes in general constitute a manifestly unreasonable product under comment e to section 2, any products liability claim
based on defective design would fail.
The shortcoming of this approach is that an enormous amount of
arguably undesirable market conduct by tobacco manufacturers escapes
attention altogether. 28 5 As Professor Hanson and I have demonstrated,
by using an arsenal of public relations and other informational control
mechanisms-including (1) establishing an industry-controlled scientific
committee to generate seemingly independent research, (2) producing
283. Cf. Jonathan Baron, Judgment Misguided: Intuition and Error in Public
Decision Making 51-52 (1998) (describing study in which participants favored public
funding of a diagnostic test that would screen all citizens, even though the test saved fewer
lives than a more reliable alternative test that could only be given to half the population);
Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29J. Legal Stud. 1059, 1087 (2000)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis] (noting that distributional
concerns might prompt risk regulators to devote special attention to "the spread of
diseases whose incidence is concentrated among women").
284. See Hanson & Kysar, TBSII, supra note 28, at 1473-79.
285. To be sure, such conduct could be analyzed as part of a claim of
misrepresentation or breach of express warranty. These causes of action, however, are
limited in their ability to police manufacturer manipulation because of stringent doctrinal
elements such as the justifiable reliance requirement, the puffery defense, and the
requirement that representations must be sufficiently specific and fact-based to be
falsifiable. See Cullen Goretzke, Comment, The Resurgence of Caveat Emptor: Puffery
Undermines the Pro-Consumer Trend in Wisconsin's Misrepresentation Doctrine, 2003
Wis. L. Rev. 171, 172-75 (criticizing Wisconsin's puffery doctrine for holding consumers to
a standard ofjustifiable reliance based on misguided behavioral assumptions). By contrast,
introducing evidence of manufacturer marketing practices in the context of the design
defect claim allows judicial inspection of manufacturer representations simultaneously
with an inspection of the object of those representations, the marketed product. In that
manner, the court is able to assess the product as it actually is understood and used by
consumers, who do not experience advertising misrepresentations and product harms as
neatly circumscribed categories.
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supposedly less harmful cigarettes that actually were known by their designers to provide little or no health advantages over regular cigarettes,
(3) silencing critics through tactics such as employment discharge and
spurious litigation, (4) suppressing internal medical research that often
was more advanced and more damning than that of government and
public health authorities, and (5) utilizing marketing and public relations
techniques that capitalized on consumer cognitive biases to lower cigarette risk estimates-the tobacco industry perpetrated an unparalleled
campaign of misinformation on the American public. 28 6 Such conduct

bears significantly on consumer expectations regarding the safety of tobacco use, yet under the Third Restatement's comparatively narrow riskutility test, plaintiffs are unable to introduce evidence regarding tobacco
manufacturer conduct unless it can be tied to a proposed alternative
product design.
This distinction is significant in light of the apparent sophistication
of tobacco companies' utilization of consumer risk perception dynamics
in their marketing. As noted above, research suggests that perceptions of
risk and benefit not only are inversely correlated, but also are driven substantially by prior affective impressions. 2 7 Advertisements for RJ. Reynolds's Winston brand of cigarettes appear to have targeted, consciously or
unconsciously, these very aspects of human cognition in a 1970s advertising slogan.28 8 By reminding consumers that "[t]here's a lot of good between 'Winston ...and should,"' the manufacturer not only emphasizes

the importance of the utility or "good" provided by Winston cigarettes,
but also simultaneously confounds the consumer's ability to consider independently the risks of smoking or the benefits of quitting (what the
consumer "should" do). More generally, a vast number of tobacco advertisements can be seen as directed toward establishing some basic association between cigarettes and a positive affect, generally in a nondeliberative, nonanalytical manner. For instance, Lorillard's slogan, "Alive with
Pleasure," 28 9 clearly carries a much different, and much more positive,
affective tag than the word "hate," which was used above as an example of
how affective processing functions.2 9 0 The importance of such an association to the product manufacturer consists not only in simultaneously
influencing consumer perceptions of product benefits and risks, but also
in doing so through the consumer's affective processing system, rather

286. See Hanson & Kysar, TBSII, supra note 28, at 1467-1502.
287. See supra notes 171-181 and accompanying text.
288. Advertisement for Winston Cigarettes, There's a lot of good between
"Winston ...and should," Road & Track, Apr. 1974, at 65 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
289. Advertisement for Newport Cigarettes, Newport: Alive with pleasure!, Sports
Illustrated, Feb. 1989, at 64 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
290. See supra note 171.
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than through the analytical processing system that might be better
9
adapted to considering the health and safety risks posed by smoking.2 1
Advertisements used in the late 1990s by R.J. Reynolds for its Salem
Menthol cigarettes and Brown & Williamson for its Kool Natural cigarettes raise similar concerns.2 9 2 Both ad campaigns were oriented
around concepts of "nature" and "natural" product attributes. A print ad
for Kool Natural Lights, for instance, mentioned the word "natural" a
remarkable thirteen times in an otherwise brief advertisement.2 93 Such
attempts to link cigarettes, which generally contain hundreds of artificial
additives and ingredients, 29 4 with the imagery of nature may play into the
fact that people respond more favorably to risks that they perceive as arising from nature rather than from manmade sources. 295 Thus, when R.J.
Reynolds tells its audience bluntly, "Menthol from nature. Created by
plants, not people," 296 the company may inspire consumers to view smoking hazards less seriously than they otherwise would.
Conventional risk assessments do not distinguish between hazards
posed by natural activity and those posed by human activity. Thus, under
any risk-utility test that conceives of risk in a conventionally narrow fashion, no reason would exist to inspect the "natural" advertisements and
consider their impact on consumer risk perceptions. Through the consumer expectations test, on the other hand, courts could target specifically such divergences in understanding between expert and lay perceptions of risk. 29 7 As the Wisconsin Supreme Court carefully emphasized in
Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc. (and in contrast to the many courts
that implicitly conflate consumer expectations with risk-utility analysis),
the consumer expectations test requires ajury to consider relevant factors
from the perspective of the ordinary consumer, including those factors
that also may be relevant under a risk-utility test.298 "Risk" under the consumer expectations test therefore can take on a more encompassing
meaning than under the risk-utility test. Specifically, it can incorporate
the numerous ways in which researchers of human behavior and percep291. Cf. Loewenstein et al., supra note 178, at 277 (noting that lottery marketers
"highlight the pleasure of anticipation associated with lottery purchases with slogans such
as 'buy a dream,"' rather than emphasizing probabilistic information).
292. The two examples in this paragraph are taken from Hanson & Kysar, Joint
Failure, supra note 28, at 247.
293. Advertisement for Kool Natural Lights Cigarettes, Entertainment Weekly, Oct.
16, 1998, at 43 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
294. See Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic
Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 Yale L.J. 1163, 1348 n.769 (1998).
295. See Gillette & Krier, supra note 258, at 1073 (noting that "the public is known to
be concerned about risks ... that are manmade as opposed to natural").
296. Advertisement for Salem Cigarettes, Menthol from nature, Stuff@Night Mag.,
July 6, 1999, at 25 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
297. See Twerski, From Risk-Utility to Consumer Expectations, supra note 21, at 897
(arguing that "properly understood," the consumer expectations test is "a sophisticated
and delicate tool that can focus attention on the impact of marketing on product safety").
298. 629 N.W.2d 727, 740-41, 742 (Wis. 2001).
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tion have discovered that lay individuals uniquely process and evaluate
risk information.
Finally, consumers appear to care a great deal about the process that
results in a particular product design, in addition to the end form that
the design itself takes. 299 The cognitive psychology literature on risk perception supports this view by noting that lay attitudes concerning the acceptability of risk depend critically on the perceived source of the risk
and the decisionmaking process by which it is generated. Thus, consumer expectations regarding product safety may be driven heavily by the
extent to which consumers trust the manufacturer of the product, including such important variables as whether the manufacturer incorporates
and responds to safety decisionmaking input from lay citizens,"O() whether
consumers perceive meaningful choices in the relevant market,3111 and
whether the manufacturer's internal cost-benefit calculations too severely
depart from public values concerning life and safety."02 As Professor Davis notes, "[t]he wisdom of choices made and the process by which they
were made are ignored if the focus is on 'risks vs. utility' alone."-"- Thus,
a further advantage to retaining and reorienting the consumer expectations test is that it seems capable of capturing important societal values
regarding the scope and nature of manufacturer decisionmaking
t 4
processes that result in the imposition of health and safety risks. 1
299. See Hubbard, supra note 21, at 476 ("Humans have substantive expectations
concerning particular products; in addition, they have systemic expectations concerning the
economic systems that manufacture and distribute products and the governmental systems
which regulate economic systems and determine liability for defective products."). To be
sure, courts frequently talk of products liability as focusing exclusively on the challenged
product rather than the conduct of its manufacturer. However, as commentators long
have noted, such a distinction is conceptually problematic. See Dickerson, supra note 21,
at 302 n.5 ("In a sense, even impugning the product impugns the defendant's conduct.").
The findings of cognitive psychology regarding the role of trust and process in risk
perception cast further doubt on the distinction.
300. See supra text accompanying notes 269-271.
301. Cf. Twerski, From Risk-Utility to Consumer Expectations, supra note 21, at 892
(arguing that courts in design defect cases should consider "the extent to which the market
was competitive and provided real choices to consumers").
302. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 Rutgers L. Rev.
1013, 1014 (1991) (noting that public reaction to the Ford Pinto case demonstrates "an
apparent mismatch between public opinion and the assumptions underlying the riskbenefit test for design liability").
303. Davis, supra note 53, at 1271; see also Aaron D. Twerski et al., Shifting
Perspectives in Products Liability: From Quality to Process Standards, 55 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
347, 358-80 (1980) (arguing that courts should focus products liability inquiry on the inhouse design review process that manufacturer undertook, considering whether the review
process adequately took into account the interests of those who might have been injured
by the product).
304. This seems especially noteworthy in light of cases such as Jarvis v. Ford Motor
Co., 69 F. Supp. 2d 582, 586-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), afFd in part, vacated in part, 283 F.3d 33
(2d Cir. 2002), that hold a manufacturer cannot be found to have engaged in negligent
conduct with regard to designing a product if the product itself has been deemed
nondefective according to governing products liability standards. See also Romero v. Int'l
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As noted above, numerous commentators have decried the consumer expectations test for capturing only the vague impressions of
"quixotic lay juries 30° 5 rather than direct responses to narrowly formed
inquiries.3 0 6 However, a reinvigorated understanding of consumer expectations, premised on the findings of the risk perception literature, can
lead to a test that is no more subjective, and possibly less subjective, than
the risk-utility test. After all, the risk-utility test quickly enmeshes
factfinders in complex engineering and economic issues, while forcing
them to conduct a balancing analysis that may well conflict fundamentally
with their conception of moral reasoning. 17 In contrast, jury members
are particularly well equipped to contemplate and evaluate the rival rationality identified by psychologists and other risk perception researchers, given that they constitute the precise population from which the no8
tion of a rival rationality has been derived.0
To be sure, application of the consumer expectations doctrine must
not consist of the type of largely unguided, formless judgment that commentators to date have associated with it. Rather, juries should be
charged with the task of determining specifically, as a factual matter, what
level of safety the ordinary consumer expects, taking into account the
types of factors that cognitive psychologists and other observers of human
Harvester Co., 979 F.2d 1444, 1447, 1453-54 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that jury's verdict
that defendant had "failed to exercise reasonable care" irreconcilable with jury's verdict in
favor of defendant on negligent design and strict liability claims); Witt v. Norfe, Inc., 725
F.2d 1277, 1280 (11 th Cir. 1984) (regarding as "irreconcilably contradictory" jury findings
for the defendant on a strict liability question and for the plaintiff on the negligence
question); Lambert v. Gen. Motors, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 657, 660-61 (Ct. App. 1998) (stating
that where alleged negligence of the defendant only involves the manner in which the
product is designed, inconsistent verdicts cannot stand); Halvorson v. Am. Hoist & Derrick
Co., 240 N.W.2d 303, 307 (Minn. 1976) ("If a product is not dangerous and defective in
the absence of safety devices, it is not negligence to manufacture it that way."); Lecy v.
Bayliner Marine Corp., 973 P.2d 1110, 1116-17 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (holding thatjury's
determination that a product was not unreasonably designed precludes a finding of
negligent design). But see Sharp ex rel. Gordon v. Case Corp., 595 N.W.2d 380, 388 (Wis.
1999) (determining that jury finding that a product is not unreasonably dangerous does
not preclude ajury finding of negligent design).
305. Henderson & Twerski, Europe, Japan, supra note 55, at 2.
306. See supra text accompanying notes 58-60. The Reporters, for instance, express
doubt about whether the psychological characteristics of consumers could form a
coherent, identifiable pattern. See Henderson & Twerski, Achieving Consensus, supra
note 12, at 882-83 (noting that the consumer expectations test attempts to capture "the
more subjective perspective of personal (albeit somehow collective), psychological
expectations"). Likewise, the drafters of the Model Uniform Product Liability Act rejected
the consumer expectations test on the ground that the test "takes subjectivity to its most
extreme end. Each trier of fact is likely to have a different understanding of abstract
consumer expectations." Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,724 (Oct.
31, 1979).
307. See supra notes 166-170 and accompanying text.
308. Cf. Just What You'd Expect, supra note 84, at 2381 ("Although jurors generally
are not engineers or product designers, they are consumers with an innate understanding
of what consumers expect.").
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judgment and decisionmaking have identified as pertinent to public understanding and beliefs about risk. Expert testimony therefore should be
admissible for those aspects of a product's design, manufacture, or marketing that raise issues relating to lay risk perception-3 09 More specifically, to survive a summaryjudgment motion, plaintiffs must demonstrate
the existence of a triable question of fact concerning the extent to which
consumer risk perceptions and safety expectations of the product in question differ in legitimate and significant ways from the standards derived
under risk-utility analysis. In this manner, despite the longstanding complaint of products liability scholars that consumer expectations fail to provide a coherent and workable basis for design defect liability, and despite
the failure of courts generally to articulate such a basis, the doctrine will
provide an important complement to the spare instrumentalist balancing
of risk-utility analysis.
C. Do Lay Judgments Constitute a Rival Rationality?
In a recent review of an edited collection of Slovic's work, Professor
Sunstein argues against the claim that the findings of the risk perception
literature collectively constitute a rival rationality.3 10 Rather, in Sunstein's view, most of the distinctive features of lay risk perception identified by the psychometric paradigm can be recharacterized as artifacts of
the experimental design, 3 1 undesirable instances of factual or cognitive
error , " 12 or simply repetitive glosses on the same underlying cognitive
309. See Phillips, supra note 138, at 1060-63 (arguing that expert evidence regarding
consumer expectations should be admissible). A significant question then becomes
whether plaintiffs should be required, rather than merely permitted, to present expert
testimony in this manner. On one hand, requiring expert testimony would help to ensure
that the reinvigorated consumer expectations standard truly does move beyond its past
role as a vague, often indecipherable basis for liability. On the other hand, requiring
expert testimony also would create an evidentiary burden similar in magnitude to the one
presented by the reasonable alternative design standard that has attracted criticism from
consumer expectations courts. Resolution of this tradeoff is better left to the courts, which
ultimately must reckon with and bear the consequences of tradeoffs between access to and
administrability of justice.
310. See Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, supra note 265. Sunstein has offered other
arguments along these lines in earlier work. See Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit
Analysis, supra note 283, at 1087-88; Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions,
Worst Cases, and Law, 112 Yale L.J. 61, 83-85 (2002).
311. See Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, supra note 265, at 1147 ("How do we know that
ordinary people think that Slovic's qualitative factors are so important? The answer is ....
that Slovic and his fellow experimenters expressly identified these factors, set them before
experimental subjects, and asked their subjects to rate certain risks along these specific
dimensions." (emphasis omitted)).
312. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, supra note 265, at 1150-52. Sunstein's account here
relies heavily on Margolis's argument in Dealing with Risk, supra note 23. The basic claim
is that lay minds are not attuned to thinking in terms of opportunity costs-such costs are
often "off-screen"-and that, once informed about the foregone benefits that will be
caused by a safety decision, lay judgments of risk often come into line with those of experts.
See id. at 75-92. For other arguments that lay-expert disagreements over risks are based
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phenomenon, which is best understood as "some combination of the affect heuristic and a quick, intuitive, imperfectly informed assessment of
1 3
the magnitude of the relevant hazards and accompanying benefits.".
To be sure, Sunstein notes, the reasoning behind the psychometric paradigm is "clearly correct" to the extent that it unearths factors such as distributive equity that seem to have a strong identifiable influence on the
public's attitudes toward risk and the desirability of regulation.3 1 4 In his
view, however, these few robust findings are better conceived of as supplementary values that should be accommodated within the dominant expert mode of thinking about risk-cost-benefit analysis-rather than as
3 15
constitutive of a coherent rival rationality.
This line of objection is highly significant for the design defect test
debate in products liability. If Sunstein is correct that the risk perception
literature has not made the case for a fully independent conception of lay
rationality, then a possible response for products liability law to that literature simply would be to incorporate its most robust findings into the
risk-utility test, rather than to mobilize consumer expectations analysis as
an independent vehicle for capturing lay risk judgments. After all, the
Third Restatement seems to allow ample scope for additional factors to be
considered under the risk-utility test.3 16 Layjuries, as the entities generally making the final assessment of whether a product should be deemed
"not reasonably safe" in light of an alternative design,3 17 presumably
on erroneous or uninformed reasoning by lay persons, see Stephen Breyer, Breaking the
Vicious Circle: Toward More Effective Risk Regulation 33-39 (1993); Frank Cross, The
Public Role in Risk Control, 24 Envtl. L. 887, 967-69 (1994).
313. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, supra note 265, at 1149; see also id. (arguing that
Slovic's evidence might better support the hypothesis "that people's rankings of risks
reflect, in significant part, the roles of affect and crude, rough-and-ready assessments of net
benefits"); id. at 1152 (stating that lay-expert perceptual divergences are explicable "not
only or mostly by reference to rival rationality, but also and more fundamentally by some
combination of the availability and affect heuristics and a failure, on the part of ordinary
people, to put all of the effects of risks on-screen"). But see David Holtgrave & Elke
Weber, Dimensions of Risk Perception for Financial and Health-and-Safety Risks, 13 Risk
Analysis 553 (1993) (finding evidence that qualitative risk dimensions have explanatory
power for individuals' evaluations of risk even after controlling for probabilities and
outcomes).
314. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, supra note 265, at 1145.
315. See Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 283, at 1087-88.
As an example of how such modified cost-benefit analysis might occur, Sunstein endorses
the Environmental Protection Agency's recent sensitivity analysis of the merits of arsenic
regulation, in which the agency used a 7% increase in monetized risk to reflect the
involuntary and uncontrollable nature of the health risk posed by arsenic in drinking
water. See Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, supra note 265, at 1144 n.106.
316. See Restatement (Third), supra note 7, § 2 cmt. f ("A broad range of factors may
be considered in determining whether an alternative design is reasonable and whether its
omission renders a product not reasonably safe."); see also Henderson & Twerski, Oregon,
supra note 155, at 14 ("Consumer expectations and perceptions of product safety provide
important data regarding the levels of risk that inhere in product use and whether, given
that level of risk, design alternatives should have been adopted.").
317. See Restatement (Third), supra note 7, § 2(b).
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would be at liberty to consider variables such as the distributive impact of
a product risk, the level of openness or representativeness of the decisionmaking process that created the risk, and the degree of dread associated
with the resulting form of death or injury.
Of course, lay juries only exercise this role if the plaintiff's case first
survives a summary judgment motion that is evaluated by the judge. Significantly, a chief argument offered by the Reporters in favor of their
doctrinal framework has been thatjudges evaluating the reasonable alternative design requirement on summary judgment will be more likely to
give "due respect to the importance of the very technology that brought
sophisticated products to the marketplace."" 18 Thus, one reason not to
simply accommodate lay risk values through an expanded set of riskutility factors, rather than directly through a consumer expectations test,
is that the policy purposes lying behind the risk-utility test seem at odds
with the lessons of the risk perception literature. If a primary goal of the
reasonable alternative design requirement is to ensure that litigation outcomes respect "technology as the cornerstone of rational products litigation"3 1l -and ifjudges are likely to comply with that exhortation through
their summary judgment rulings-then an entirely independent doctrinal vehicle may be necessary to respect the various values encompassed by
3211
nontechnocratic approaches to risk.
1. 0itiques of the Rival Rationality Thesis. On close inspection,
moreover, Sunstein's skepticism about the rival rationality thesis turns out
to be unpersuasive, or at least premature. For instance, in response to
Sunstein's contention that lay risk perception seems to reduce to a general affect-driven phenomenon, one might plausibly contend that the psychometric paradigm research itself is an attempt to particularize the type
of qualitative impressions that drive individuals' affective responses to
risk. On this account, Sunstein's hypothesis that "[pleople's riskiness
318. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Intuition and Technology in
Product Design Litigation: An Essay on Proximate Causation, 88 Geo. LJ. 659, 681 (2000)
[hereinafter Henderson & Twerski, Intuition and Technology].
319. Id. at 688-89.
320. In addition, extremely difficult pragmatic questions arise once one determines
that lay risk perceptions merely require incorporation into technical risk assessment,
rather than some more direct and fundamental means of incorporating public input into
health and safety decisionmaking. At what conversion rate, for instance, does one
monetize the negative utility associated with the involuntariness of a risk? When revising
its regulations for the permissible level of arsenic in drinking water, the Environmental
Protection Agency used a 7% increase in monetized risk for the involuntary and
uncontrollable nature of the risk in its cost-benefit sensitivity analysis. See supra note 315.
In that manner, the beliefs and attitudes of lay citizens have been converted into a
willingness-to-pay value for inclusion in the cost-benefit analysis, but direct judgment on
the underlying decision remains an exercise of quantification rather than deliberation.
Put differently, citizens are unable to express the strength of their lay values, except
inasmuch as those values can be captured by experimental willingness-to-pay
methodologies. Accordingly, the characteristics that guide lay judgments about risk are
accommodated, but not in a manner that respects lay judgment.
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judgments might be based on overall affect" 32 1 would no longer stand in
direct tension with the research on psychometric characteristics of risk
perception. The latter simply would be a more detailed rendering of
"overall affect." The benefit of this view is that it provides a concrete,
well-documented starting point to respond to Sunstein's complaint that
"we . . .need more information about why people have one or another
affect toward nuclear power, pesticides, x-rays, and the like."'3122 It may
turn out that, in risk contexts, the somewhat amorphous concept of affect
is a function of precisely the type of perceived qualitative characteristics
that Slovic and his collaborators have been studying all along.
Perhaps in anticipation of such an argument, Sunstein also critiques
some of the individual qualitative characteristics that are said by cognitive
psychologists to play a strong role in lay risk perception. He argues, for
instance, that the apparent willingness of lay observers to tolerate greater
levels of risk from natural as opposed to artificial sources appears to be
based on "a belief in the benevolence of nature." 323 If it exists, such a
belief would be factually erroneous, as reams of scientific data on natural
hazards can attest. Thus, from a regulatory perspective, one might feel
justified ignoring public attitudes about risk to the extent that they are
based on perceptions regarding the natural or artificial nature of the
risk's source. Sunstein's analysis, however, ignores other ways in which
the natural/artificial distinction appears to be premised on valid attitudes
regarding human culpability and governmental responsibility.3 24 As Professor Sagoff explains, the public may demand greater regulatory response to artificial risks, as opposed to natural risks of equivalent expected physical consequence, for a variety of legitimate reasons:
governments are especially charged with monitoring human activities;
only risks created by human action can threaten individual autonomy or
bodily integrity in a socially meaningful sense; and manmade harms carry
additional losses in the form of regret, indignity, guilt, and other reac3 25
tions that are not as prominently associated with natural tragedies.
Thus, contrary to Sunstein's claim, lay risk perception can be seen as concerned with natural/artificial distinctions for rational, as opposed to factually erroneous, reasons.
Sunstein also attempts to destabilize the voluntariness/involuntariness factor in the psychometric paradigm by noting that many risks commonly perceived to be "involuntary" nevertheless can be avoided through
individual action. For instance, consumers concerned about pesticides
321. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, supra note 265, at 1155 n.143.
322. Id. at 1144 (emphasis omitted).
323. Id. at 1129.
324. Sunstein does briefly acknowledge that lay attitudes might "be based on a moral
judgment that the risks associated with nature should not be a source of intense human
concern." Id. at 1129 n.39.
325. See Gillette & Krier, supra note 258, at 1077-78 (discussing unpublished
manuscript later published as Mark Sagoff, Technological Risk, in The Environment in
Question 194, 207 (David E. Cooper &Joy A. Palmer eds., 1992)).
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can purchase only organic produce; families worried about ambient air
pollution can move to a different, less polluted location. 326 Thus, Sunstein argues, "[w]hen a risk seems 'involuntary,' it is usually because the
people who face the risk do not know about it or because it is especially
difficult or costly to avoid it."2 7 To the extent that this argument views
voluntariness/involuntariness as better described by a sliding scale, rather
than a binary opposition, it clearly is correct. To the extent that the argument denies the relevance of social agreement concerning harms that
legitimately may be externalized-such that victims who fail to take defensive expenditures can be said to have "voluntarily" assumed a risk-it
clearly is incorrect. By common agreement, homicide victims are not believed to assume the risk of murder for failing to bribe their attackers.
Similarly, society may agree that minimum air quality standards, like freedom from intentionally inflicted death, are part of basic shared assumptions regarding permissible and impermissible behavior. Failure to "contract out" of environments that violate such assumptions therefore would
not be seen to constitute a voluntary assumption of risk. Social agreements of this sort regarding the limits of risk imposition are expressed in
positive law, but they also are expressed in beliefs about what constitutes
voluntary and involuntary behavior.3 28 Sunstein's argument seems to be
directed more to changing the content of those beliefs than to denying
their existence.
In a similar fashion, Professor Margolis has argued that identifying
"trust" as a relevant qualitative characteristic for lay risk perception is unhelpful, given that "if one party (the public) does not believe what another is saying ... it is tautological that A does not trust B. '' - 2 ) Thus, for
Margolis, evidence regarding the role of trust in risk perception simply
demonstrates that lay observers often do not believe factual information
provided to them regarding a risk, not that they have a richer conception
of what risk means or signifies. It is important to be clear, however, about
what and whom individuals are said to be trusting. One may disbelieve a
source of factual information, in which case lay risk perceptions simply
may be driven by a different set of acceptable data than expert perceptions. But one also may not trust the perceived source of a risk itself, in
which case lay perceptions may reflect some judgment about the past reliability of the source, the openness of its deliberative processes, or its willingness to consider public viewpoints, among other factors. : 3" In other
words, if lay observers reject safety assurances about chemical pesticides
326. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, supra note 265, at 1154.
327. Id.
328. See Gillette & Krier, supra note 258, at 1077 ("Behind the notion of
voluntariness, then, there may lurk more fundamental concerns about autonomy and
equality and power among individuals in the society, for it is the pre-existence of these that
lets free choice be morally interesting.").
329. Howard Margolis, A New Account of Expert/Lay Conflicts of Risk Intuition, 8
Duke Envtl. L. & Pol'y F. 115, 116-17 (1997).
330. See supra text accompanying notes 267-271.
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issued by the National Academy of Sciences because they do not trust that
body as a source of risk information, then Margolis's objection may be
well taken. If, however, lay attitudes are premised on a lack of trust in the
source of chemical pesticides themselves-if chemical manufacturers are
31
not perceived to be historically reliable or socially responsible actorsthen lay reactions may be seen as voicing legitimate public concern over
perceived characteristics of the manager of a risk, separate and apart
from the hazard itself.
One suspects that debates similar to the foregoing could be conducted for each of the qualitative characteristics that researchers have
identified as being potentially generative of lay risk perceptions. It seems
premature, then, to conclude that lay attitudes do not collectively form a
rival rationality. After all, Sunstein himself has advocated the incorporation into risk-utility analysis of no less than five distinct ways in which
public risk beliefs differ legitimately and importantly from those of expert
risk assessment. 332 Moreover, the incorporation approach seems to assume that cognitive psychologists have thoroughly mapped lay risk perceptions, and that another five significant aspects of lay risk attitudes are
not waiting to be discovered by researchers. Even after twenty-five years
of groundbreaking research, however, scientists like Slovic are continuing
to identify ways in which individual risk processing is richer, thicker, and
more value-laden than the cost-benefit balancing of experts. In short, at
this juncture, the rival rationality thesis appears to be at least as robust as
its rivals.
2. Implications for Products Liability. Among products liability
scholars, the risk-utility test generally is seen as an "objective" means of
assessing design defectiveness, while the consumer expectations test is
said to reflect the "subjective" idiosyncrasies of individuals. 33 3 As Slovic
argues, however, the objective-subjective dichotomy in risk perception is
quite unstable. Once one begins to define thoroughly the concept of
"objective risk," one encounters value judgments at nearly every stage of
the analysis. What level of risk aversion should be incorporated into the
assessment methodology? Should all deaths be counted equally, or
should decisionmakers instead focus on years of expected life lost?
Should all years of expected life be counted equally, or should regulators
instead make some accounting of age, race, gender, income, disability,
and other factors that might appear to vest some life-years with more

331. See Slovic, Perceived Risk, supra note 267, at 317.
332. See Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 283, at 1087-88.
333. See Henderson & Twerski, Achieving Consensus, supra note 12, at 881 ("The
concept of consumer expectations carries with it inescapable psychological connotations
that frustrate attempts to objectify the appropriate standard."); Montgomery & Owen,
supra note 53, at 844 (describing design defect inquiry as "an objective evaluation of the
true costs and benefits of the product as marketed in its particular condition" (emphasis
omitted)).
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"utility" than others?334 Should health and safety risks be monetized to
allow easy comparison with benefits? If so, how should regulators value
life and physical well-being? Should valuations be inferred from market
behavior, or does such a methodology risk enshrining undesirable distributive elements of current market equilibriums within positive law? In
light of the unavoidability of questions of this nature, Slovic concludes
that "there is no such thing as 'real risk' or 'objective risk."' 33 5 Instead,
the definition and description of risk necessarily entails an exercise in
social power, an act of inclusion and exclusion that carries enormous
practical and rhetorical significance for ensuing debates about environmental, health, and safety threats.33 6
In his recent review, Sunstein attempts to discredit Slovic's point as
being "largely semantic and unhelpful, even misleading. '3 37 Before doing so, however, Sunstein first admits that there exist "different ways to
describe mortality risks and the normative judgments that accompany the
choice," 33 8 and that expert estimates of the magnitude and consequences
of a risk "often depend[ ] on educated guesses and normative commitments, not science. ''3 -39 It is difficult to see how these two concessions do
not compel Slovic's conclusion. Sunstein seems to conflate a "real" threat
with an "objective" one.3 4 0 No one doubts that hazards are real in a phenomenological sense. Rather, the dispute concerns whether social agreement as to the magnitude and meaning of such risks is so widespread as
to be deemed "objective." The very existence of rigorous debate between
such luminaries as Slovic and Sunstein suggests that objectivity remains a
3 4
distant, if not impossible, goal. '
334. See Richard Zeckhauser, Measuring Risks and Benefits of Food Safety Decisions,
38 Vand. L. Rev. 539, 559-60 (1985) (discussing the use of quality-adjusted life years
(QALYs) to distinguish health impacts based upon demographic characteristics of the
victim). The issue of whether to value lives discriminately achieved public salience earlier
this year via controversy regarding the EPA's use of a discounted value for lives saved when
they occur among individuals over seventy years of age. See John J. Fialka, Balancing Act:
Lives vs. Regulations: "Senior Death Discount" Riles Critics but OMB Favors Analyses that
Weigh Life Expectancy, Wall St. J., May 30, 2003, at A4.
335. Slovic, Trust, supra note 269, at 392.
336. See Paul Slovic, Introduction and Overview, in The Perception of Risk, supra
note 258, at xxi, xxxvi ("Whoever controls the definition of risk controls the rational
solution to the problem at hand."). As Gillette and Krier note, once one acknowledges
that expert-lay divergence in risk perception is not merely a matter of error on the part of
nonexperts, "it unarguably follows that the choice of approach is an ethical and political
one that technical experts have neither the knowledge nor the authority to dictate,
because the issue transcends technocratic expertise." Gillette & Krier, supra note 258, at
1085.
337. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, supra note 265, at 1146.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 1147.
340. See id. (arguing that inability to quantify a risk or to identify a single mode of
representing it "does not establish that risks are not real or that they are not objective").
341. Slovic and Sunstein seem to agree that valuejudgments are unavoidable in any
decision regarding whether to regulate a risk. Their debate focuses instead on whether
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It therefore seems premature to conclude that the current findings
of risk perception researchers, let alone the findings that remain to be
discovered, simply can be incorporated within expanded notions of "risk"
and "utility." Equally, it seems premature to conclude that courts simply
can accommodate pertinent features of lay risk judgment within the riskutility test, as opposed to retaining the consumer expectations test as a
means for directly accessing such judgments. ' 42 To be sure, one must
acknowledge Sunstein's argument that a significant portion of lay-expert
risk disagreement stems from information failures, cognitive errors, interest group distortions, and other aspects of lay risk perception that are
normatively undesirable. 343 Within products liability law, therefore,
courts should not rely solely on a consumer expectations test to determine design defectiveness. The expectations of consumers are most
helpful in product design litigation when they capture lay values that do
not appear in the comparatively narrow risk-utility test. Technical analysis of product risks and benefits remains necessary, however, to ensure
that product manufacturers face appropriate safety incentives whenever
consumer expectations, for whatever reason, are lower than the level of
344
safety that a risk-utility test would deem reasonable.
The challenge for scholars of environmental, health, and safety regulation is to identify when lay-expert divergences represent valid expressions of public values, as opposed to cognitive errors or misperceptions.3 45 In the meantime, however, products liability law can
any earlier stage in the risk identification, assessment, and management process can
properly be labeled "objective." The better view is that value judgments unavoidably color
the description and presentation of even the most basic scientific knowledge regarding a
hazard, and that, in any event, some value judgment must ultimately be made regarding
the risk. Attaching the label "objective" to any stage of the risk regulation process simply
clouds the issue. It creates a temptation to obscure necessary value judgments under cover
of science. Cf. Kysar, Some Realism, supra note 184, at 262-78 (describing undisclosed
normative assumptions underlying cost-benefit analysis of global climate change mitigation
policies).
342. Cf. Shapo, The ALl Restatement Project, supra note 30, at 666 (arguing that
incorporating consumer expectations as a factor within the risk-utility test is insufficient
because "[a] lack of recognition of the importance of product portrayal and product
image leads to a lack of appropriate emphasis on the expectations that consumers
reasonably develop about products"); Twerski, From Risk-Utility to Consumer
Expectations, supra note 21, at 901 (stating that incorporating consumer expectations into
risk-utility analysis "blunts the sharp edge of the argument that manufacturers should not
escape liability for failing to meet consumer expectations").
343. Even Slovic notes that "there is wisdom as well as error in public attitudes and
perceptions," and that "[1]aypeople sometimes lack certain information about hazards."
Slovic, Perception of Risk, supra note 258, at 231 (emphasis added).
344. See supra text accompanying notes 64-67 (detailing how consumer expectations
test can work against plaintiffs when defendant liability might further the instrumental
goals of products liability law).
345. See Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, supra note 265, at 1155 ("No one ... has sorted
out the extent to which these errors, or instead qualitative judgments, underlie the
relevant disagreements. There remains a large empirical agenda here.").
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accommodate both possibilities by employing the Barker twin-test formulation for design defectiveness.3 4" By allowing plaintiffs to establish design defectiveness based either on traditional risk-utility analysis or on a
brand of consumer expectations analysis that is sensitive to the research
regarding lay risk perceptions, courts can promote both maximization of
utility and respect for qualitative nuances that might be missed in purely
technical analysis of product attributes. Under the risk-utility test, product manufacturers will be held liable whenever an alternative design
might cost-effectively have eliminated or reduced a threat of death or
bodily injury, regardless of whether consumers expected less safety from
the product. On the other hand, whenever risk-utility analysis would ignore significant areas of concern to consumers-such as the distributive
impact of a product risk or its perceived involuntariness-the consumer
expectations test will be available to give effect to such legitimate concerns. Employment of both risk-utility and consumer expectations tests
in this manner reflects the sensible view that, as Professor Moran has
noted more generally in regard to risk regulation, "[t]echnocratic and
populist decision-making [should] become complementary ways of balancing distinctive values, rather than mutually exclusive, antagonistic per' 34 7
spectives on risk.
D. Limitations and Complications
Products liability commentators rightly have criticized the consumer
expectations doctrine, despite its apparent staying power. The aim of this
Article therefore has not been to defend the doctrine as it is currently
conceived and applied, but rather to point the way toward a more theoretically defensible formulation of it, one that attempts both to respond
to the doctrine's critics and to carve out a substantively distinct role for it
to play. Accordingly, the design defect test defined and discussed in this
Article should be thought of as a work in progress, subject to debate and
revision in the best spirit of the common law. Along those lines, this section briefly addresses an initial assortment of potential objections to, and
limitations of, the reinvigorated consumer expectations test.
1. Causation. One argument offered by the Reporters has been
that, given the relative lack of focus on technological data in the consumer expectations test, design defect litigation under such a test runs
the risk of becoming "the perfect plaintiffs tort," drastically departing
from traditional tort law by collapsing defectiveness and proximate causa346. See text accompanying notes 68-72. Significantly, the Reporters seem not to
have considered the possibility that a Barker-style doctrinal formulation would be desirable,
or even possible, for the Third Restatement. See Henderson & Twerski, Politics, supra note
97, at 672 ("From the outset it was clear that in formulating a rule for design defect we had
to choose between some form of risk-utility test and a test based on the disappointment of
consumer expectations.").
347. Rachel F. Moran, Fear Unbound: A Reply to Professor Sunstein, 42 Washburn
L.J. 1, 8 (2002).
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3 48
tion into one largely unconstrained moment of intuition by the jury.
Conversely, the Reporters contend that a chief benefit of the reasonable
alternative design requirement is that it makes products liability litigation
manageable and predictable by providing a peg on which to hang the
349
causation analysis.
This proposition may be true, but it proves too much: A products
regime in which defective design liability was eliminated altogether would
make the causation analysis more manageable still, yet that hardly seems
a decisive argument in favor of such a change. The Reporters' overriding
but one judicial
concern-"constraining design-based liability"350 -is
goal that must be considered in constructing the products liability regime. Other relevant goals include enhancing the efficiency of consumer
product markets by deterring unreasonable product designs and enabling the expression of public risk values by providing a forum forjudicial
assessment of dangerous products. The doctrine of proximate causation
seeks to accommodate numerous goals of this nature by balancing the
35 1
substantive desirability of liability with its procedural administrability.
Admittedly, in its present amorphous and ill-defined state, the consumer expectations test does little or nothing to tailor the proximate causation question, and therefore it can be said to provide too little attention
to the importance of procedural administrability. 35 2 Indeed, as the Reporters put it, the current consumer expectations test "totally eviscerates . . . proximate causation as a discrete issue in a defective design
case." 3 53 In the more refined sense proposed by this Article, however, the
consumer expectations test would depend on the identification of specific aspects of lay risk perception that would in turn preserve the proximate causation issue as an independent, administrable doctrinal element.
Recall, for instance, the Black Talon hollow-point bullet example described above, in which it was suggested that juries operating under the
psychologically-enriched consumer expectations standard might view the
specially designed bullet as defective in light of its particularly destructive
nature. 354 Significantly, such a finding would not lead to an intractable

348. Henderson & Twerski, Intuition and Technology, supra note 318, at 678-79.
349. See id. at 661; see also James A. Henderson, Jr., Why Creative Judging Won't
Save the Products Liability System, 11 Hofstra L. Rev. 845, 849 (1983) (noting that an
.approach [based on reasonable alternative design] would replace the open-ended socialpolicy question presented by the general reasonableness standard with a series of relatively
discrete, fact-oriented elements that more readily lend themselves to adjudication").
350. Henderson & Twerski, Intuition and Technology, supra note 318, at 661.
351. Cf. Hanson & Kysar, TBSIII, supra note 28, at 316-23 (offering a more extensive
treatment of the Reporters' proximate causation point in the context of an argument in
favor of an enterprise liability standard for products liability law).
352. See, e.g., Henderson & Twerski, Intuition and Technology, supra note 318, at
681 ("The consumer expectations test is nothing more than a veiled attempt at turning all
of design defect law into an intuitive, quasi-res ipsa-like case where.., defect and causation
are merged.").
353. Id. at 678.
354. See supra text accompanying notes 278-281.
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causation question because the class of litigants who could recover
against the manufacturer would include only plaintiffs (or their representatives) who had experienced the aspect of the product that rendered
it defective under the consumer expectations test-namely, the "incomparable destructive capacity of the bullets." 355 That is, unless the plaintiff
suffered the additional pain and mutilation that the hollow-point bullet is
uniquely capable of inflicting-and that makes the product arguably defective under a consumer expectations standard-she would fail to establish proximate causation.
In short,just as risk-utility-based litigation renders causation manageable by asking whether the absence of the reasonable alternative design
led to the plaintiffs harm, courts proceeding under the consumer expectations test can ensure administrability by asking whether the plaintiffs
harm was of the kind envisioned when the factfinder deemed the product
design inconsistent with lay risk values.
2. Mixed Signals. - Given this Article's recommendation to employ
both the consumer expectations and risk-utility tests to establish design
defectiveness, one also might object that a manufacturer attempting to
comply with a finding of defectiveness under one test then could become
whipsawed if its redesigned product failed to pass muster under the other
test in subsequent litigation.3 56 For instance, in the air bag example described above, it was suggested that risk-utility analysis might impose liability on a manufacturer for selecting Design A, while the consumer ex35 7
pectations standard might impose liability for selecting Design B.
When analyzing an analogous situation in which juries could find multiple product designs defective under a loosely defined consumer expectations standard, the Reporters argue that "a manufacturer cannot rationally respond to [such a situation], short of removing its product from the
market."3 58
The apparent coerciveness of this conflicting judgments scenario might strike some readers as an inappropriately interventionist (or
even paternalistic) position for courts to adopt.
Several possibilities other than market withdrawal exist for the manufacturer, however. For instance, the manufacturer might respond to the
liability incentives of the consumer expectations test-missing in a pure
risk-utility regime-by fashioning a new Design C that attempts to limit
lives lost to ninety without disparate gender impacts. Or the manufac355. Leslie v. United States, 986 F. Supp. 900, 910 (D.N.J. 1997), affd, 178 F.3d 1279
(3d Cir. 1999).
356. Cf. Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 962 (3d Cir. 1980) (noting quandary
faced by product manufacturers when 'juries applying varying laws in different
jurisdictions" might reach inconsistent design defect determinations); James A.
Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Products Liability, 10 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 21, 23
(2000) ("The consumer expectation test allows conflicting answers to a question that
ought to have, at least in terms of the ideology of the law, one decent and sensible
answer.").

357. See supra text accompanying notes 282-283.
358. Henderson & Twerski, Politics, supra note 97, at 674.
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turer might attempt to segregate its market, such that Design B is marketed to male drivers, while Design A is targeted to females.3 59 Finally, if
either of those options proved infeasible, the manufacturer would not
necessarily remove its product from the market, but rather might continue to produce Design B while simply internalizing liability costs imposed under the consumer expectations test. If that were the case, the
defective design judgments levied against the manufacturer simply would
stand as an expressive indication of society's discomfort with certain
gendered side effects of its technological progress-and nothing more.
That is, the judgments would serve as a judicial legitimation of lay risk
values that neither compels manufacturer design standards nor constrains consumer choice.
In the related risk regulation context, Professor Moran has noted
that the psychological nuances embodied in public fear "can signal a
need for officials to engage in a dialogue with lay people about the
boundaries between protective legislation and paternalistic overreaching. '36 ° Unlike the regulatory system, which generally must rely on ex
ante prohibitions, however, a chief benefit of the products liability system
is that it is less heavy-handed in its effect, relying instead on ex post, incentive-based forms of liability.3 6 1 Manufacturers faced with liability
under the consumer expectations doctrine need not withdraw their products from the market, nor even alter their designs. The fear of "paternalistic overreaching" is accordingly diminished.
Relatedly, when addressing a manufacturer's con3. Warnings. ceivable responses to consumer expectations liability, the Reporters object that under a consumer expectations test, "[a]nything short of an
elaborate explanation of countervailing risks [by the product manufacturer] in its advertisements would lead to liability. '3 62 One initial response to this complaint is that it is not immediately clear why "elaborate
explanation" by manufacturers as to the harm posed by a product is undesirable. Arguably, such an outcome would lead to information overload, ultimately undercutting the force of other, more significant product
hazard warnings. - 6" But if the manufacturer's objective is actually to affect the content of consumer expectations (and thereby alter case outcomes under the consumer expectations test), then the manufacturer will
need to overcome such problems of information overload, along with all
other cognitive complications associated with risk communication. The
359. See Hanson & Kysar, TBSII, supra note 28, at 1561-64 (discussing product
manufacturers' ability to segment markets); Kysar, Kids & Cul-de-Sacs, supra note 236, at
887 (describing use of census data by product manufacturers and marketers to identify and
construct consumer subcategories).
360. Moran, supra note 347, at 27.
361. Cf. Hanson & Kysar, TBSII, supra note 28, at 1555-58 (comparing regulatory
and incentive-based systems in enterprise liability context).
362. Henderson & Twerski, Oregon, supra note 155, at 13.
363. See W. Kip Viscusi, Individual Rationality, Hazard Warnings, and the
Foundations of Tort Law, 48 Rutgers L. Rev. 625, 665-66 (1996).
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product manufacturer, operating under the discipline of market forces
and the consumer expectations test, seems the best-equipped party to un364
dertake such a task.
Moreover, it is not clear that product manufacturers actually would
engage in "elaborate explanation" of product risks as a result of the consumer expectations test, given that the amount of liability reduced
thereby may notjustify the expense of explanation. Consumers may not
be aware of, and therefore may not expect, a product risk that is quite
remote. In light of the remoteness of the risk, however, manufacturers
might be better off simply paying tort judgments under the consumer
expectations standard, rather than incurring the expense of an "elaborate explanation" or risking consumer overreaction to such an
3 65
explanation.
The point again is that product manufacturers are well situated to
undertake such a calculus. Decades of experience with sophisticated advertising and marketing practices have provided manufacturers with a
keen understanding of consumer perception, behavior,.and choice. 366 If
any party is capable of weighing the costs of consumer education against
product risks, that party would seem to be the manufacturers and marketers of products. Likewise, if any party is capable of devising information
campaigns that actually educate consumers and motivate risk-reducing
behaviors, that party would again seem to be manufacturers operating
under the incentives of a competitive marketplace and the newly invigo-

rated consumer expectations test.
4. The Future of Consumer Expectations. - This latter point creates a
final, and potentially quite serious, complication for the consumer expectations test, even in the more particularized form advocated by this Article. Any standard of manufacturer liability that hinges on the psychologi364. Cf. Davis, supra note 53, at 1270 ("If the [product] image is misunderstood and
the public is confused about what product quality means, product manufacturers should
be required to correct the image or to make a product that conforms with it."); Hanson &
Kysar, TBSII, supra note 28, at 1558-65 (discussing market incentives driving
manufacturers to warn in enterprise liability context). For instance, as noted supra text
accompanying notes 284-296, product manufacturers and marketers long have
demonstrated awareness that vivid, emotionally-driven advertising is more persuasive than
purely cognitive, information-based advertising. The consumer expectations standard
described in this Article therefore might prompt manufacturers to employ similar
sensitivity and sophistication in constructing their product warnings. Cf. Laurie Hendrickx
et al., Relative Importance of Scenario and Information and Frequency Information in the
judgment of Risk, 72 Acta Psychologica 41, 58-61 (1989) (finding that health and safety
warnings are more effective when linked to emotionally-driven features such as people or
anecdotes than when based on statistics).
365. For instance, in a recent essay, Professor Henderson notes that product
manufacturers might rationally refuse to warn about trivial or miniscule risks, even after
being subjected to failure-to-warn liability, by engaging in the following reasoning:
"[A]lmost all reasonable consumers would go ahead and use or consume the product, so
why warn and make things unpleasant?" Henderson, Echoes, supra note 27, at 989 n.160.

366. See Hanson & Kysar, TBSII, supra note 28, at 1428-1553.
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cal expectations of consumers must address a problem of potential
endogeneity; that is, to what extent are consumer expectations determined by product manufacturers or, indeed, by the liability system itself?.
The issue here is more narrowly focused than the general dialectical relationship between producers and consumers that attracts the attention of
consumer culture theorists. Likewise, it sweeps less broadly than the consumer susceptibility viewpoint, which regards manufacturers as having
nearly limitless influence over consumer beliefs and behaviors. The issue
here instead is a concern that by acknowledging the ability of product
manufacturers to address consumer risk perceptions in response to the
liability incentives of tort law, one also must admit that the very risk values
sought to be effectuated by the new consumer expectations doctrine are
vulnerable to long-term influence and, possibly, erasure at the hands of
product manufacturers.
More concretely, this Article has described two general categories of
cases in which the reinvigorated consumer expectations doctrine might
be particularly relevant: first, cases such as the "natural" tobacco advertisements, in which aspects of lay risk perception are specifically targeted
or manipulated by product manufacturers in a manner likely to confound consumer decisionmaking;- 67 and, second, cases such as the Black
Talon hollow-point bullet example, in which a product might be deemed
unreasonable according to risk values that are held by ordinary consumers, even if more technical modes of analysis failed to recognize the objectionable features of the product.- 68 The problem raised is that the existence of the former category of cases undermines one's confidence that
the latter category is fully stable and independent of risk-utility criteria.
That is, faced with liability for disappointing consumer expectations,
manufacturers might simply go to work chiseling away at the content of
those expectations, employing their demonstrated ability to influence
consumer risk perceptions in ways that encourage consumers to adopt
purely technocratic ways of evaluating product harms. Ultimately, then,
consumers might come to "expect" only the level of product safety that
would be merited by a more narrow and technical risk-utility analysis,
thereby rendering moot this Article's proposed use of consumer expectations doctrine to identify and effectuate important alternative lay risk
69
beliefs.
367. See supra notes 292-296 and accompanying text.
368. See supra notes 278-281 and accompanying text.
369. Many scholars seemingly would welcome such a development. For instance, one
notable psychologist has argued in favor of citizen education programs that would be
designed to break down apparent lay resistance to consequentialist thinking of the kind
employed in risk-utility analysis. See Baron, supra note 283, at 196-99. In a recent paper,
Sunstein introduces the possibility that such popular aversion to cost-benefit analysis does
not flow from a fully developed alternative form of moral reasoning such as deontology,
but rather is the result of a "crude but quite tenacious moral heuristic" that substitutes for
full-blown utilitarian analysis in light of individuals' limited cognitive capacities. Cass R.
Sunstein, Moral Heuristics 8 (Univ. of Chicago, John M. Olin Law & Economics Working
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Whatever its likelihood, such a prospect raises significant questions
concerning commercial speech and its role in a deliberative democracy,
as well as longstanding philosophical and jurisprudential struggles regarding the proper role of utilitarian and nonutilitarian approaches to
moral reasoning. Rather than enter such formidable, unyielding debates,
it is enough for present purposes simply to observe that the world of universal utilitarianism has not yet arrived.3 7 11 Until it does, products liability
law need not further the erosion of citizen risk values by giving effect only
to technical, sterilized expectations of safety. Rather, the common law of
products liability should reflect the culture within which it operates, and
it should do so by acknowledging lay risk values to the extent that, and so
71
long as, they exist.
CONCLUSION

Despite describing the risk-utility test as relying on "objective"
data,372 the Reporters of the Third Restatement fully acknowledge that
value judgments are unavoidable in design defect litigation. Indeed, the
Reporters argue that the risk-utility test is preferable to consumer expecPaper No. 180, Mar. 2003), available at http://ww.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/
index.htnl (on file with the Columbia Law Review). The implication of this argument
seems to be that, at least in certain circumstances, lay persons should surrender not merely
their scientific judgments to experts, but their moral judgments as well. Along those lines,
legal scholars recently have argued that punitive damages decisions should be removed
from the purview of the jury, given thatjurors tend to make such decisions based on moral
factors rather than according to the economic theory of optimal deterrence. See supra
note 166. Scholars even have suggested that policymakers following the rational dictates of
cost-benefit analysis should conceal the true bases of their decisions from the public so
that, "'whatever ordinary people think, the relevant administrators will seek to promote
optimal deterrence."' Hoffman & O'Shea, supra note 166, at 401 (quoting Sunstein et al.,
supra note 166, at 250). In sum, there appears to exist a serious academic movement to
remake lay individuals in the image of a risk-utility calculator and, in the event that such an
effort fails, to remove decisionmaking authority from individuals who are likely to employ
alternative modes of reasoning and evaluating. Manufacturers facing the prospect of
liability under a newly-invigorated consumer expectations standard might be expected to
join in such an effort.
370. See supra notes 166-170 and accompanying text (describing evidence of
nonutilitarian decisionmaking by individuals).
371. Cf. Shapo, Tort Law and Culture, supra note 16, at 284 (describing a "role of
courts as cultural agents-realigning the law with developments in the economy and with
the evolving attitudes of ordinary people"). As Professors Ackerman and Heinzerling
write, "[o]ne response [to the lay risk perception literature] is to try to 'educate people out
of these reactions by convincing them that their fears are unfounded; another response,
which we prefer, is to listen to their stories to see whether there is some sense in them."
Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: On Knowing the Price of Everything and
the Value of Nothing (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 6-6 to 6-12, on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
372. The Reporters write, "[t]he operative perspective in risk-utility analysis is the
objective one of achieving reasonable design safety from an overall, societal standpoint,
not the more subjective perspective of personal . . . psychological expectations."
Henderson & Twerski, Achieving Consensus, supra note 12, at 882-83.
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tations analysis precisely because it "deals more comfortably with the necessity of making cross-personal comparisons regarding consumer preferences" in design defect litigation. 373 In other words, risk-utility analysis is
believed to be superior because it provides a single, uniform rubric for
assessing product risks and benefits. The Reporters' argument, though,
favors outcome uniformity and predictability, not value neutrality. After
all, one must exercise normative judgment in defining the parameters of
the risk-utility rubric. Peel away the layers and one will find difficult value
choices at the core of any risk-utility or cost-benefit analysis. In the Third
Restatement, like the standard cost-benefit analysis of risk regulation, such
choices appear to express a preference for the technical expertise of engineers over the populist beliefs of consumers.
To their credit, the Reporters are forthcoming about this preference. In their view, the risk-utility test for design defect litigation is necessary to ensure thatjudges give "due respect to the importance of the very
'374
technology that brought sophisticated products to the marketplace.
That is, because it "rel[ies] on technology rather than intuition," the riskutility test "plays an important role in constraining design-based liability."3 7 5 Elsewhere, the Reporters argue against the consumer expectations test by noting that "[i] t is unrealistic to believe that one can surgically separate ordinary consumer expectations from the value preferences
of flesh-and-blood human beings. '3 76 Why would one want to ignore the
value preferences of flesh and blood human beings? Because, in the Reporters' view, "technology [i]s the cornerstone of rational products litigation, " 3 7 7 and lay juries operating under a consumer expectations stanthe nature of technology or
dard cannot be trusted to understand
3 78
appreciate its social significance.
The difficulty with this line of argument is that it ignores the variety
of ways in which consumer expectations capture important value judgments that are absent from risk-utility analysis. The Reporters complain
that "[t] he consumer expectations test is nothing more than a veiled attempt at turning all of design defect law into an intuitive, quasi-res ipsa373. Id. at 882; see also Henderson & Twerski, Europe, Japan, supra note 55, at 19
("The risk-utility standard . . . better deals with the necessity of making inter-personal
trade-offs than a consumer expectations test. The perspective from which one engages in
risk-utility analysis is the overall good of society ....
By contrast, the notion of
expectations' clings more stubbornly to a selfish, personal perspective.").
374. Henderson & Twerski, Intuition and Technology, supra note 318, at 681.
375. Id. at 661.
376. Henderson & Twerski, Achieving Consensus, supra note 12, at 881.
377. Henderson & Twerski, Intuition and Technology, supra note 318, at 688-89.
378. See Henderson & Twerski, Intuition and Technology, supra note 318, at 680 ("In
the teeth of technical expert testimony that a proffered alternative design would not have
avoided the plaintiffs injury, the jury is permitted to turn its head and reach the intuitionbased conclusion that the product failed consumer expectations .... "). The Reporters'
stance is consistent with the more general movement in law, observed by Sunstein, "toward
greater reliance on technical expertise" and away from "the unreliability of ordinary
intuitions." Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, supra note 282, at 765.
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like case .... ,,'"0 But intuition is not necessarily the ill-formed monster
that the Reporters take it to be. Rather, intuitions frequently can be seen
to represent the fairly well-behaved reactions of lay citizens to dimensions
of product risk that fail to appear in an expert's comparatively narrow
cost-benefit analysis. Thus, if the consumer expectations test were tied to
concrete, robust findings from psychologists such as Slovic, as this Article
argues it should be, then the test would come to represent, not a moment
of unbridled intuition on the part of juries, but an important vehicle for
capturing lay judgments about technology, risk, and social meaningjudgments that seem difficult to capture within risk-utility approaches to
the design defect question.
The Reporters speculate that "[p]erhaps the lure of [the consumer
expectations] doctrine is that it awakens in all of us nostalgia for a world
in which technology was not dominant."' 8 0 Their musing, however, presupposes the answer to one of the most significant questions facing products liability law today: whether and under what conditions the value
structure implied by risk-utility analysis should trump the value structure
inherent in the expectations of ordinary consumers. Is technology really
"dominant" or, instead, do consumers retain, and should products liability laws reflect, a contrary set of attitudes and beliefs about the proper
roles of technology and risk in an advanced society? This Article has argued that allowing design defect liability to rest on the frustrated expectations of consumers provides an avenue for judicial expression of legitimate public values that are not readily captured by risk-utility analysis.
Ours is "a world of incredible technological sophistication, ' 38 1 as the Reporters note, but it is not yet a world of technocratic domination.
379. Henderson & Twerski, Intuition and Technology, supra note 318, at 681.
380. Id. at 689; cf. Mary L. Lyndon, Technology and the Law: Articulating a Women's
Rights Perspective, 69 St. John's L. Rev. 191, 192 (1995) ("Two basic deterministic
assumptions have profoundly influenced the law's response to technology: (1) that the
pattern of technical process is preordained, and not the product of human choice; and (2)
that society must adapt its arrangements in response to technological developments.").
381. Henderson & Twerski, Intuition and Technology, supra note 318, at 689.
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